[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. June 1919.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(11262.)

F.O. 416/63

F.O.

416

PART V.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.

63

July to December 1915.

F.O. 416/

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	86	June 10, 1915	Gendarmerie and its Swedish officers. Suggests reasons for pro-German attitude of officers, and believes greater neutrality will be shown in future. Reviews their services, and recommends retention, at least till end of war. Informs of Russian views, and discusses question of financial assistance to gendarmerie at Fars. Transmits telegrams from His Majesty's representatives at Shiraz and Bushire ...	1
2	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1316 Tel.	July 1,	Financial assistance to Persia. To express to Minister for Foreign Affairs His Majesty's Government's hope that he will agree to join in proposed accommodation. Points out undesirability of delay (see Part IV, No. 163). Shows effect of proposed transaction on British and Indian exchequers	6
3	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	947 Tel.	4,	Swedish gendarmerie officers. Refers to Part IV, Nos. 153 and 158. Summarises *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government, which reviews their more correct attitude but deprecates placing too great confidence in present change. Russian Government nevertheless concur in instructions sent to His Majesty's Minister, Stockholm (see No. 4)	6
4	To Mr. Howard ... (Stockholm)	673 Tel.	5,	Swedish gendarmerie officers. Refers to No. 3. Instructions may now be acted on (see Part IV, No. 158)...	7
5	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	228 Tel.,	6,	Swedish gendarmerie officers. Refers to No. 3. Concurs in views of Russian Government. Suggests deferring communication of text	7
6	" " ...	232 Tel.	8,	German intrigues and attitude of Cabinet. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, in name of two legations, regarding rumour that Shah, under German influence, had intimated that Farman Farma should leave Cabinet. His Excellency informed that if Cabinet yielded, Governments must consider other measures to protect their interests. He was desired to inform Shah of this intention. Russian Minister has sent similar message. Minister for Foreign Affairs was also warned of His Majesty's Government's policy as to German intrigues in Afghanistan ...	7
7	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	173 Tel.	9	German and Turkish agitators in Afghanistan. Instructions issued to Government of India that troops shall not enter Persia pending orders. Emphasises necessity of taking all possible action to counter German agitation	8
8	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	240 Tel.	10,	German intrigues and Cabinet crisis. Refers to No. 6. Reports audience with Shah, in conjunction with Russian Minister, regarding. Considers situation in country and Afghanistan, and urges, Russian Minister concurring, that action be taken forthwith	8

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
9	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	176 Tel.	July 11, 1915	Germans in Afghanistan. To telegraph Viceroy when military intervention is necessary to prevent	8
10	" " ...	181 Tel.	12,	German intrigues in Afghanistan. Refers to No. 8. To inform Government of India of necessary action to prevent	8
11	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	244 Tel.	14,	Attack on Residency, Bushire. Senior Naval Officer reports. Apparently repulsed. Major Oliphant and Captain Ranking killed	9
12	" " ...	245 Tel.	13,	Germans in Afghanistan. Refers to No. 11. Considers despatch of preventive force is now justified, and submits that steady tribesmen be employed to attack emissaries	9
13	" " ...	247 Tel.	14,	Internal situation. Continued Cabinet crisis. Strength of pro-German party and attitude of Ain-ed-Dowleh. In view of situation, submits urgency of decisive action. Recommends increase to Russian force and British occupation of certain ports pending reparation for Bushire outrage (see No. 11) and arrest of German agents (see No. 16). Russian Minister concurs ...	9
14	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	189 Tel.	15,	Germans in Afghanistan. Refers to No. 12. Approves, and authorises necessary action in concert with Government of India ...	10
15	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	252 Tel.	16,	German parties near Tabas. Consul, Meshed, reports arrival, and urges that Persian Government be compelled to order Governor-General to employ Cossacks. Russian consul-general concurs	10
16	" " ...	253 Tel.	17,	Internal situation and question of reparation to His Majesty's Government. Refers to No. 13. (1) Reports audience with Shah regarding. Russian Minister held similar language. Points out Shah's unsatisfactory attitude, and possible continuation of Cabinet crisis. (2) Recommends presentation of certain demands by two Governments should sufficient military strength to enforce be available	10
17	India Office ...	...	19,	Relations with Allies. Refers to No. 13. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, who concurs in proposals except seizures of ports. His Excellency recommends British administration of Bushire and explanation to Persian Government of His Majesty's Government's intentions. Points out difficulties of situation in relation to Ameer	11
18	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	254 Tel.	18,	Relations with Allies. Refers to Government of India telegram. Discusses necessity for exhibition of strength, and risks of Persian abandonment of neutrality. Urges despatch of Russian troops in north and occupation of Bushire. Suggests joint action. Allied demands include specific measures against German emissaries	11
19	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1528 Tel.	21,	Military action at Meshed. Proposes to recruit force to keep peace and intercept German bands. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty's Government's intentions and guarantees, and to suggest that Allied representatives at Meshed might concert measures ...	13

No.	Name.		Date.	Subject.	Page
20	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	258 Tel.	July 23, 1915	Reinforcements for Kazvin. Considers collision between Allied troops and German bands inevitable. Requests to be informed of Russian reinforcements, and emphasises salutary effect of suggesting military measures	14
21	To Sir G. Buchanan.. (Petrograd)	1563 Tel.	24,	Reinforcements for Kazvin. Refers to No. 20. Hopes for satisfactory answer to	14
22	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	261 Tel.	26,	Relations with Allies. Considers measures contemplated in consequence of outrage inadequate, and urges immediate action and despatch of Russian troops. Russian Minister is making identic representations (see No. 13)	14
23	" " ...	264 Tel.		Financial situation. Deficit reported includes opium and excise revenues. Discusses conditions to be attached to moratorium ...	14
24	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1596 Tel.	27,	Financial situation. Refers to No. 22. Stipulation to moratorium is being favourably considered. To report intentions of Russian Government in regard to His Majesty's Government's proposal	15
25	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	97	7,	Unsatisfactory conduct of Ain-ed-Dowleh. Reports on. May be explained by insecurity of his political position. He has lately, however, displayed energy in restraining German intrigues	15
26	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1081 Tel.	31,	Financial situation. Refers to Nos. 23 and 24. Transmits *aide-mémoire* from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that Government is of opinion that instability of political situation makes advance undesirable at present	17
27	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	265 Tel. Very Conf.	Aug. 2,	Alleged outrages by Russian troops at Kain. Thinks exaggeration probable, but trusts Russian military authorities will repeat injunctions of Russian Minister as to good conduct	18
28	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1676 Tel.	3,	Proposed financial assistance. Refers to No. 26. Expresses hope that Russian Government will leave question to discretion of both representatives at Tehran, who consider proposed stipulation an ample safeguard. Refusal may encourage application to Germany	18
29	" " ...	1689 Tel.	3,	Alleged Russian outrage at Kain. Refers to No. 27. Unwilling to raise question officially, but emphasises importance of impressing privately on Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of issuing stringent instructions	18
30	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	267 Tel. Confidential	3,	Need for military action at Birjand. Consul desires services of ex-Indian soldiers, recruiting of whom was stopped at Meshed. Trusts Russian Government will agree, in view of attitude of Governor of Seistan (see Nos. 19, 32, and 38)	18
31	" " ...	268 Tel.	3,	German activity in Persia. Reports signs of, suggesting possible important design. Doubtful loyalty of Bakhtiari, and untrustworthiness of Sirdar Assad and Samsan-es-Sultaneh. Despatch of Russian troops imperative. Position of consuls at Shiraz and Ispahan is dangerous, but their withdrawal would be a sign of weakness...	19

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
32	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1707 Tel.	Aug. 5, 1915	Proposed military force for Birjand. Refers to No. 30. To make representations in desired sense (see No. 38)	20
33	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	270 Tel.	5,	German activity. Alleged agreement to overthrow Government between Bakhtiari and Kashgai, and its dangerous character under German guidance. Urges punitive expedition in addition to occupation of Bushire, and immediate despatch of Russian troops to Kazvin. Weakness of any Cabinet which Mustafi-el-Mamelek may be able to form	20
34	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1715 Tel.	6,	Russian reinforcements. Refers to No. 31. Hopes Minister for Foreign Affairs will realise urgent necessity for (see Nos. 34 and 41)	20
35	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	217 Tel.	6,	German activity. Refers to No. 31. Agrees that withdrawal of consular officers is undesirable	21
36	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1130 Tel.	9,	Russian reinforcements. Refers to No. 34. Viceroy of Caucasus has refused troops for Persia, but Minister for Foreign Affairs will make further effort to obtain them. His Excellency alluded to question of recall of ex-Shah, but possibly was not serious	21
37	" " ...	1135 Tel.	10,	Proposed financial assistance. Refers to No. 28. Russian Government consider moment inopportune for reasons stated in No. 26. They share His Majesty's Government's views on principle that matter should be left to discretion of Allied representatives	21
38	" " ...	1136 Tel.	10,	Proposed force for Birjand. Refers to Nos. 30 and 32. Russian Government agrees to recruiting by His Majesty's Government. They are aware of dangers of situation, and their previous objections to action proposed at Meshed was due to belief that Russian force was sufficient	21
39	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	274 Tel.	10,	Possibility of recall of ex-Shah. Refers to No. 36. Does not think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was serious in suggesting, in view of previous failure	22
40	" " ...	275 Tel.	10,	Swedish gendarmerie at Fars. Doubts wisdom of maintaining, in view of reports from His Majesty's consul, Shiraz, regarding their hostile attitude. Presumes His Majesty's Government will no longer accord subvention, which Swedes are now unwilling to accept	22
41	" " ...	276 Tel.	10,	Attitude towards Allies. Russian Minister reports troops cannot be sent to Kasvin. Discusses situation and suggests two alternative policies. Advises employment of money intended for gendarmerie subvention to secure Bakhtiari (see No. 40). Latter may demand withdrawal of Ispahan from Russian sphere. Requests instructions (see No. 42)	22
42	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	223 Tel.	11,	Attitude towards Allies. Refers to No. 41. To proceed on lines proposed, but to avoid discussion regarding removal of Ispahan from Russian sphere	23

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
43	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	224 Tel.	Aug. 11, 1915	Swedish gendarmerie at Fars. Refers to No. 40. Concurs in withdrawal of offer of subvention	23
44	Mr. Howard ... (Stockholm)	974 Tel.	11,	Swedish gendarmerie at Fars. Informs of withdrawal of subvention. Not to approach Swedish Government unless they enquire (see No. 43)	24
45	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	282 Tel. Very Conf.	15,	Negotiations with Bakhtiari. Proposes to send Mr. Bristow to Ispahan to carry out. Requests instructions as to sum available. Russia may possibly contribute, but her promises may not be realised	24
46	" " ...	234 Tel.	19,	Negotiations with Bakhtiari. Refers to No. 45. Approves action, and has placed required sum to his credit. Undesirable to invite Russian contribution	24
47	" " ...	288 Tel.	19,	Internal situation. Refers to No. 41. Gives details of Cabinet formed, by Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik. German activity. Conduct of German consul at Kermanshah. Critical situation at Shiraz. Attitude of Bakhtiari to Ispahan agitation	24
48	" " ...	291 Tel.	21,	Serious nature of panic at Urumia. Consul at Tabriz reports. Action of Russian military authorities	25
49	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1204 Tel.	22,	Germans in Afghanistan. Russian consul at Seistan informs of passage of small band, including Turks and Germans. Information came too late for Cossacks to prevent	25
50	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	296 Tel.	26,	Swedish gendarmerie. Reports their anti-neutral attitude, and suggests warning by Swedish Government or message to press	25
51	" " ...	297 Tel.	26,	Internal situation. Reports on position at Shiraz, Ispahan, and Tabriz. Inactivity of new Cabinet in face of German intrigues. Success of negotiations with Bakhtiari, whose arrival at Tehran should alleviate situation. Cabinet's attitude towards prospect of their assistance and that of Russian Cossacks. Allied policy towards Cabinet	26
52	" " ...	298 Tel.	28,	Serious British position. Reports insincerity of Government, who are endeavouring to use crisis at Shiraz and Bakhtiari negotiations to secure evacuation of Bushire. Khans desirous of money. Has instructed His Majesty's consul to prepare to leave Shiraz	26
53	" " ...	301 Tel.	29,	Sowars for Ispahan and Tehran. Refers to No. 55. Reports conversation with Prime Minister, who approved arrangements with Bakhtiari for, but deprecated His Majesty's Government's present proposals for assistance in bearing expenses incurred ...	27
54	Lieutenant - Colonel Sir P. Cox (Basra)	Telegraphic	29,	Situation at Shiraz. Refers to No. 52. Deprecates departure of consul and British colony, and suggests that Governor-General should be warned of his responsibility. Friendly attitude of Kawam	27
55	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	300 Tel.	29,	Occupation of Bushire. Reports Prime Minister's agreement in principle to His Majesty's Government's proposals. Discusses his proposals for reparation, including removal of Governor-General of Fars, and suggests modifications (see also No. 53)	27

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
56	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	302 Tel.	Aug. 29, 1915	Attitude of Government and Bakhtiari. Refers to Nos. 52 and 53. Reports unsatisfactory impression confirmed by difficulties with Bakhtiari regarding sowars, and by situation at Bushire. Position at Shiraz improved, but presence of Governor-General is dangerous	28
57	" " ...	303 Tel.	29,	German activity. Refers to No. 51. Concurs in pessimistic views of Russian Minister regarding German mastery in certain important towns. They appear desirous of creating condition of insecurity which will force Allied representatives to withdraw	28
58	" " ...	306 Tel.	30,	Irritation regarding Bushire. Refers to No. 57. Points out that removal of Persian flag has assisted Germans in estranging tribesmen, and may create difficult situation for Kawam and Soulet. Recommends assurance that it will be replaced on expulsion of Governor-General	28
59	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	240 Tel.	30,	Action of His Majesty's Minister in regard to Cabinet and Bakhtiari. Refers to No. 51. Approves	29
60	" " ...	242 Tel.	30,	Situation at Shiraz. Refers to Nos. 52 and 56. Considers it advisable that consul and colony should remain, and authorises His Majesty's Minister to inform Government that Governor-General and Minister of Interior will be held responsible for their safety	29
61	" " ...	244 Tel.	31,	British demands. Refers to Nos. 53, 55, 56, and 57. To use his discretion to obtain satisfactory terms for evacuation of Bushire. Suggests desiderata	29
62	" " ...	246 Tel.	31,	Situation at Bushire. Informs of views of Persian Minister, which concur with those expressed in No. 58. Consul, Shiraz, may give suggested assurance regarding flag ...	29
63	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1276 Tel.	Sept. 1,	Occupation of Bushire. Refers to No. 61. Minister for Foreign Affairs deprecates evacuation, which would leave Allies without guarantee against ultimate return of German emissaries	30
64	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	310 Tel.	1,	British demands. Refers to No. 61. Discusses Sir E. Grey's suggestions, and proposes to insist on conditions specified in No. 55	30
65	" " ...	312 Tel.	1,	Attack on consul-general, Ispahan. Reports	30
66	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	1995 Tel.	2,	British intentions at Bushire. Refers to No. 63. Informs of conditions under which it is proposed to allow Persian flag to be rehoisted, and of conditions for evacuation	31
67	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	313 Tel.	2,	Intentions of Persian Government. Refers to No. 61. Reports interview with Prime Minister regarding conditions for evacuation of Bushire. His Excellency was warned of serious consequences of inactivity in face of present unsatisfactory situation at Ispahan and elsewhere, but would give no reply pending consultation with colleagues	31

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
68	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	314 Tel.	Sept. 3, 1915	Attack on consul-general, Ispahan. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed regret. His Excellency was warned of consequences of inactivity, and informed that His Majesty's Government could not recede from proposal already made respecting Bushire. He again requested financial assistance ...	31
69	" " ...	315 Tel.	3,	Serious situation at Ispahan. Refers to No. 67. Germans are fomenting. Advocates departure of consuls and colonies in view of Government's inability to act. Discusses effect on Shiraz, where Government have promised removal of Governor-General	32
70	" " ...	316 Tel.	4,	Critical position owing to German intrigues. Shah appears to be under German influence. Discusses measures to be adopted by Allies, and recommends presentation of specific terms to Government. Reviews dangers of German action which would follow a favourable reply, and British policy in the alternative	32
71	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	255 Tel.	5,	Situation at Ispahan. Refers to No. 69. Deprecates withdrawal, but authorises removal of colony, if necessary, at His Majesty's Minister's discretion. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of intention, and to assure him that His Majesty's Government will hold him responsible for safety of British subjects	33
72	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	318 Tel.	6,	Situation at Ispahan. Refers to No. 70. Reports unsatisfactory attitude of Prime Minister towards. Thinks withdrawal of consul and colony is imperative, and may have good effect in arresting German designs. Has authorised consul-general to leave if necessary	33
73	" " ...	319 Tel.	6,	Situation at Ispahan. Learns, through commander of gendarmerie, of plot to assassinate Mr. Bristowe, consuls, and bank managers, and of agitation to drive out British and Russians. Has written Prime Minister, holding him responsible ...	34
74	" " ...	320 Tel.	6,	Situation at Ispahan. Has told Prime Minister he will be held personally responsible	34
75	" " ...	321 Tel.	7,	Policy of His Majesty's Government. Deprecates Government of India's suggested policy of drift. Suggests and discusses alternative proposals, and advises, as last chance, immediate supply of desired money and arms	34
76	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	260 Tel.	7,	Situation at Ispahan. Refers to Nos. 72, 73, and 74. Approves instructions to consul-general reported in No. 70 pending decision of Cabinet regarding policy towards Persian Government	35
77	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	326 Tel.	8,	Critical situation at Hamadan. Reports measures of German consular agents to drive out British and Russians	35
78	" " ...	328 Tel.	8,	Occupation of Bushire. Transmits details of agreement reached with Prime Minister regarding His Majesty's Government's demands. Requests that necessary instructions may be sent to military authorities. Considers Government's surrender largely due to Russian landing at Enzeli (see No. 75)	36

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
79	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	261 Tel.	Sept. 9, 1915	Occupation of Bushire. Refers to No. 78. Approves. India Office is instructing military authorities	36
80	" " ...	262 Tel.	9,	Policy of His Majesty's Government. Refers to No. 70. Cannot approve presentation of drastic demands proposed, but authorises His Majesty's Minister strongly to deprecate Government's attitude, and promise financial assistance in event of satisfactory reply. In alternative, to represent to Prime Minister consequence of withdrawing legations...	36
81	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	330 Tel.	9,	Arrival of Russian troops. Refers to No. 78. Reports landing at Enzeli in considerable numbers. They may be sent to Ispahan	37
82	" " ...	332 Tel.	11,	Russian troops. Refers to No. 81. Asks for information regarding accuracy of report that a considerable force is expected. Its effect on Germans	37
83	" " ...	333 Tel.	11,	Policy of His Majesty's Government. Refers to No. 80. Suggests modification of financial offers, and urges that any saving effected on contemplated expenditure should be used for secret service work ...	37
84	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1339 Tel.	12,	Russian troops for Tehran. Refers to No. 82. Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot promise any considerable number	38
85	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	335 Tel.	12,	Situation at Hamadan. Menace of German consul. Weakness of Prime Minister in face of pro-German intrigues of Under-Secretary to Minister of Interior ...	38
86	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2112 Tel.	14,	Russian troops. Refers to No. 84. Trusts Russian Government may be able to increase numbers slightly to maintain good effect produced by their arrival... ...	38
87	" " ...	2115 Tel.	14,	Situation at Hamadan. Refers to No. 85. To request Russian co-operation in making certain members of Government personally responsible for safety of consulate ...	38
88	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	340 Tel.	15,	Financial assistance. Reports interview with Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose attitude had changed. Discusses their request for money and arms, and urges financial assistance. Russian Minister is making identic representations. Refers to No. 83 for minimum offer desirable, and points out its probable results ...	38
89	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2136 Tel.	16,	Financial assistance. Refers to No. 88. Suggests arrangement between Russian Government and His Majesty's Government regarding moratorium. Is authorising Mr. Marling to give suggested subvention	39
90	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	277 Tel.	16,	Financial assistance. Refers to No. 89. To act as suggested in regard to subvention at his discretion	39

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
91	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	341 Tel.	Sept. 18, 1915	Conditions for financial assistance. Has pointed out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government's demands regarding gendarmerie must be met before financial assistance is granted. Reports satisfactory attitude of his Excellency, and possibility of inducing him to dismiss most pro-German gendarmerie officers. Gives further information regarding sum desired	40
92	" " ...	347 Tel.	18,	British and Russian protection for Soulet. Soulet promises activity in Allied interests in return for. Discusses request, and asks for instructions. Russian Government's attitude	40
93	" " ...	348 Tel.	19,	Financial assistance. Will inform Government at suitable moment of grant of monthly subvention. Reports views of Imperial Bank on "retroactive" question. Have necessary arrangements for subvention been made in London?	40
94	" " ...	350 Tel.	20,	Protection of Soulet. Refers to No. 92. Consul at Shiraz considers this step only means of allaying critical situation in Southern Persia caused by German intrigues. Recommends cautiously-worded letter of protection	41
94*	" " ...	352 Tel.	20,	Zil-es-Sultan. Considers his return would probably be advantageous	41*
95	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	283 Tel.	21,	Protection of Soulet. Refers to Nos. 92 and 94, and Part IV, No. 147. Refers to Government of India's objections to commitment of His Majesty's Government, but, in view of urgency of situation and Russian attitude, authorises His Majesty's Minister to draft letter in proposed sense for Sir E. Grey's approval	41
96	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	357 Tel.	21,	Protection of Soulet. Transmits telegram from consul, Shiraz, who concurs generally in Government of India's views (Part IV, No. 147), but points out that their objections do not apply to relations with important ilkhanis. He considers agreement with Soulet and Kawam would improve situation in Fars, though involving His Majesty's Government in certain obligations, and also in difficulties with Persian Government	41
97	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	285 Tel	22,	Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 94*. Discusses question of his return, and enquires views. Proposes to renew guarantees, but they must be regarded as limited by extent of Allies' power to protect him	42
98	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	358 Tel.	23,	Proposal for compact with Bakhtiari. Discusses unfavourably views of Sir P. Cox. Doubts whether present time is suitable for negotiations. General attitude of Bakhtiari towards British. Prefers policy of giving financial assistance as required...	42
99	" " ...	359 Tel.	23,	Protection of Soulet. Refers to No. 95. Transmits text of draft letter for approval	43
99*	" " ...	360 Tel.	23,	Return of Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 97. Considers it advisable in circumstances ...	43*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
100	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2213 Tel.	Sept. 25, 1915	Zil-es-Sultan. Transmits text of proposed note, renewing guarantees and advising his return if invited by Allied representatives at Tehran. Suggests Russian Ambassador should be authorised to address similar note, and that, in view of No. 99*, invitation might be issued by representatives at Tehran at their discretion ...	44
101	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	363 Tel.	25,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 90. Reports, for approval, proposed arrangements for (see No. 102). They have been drawn up in accordance with Russian views regarding retro-active loans. Russian Government desires transaction to be considered as an advance, and to be carried out through Imperial Bank. Proposes to attach to communication covering note emphasising reciprocal measures expected from Government	44
102	" " ...	364 Tel.	25,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 101. Transmits text of proposed communication ...	45
103	" " ...	366 Tel.	27,	Protection of Soulet. Enquires whether draft letter submitted (see No. 99) is approved, in view of his expected arrival in Shiraz	45
104	" " ...	110	Aug. 30,	Weakness of gendarmerie and German activity at Kermanshah. Reports prestige of gendarmerie weakened by two defeats by tribesmen. Reviews events in abortive attempt of Allied consuls at Kermanshah to return to their consulates from Hamadan. Approves Russian Minister's reconsideration of his intention of supplying force of Russian Cossacks, in view of Captain Sonesson's refusal to supply gendarmerie escort. Importance of Kermanshah to Germans. Feeling in Tehran. Probable movements of Cossack brigade	45
105	" " ...	111	Sept. 1,	Internal situation. Discusses reasons for Ain-ed-Dowleh's resignation and character of Cabinet formed by Mustofi-ul-Mamalek. Reports details of serious German activity in July, and reasons for weak efforts finally made by Government to suppress them. Has been surprised by anxiety of Indian Government regarding Afghanistan in view of their previous silence ...	47
106	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	290 Tel.	28,	Moratorium. Refers to Nos. 101 and 102. Approves proposed arrangement, and is consulting Treasury regarding retro-active effect. To consult Tehran manager of Imperial Bank regarding details for carrying out transaction	49
107	" " ...	292 Tel.	28,	Protection of Soulet. Refers to No. 97. Approves draft, with slight alteration. Consul to communicate it at once	50
108	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	369 Tel.	29,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 106. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs desires communication delayed pending assent of Russian Minister of Finance. Both representatives think immediate action necessary	50
109	" " ...	372 Tel.	30,	Movements of ex-Governor of Shiraz and re-hoisting of Persian flag at Bushire. (a) Reports his departure from Tehran; (b) reviews situation and recommends authorisation for	50

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No.	Name	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
109*	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	373 Tel. Secret	Sept. 30, 1915	German position in Persia. Importance of road to Bagdad viâ Kermanshah. Russians should hold Kazvin and Kermanshah until we reach Bagdad. Kermanshah virtually in possession of the Germans	50A
110	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	299 Tel.	Oct. 1,	Reboisting of Persian flag at Bushire. Refers to No. 109. Authorises, provided retention of troops (see No. 78) is not affected, and administration is not handed back before conditions are fulfilled	50
111	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	374 Tel.	1,	German activity at Kermanshah. Reports passage of arms to Ispahan viâ Kermanshah, and surreptitious arrival of Turkish troops, which possibly indicates attempt on Afghanistan	51
112	" " ...	375 Tel.	2,	Moratorium. Trusts Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will authorise Minister to sign communication without inserting conditions	51
113	" " ...	376 Tel.	2,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 102. Gives details for execution of	51
113*	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2283 Tel.	2,	German position in Persia. Refers to No. 109*. To communicate the suggestion, when possible, to the Grand Duke for his consideration	50B
114	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	377 Tel.	3,	Reboisting of Persian flag at Bushire. Refers to No. 110. Retention of troops not affected by proposal for. Presumes Sir E. Grey does not intend to rescind present arrangement regarding handing back of administration	51
115	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2292 Tel.	3,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 112. Emphasises desirability of concluding it at once. Trusts Minister for Foreign Affairs will send instructions for immediate signature without insertion of new conditions ...	52
116	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	305 Tel.	4,	Intentions of His Majesty's Government at Bushire. Refers to No. 114. Present arrangements not to be rescinded ...	52
117	" " ...	306 Tel.	5,	Proposed compact with Bakhtiari. Refers to No. 98. Favours negotiations advocated by Sir P. Cox, and authorises His Majesty's Minister to initiate them if possible. Reviews total of possible commitments, which do not include Governorship of Ispahan, as town is not likely to be transferred from Russian sphere ...	52
118	" " ...	308 Tel.	6,	Properties of Zil-es-Sultan. Refers to No. 100. Prince Bahram disappointed that assurance does not mention them. Enquires views of His Majesty's Minister as to renewal of guarantees and attitude of Persian Government	53
119	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	386 Tel.	7,	Proposed compact with Bakhtiari. Refers to No. 117. Comments unfavourably on Sir P. Cox's views regarding His Majesty's Government's requirements and commitments, with special regard to question of Ispahan. Advises use of secret service inducements in lieu of negotiations ...	53
120	" " ...	392 Tel.	12,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 115. Has deprecated, to Russian Minister, Russian Government's amendment to communication (see No. 102), and gives text, which Russian Minister has now presented. Enquires whether moratorium takes effect from 8th January	54

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
121	To Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	2384 Tel.	Oct. 13, 1915	Moratorium. Refers to No. 120. To represent to Russian Government necessity of enabling their representative at Tehran to act in complete accord with Mr. Marling. Presumes Russian Government will shortly inform him officially of their willingness to bear half cost	54
122	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	316 Tel.	13,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 120. To make it retroactive if necessary, though date is at present fixed at 8th March. Views of Treasury	54
123	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	393 Tel.	15,	German intrigues. Reports threatening activity probably due to Allied movements in Caucasus and Mesopotamia, and thinks great effort imminent, probably beginning with attack on Hamadan. Discusses proposal of Russian Minister to detach troops from Kazvin, and enquires as to Russian reinforcements. B haviour of Swedish gendarmerie commandant points to intention to provoke outbreak in Tehran ...	55
124	" " ...	394 Tel.	15,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 102. Suggests omission of portion of communication objected to by Persian Government in order to support Cabinet unreservedly ...	55
125	To Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	2408 Tel. Secret	16,	Russian reinforcements. Refers to No. 123. Urges their despatch in view of fact that time will be required for His Majesty's Government's efforts in neighbourhood of Bagdad to influence situation	56
126	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	319 Tel. Secret	16,	German intrigues. Refers to No. 123. Action by His Majesty's Government not immediately possible. To use any practical financial inducements to counteract them...	56
127	" " ...	320 Tel.	16	Moratorium. Refers to No. 124. Persian Minister has made similar representations. Approves suggested omission. Presumes Russian Minister at Tehran will obtain his Government's consent direct	56
128	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	396 Tel. Secret	18,	German influence in Afghanistan. Learns that, while Ameer is loyal, certain of his relations are working in German interest...	56
129	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1531 Tel.	20,	Russian reinforcements. Refers to Nos. 123 and 125. Russia will send troops to Kazvin, but cannot spare Cossacks for Hamadan, and Government therefore consider consuls should leave (see No. 131) ...	56
130	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	402 Tel.	21,	Equivocal attitude of Persian Government. Discusses influence of forces hostile to Allies, displayed in procrastination over moratorium. Feels some anxiety regarding projected formation of national army, and mentions arrival of Turkish officers alleged to be intended to officer it. Thinks it possible Prime Minister may be forced to join Germanic alliance, or Germans may promote outbreak as suggested in No. 123 (see Nos. 132 and 135)	57
131	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	323 Tel.	22,	Withdrawal of consuls from Hamadan. Refers to No. 129. Leaves question to His Majesty's Minister's discretion, but trusts they will remain unless he considers withdrawal imperative	57

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
132	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2466 Tel.	Oct. 24, 1915	Necessity for Allied military action. Refers to No. 130. Urges Russian reinforcements for Northern Persia to act simultaneously with immediate British advance on Bagdad	58
133	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1572 Tel.	25,	Russian reinforcements. Refers to No. 132. Minister for Foreign Affairs will make every effort for. He believes troops have already been sent to Kazvin	58
134	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	408 Tel.	25,	Dangerous situation at Shiraz. Transmits telegram from consul, giving details of. Does not entirely concur that withdrawal is imperative, and thinks consul may overestimate weakness of Kawam and Soulet. Cannot agree that sufficient advantages would be gained to counter-balance disastrous effects, unless Indian military authorities can undertake expedition inland (see No. 137)	58
135	" " ...	409 Tel.	25,	Suspected treachery of Government. Prime Minister demands larger financial assistance. He admits that Turkish officers may be taken into service (see No. 130). Minister for Foreign Affairs is possibly assisting Austrian escaped prisoners (see No. 136)	59
136	" " ...	410 Tel.	26,	Suspected treachery of Government. Refers to No. 135. Prime Minister's explanations of his financial demands and inactivity in face of German intrigues are inadequate. Possibility of understanding between Cabinet and Germans. Has instructed Imperial Bank to refuse money to Government at present. Russians at Enzeli ...	59
137	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	335 Tel.	27,	Situation at Shiraz. Refers to No. 134. Deprecates suggested withdrawal, which is only to take place in last necessity ...	60
138	" " ...	336 Tel.	27,	British representations to Persia. Possible existence of agreement between Persia and Germany. To intimate to Persian Government that His Majesty's Government will hold them responsible for any rupture of friendly relations unless immediate reparation is made for recent outrages	61
139	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1596 Tel.	28,	Russian representations to Persia. Minister for Foreign Affairs has represented to Persian Minister serious effects of relations with Germans, and requested internment of escaped Austrians—created gendarmerie officers at Hamadan	61
140	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	419 Tel.	29,	Russian reinforcements. Reports arrival at Enzeli (see No. 144)	61
141	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	341 Tel.	29,	Policy of His Majesty's Government. To emphasise representations already made (see No. 138), pointing out that an agreement with Germany would justify any steps on part of His Majesty's Government. Presumes, in view of No. 140, that withdrawal from Tehran is unnecessary	61
142	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1600 Tel.	29,	Russian views on situation. Minister for Foreign Affairs is opposed to presentation of ultimatum or rupture of relations, but proposes to publish warning given to Persian Minister (see No. 139)	62

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
143	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1607 Tel.	Oct. 30, 1915	Russian views. Refers to No. 141. Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs in instructions sent to Mr. Marling, but hopes His Majesty's Government will supplement them by warning to Persian Minister in sense of that in No. 139	62
144	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	422 Tel.	30,	Position of Allies. Russian Minister doubts signature of convention with Germany. He believes troops have not yet landed, but General Staff have arrived (see No. 140)	62
145	" " ...	426 Tel.	30,	Attitude of Government. Has acted on instructions in No. 138. Minister for Foreign Affairs denies existence of convention with Germany, but admitted helplessness of Government. He enquired whether money could be drawn at once under moratorium (see No. 146) ...	62
146	" " ...	428 Tel.	31,	Allied policy. Russian Government has threatened to ignore convention of 1907 if Persia concludes understanding with Germany. Proposes, with concurrence of Russian Minister, to advance money under moratorium at once if promised reply to Allied communication is satisfactory (see No. 145). Russian Minister's views regarding troops at Kazvin. Rumours of intended attack on legations	63
147	" " ...	438 Tel.	Nov. 7,	Moratorium. Government has begun to draw money...	63
148	" " ...	471 Tel.	21,	Outbreak against British at Shiraz. Reports details received from Kawam through resident at Bushire. Satisfactory attitude of Persian Government, who have taken steps to allay rumours. Has addressed strong note to them. Requests instructions regarding further protest. Recommends that dismissal of chief of gendarmerie and Swedish officer at Shiraz be demanded	63
149	" " ...	130	Oct. 21,	Moratorium. Refers to No. 120. Transmits text of communications made by Russian Minister and himself. Discusses reasons and effects of Russian Government's objections to original wording, and Persian Government's demands for further omission (see No. 124). Note was finally presented with modifications approved in No. 127. Delay in presentation has operated in German interest	64
150	" " ...	486 Tel.	26,	Unfavourable developments in situation. Gendarmerie and others in German pay at Hamadan. Threat to property of Farman Farma, who has inquired if Allied Governments will indemnify him. Necessity for Russian success at Hamadan to restore confidence of Cabinet, from whom nothing can be expected at present	68
151	To Sir G. Buchanan... (Petrograd)	2839 Tel.	28,	Policy of Allies. Refers to No. 150. Emphasises necessity for Russian victory at Hamadan. Not advisable actually to occupy Tehran. Is asking for further details regarding Farman Farma's property	68
152	To Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	419 Tel.	28,	Farman Farma's property. Refers to No. 151. To send estimate of amount involved ...	68

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
153	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	132	Nov. 4, 1915	Moratorium. Refers to No. 149. Encloses Government's reply to His Majesty's Government's note (see No. 102)	69
154	" " ...	133	4,	British representations to Persia. Refers to No. 141. Transmits copy of note to Government, pointing out course which His Majesty's Government will adopt if Persia has entered into an agreement with Germany	69
155	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Petrograd)	1856 Tel.	Dec. 11,	Suggested alliance. Minister for Foreign Affairs considers neutrality sufficient. Alliance not worth price which would be demanded	70
156	Mr. Marling ... (Tehran)	524 Tel.	12,	Suggested alliance. President of Council considers it impossible at present, but will submit to colleagues proposal for benevolent neutrality in return for certain concessions. Little can be expected from this	70

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. February 1916.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia and Central Asia.

Part V.

[87732]

No. 1.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 86.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 10, 1915.

THERE can be little doubt that one of the factors that have enabled the German propaganda in Persia to gain so strong a hold on popular sentiment has been the attitude of the Swedish gendarmerie officers, and yet I am nearly convinced from the conversations I have had with some of them that they have been until recently quite unaware of the responsibility they must bear for the present state of affairs in Persia.

Taking all the circumstances of the case attending the position of the Swedes into account, it seems to me that this result was almost inevitable. On their arrival they soon saw, and indeed it must have been impressed upon them, that if their task was to be successfully carried on they must make their own personality felt, or, in other words, disregard in a very large measure the orders they might receive from the Persian authorities, and the result has been the creation of a disciplined force scattered over the most important trade routes and centres of Persia, practically independent of the Persian Government, and at the sole orders of the Swedes. They have received the financial support of ourselves and the Russians, and have learnt to spend lavishly, and when our subventions failed have on one or two occasions forcibly appropriated Government funds destined for other purposes. They have thus acquired an immense prestige in the eyes of the natives.

When the war broke out the Swedes had a bond of sympathy with the Persians in their dislike of Russia, and very naturally expressed their confidence, or at least their hope, that Russia would be defeated by the vast military power of Germany, and so the ground was prepared for the seed of the Turco-German propaganda. The Swedes also were very industriously cultivated by the German Legation, and when the German agents, who now overrun so large a part of Persia, arrived, what more natural than that the Swedes should give assistance to their friends' friends by facilitating their journeys, providing escorts, &c. Escorts, it must be remembered, are provided in dangerous districts by the gendarmerie to any European who may demand it, and with their wish to be friendly, the Swedes without doubt have been sometimes, but not, I concede, by any means always, very useful auxiliaries to the German agents. In the case of Prince Reuss XXXI. and M. Logotheti, their good offices converted their Excellencies journey in a sort of royal progress, but in the circumstances, it was hard for them as neutrals to refuse every assistance to foreign diplomats, and Major de Maré, who had travelled all the way from Constantinople with the Austrian and German representatives, realising that it behoved him not to be too closely identified with them, left his companions at Bagdad so as to save appearances. The result was not what he had intended; for he was looked upon as a sort of courier sent to make arrangements for the reception of the German and Austrian representatives—which he undoubtedly did. Still there does not seem to be anything in what they did to which serious exception could be taken, had the circumstances been normal, but the Swedes are still

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

very young in Persian experience and their lack of capacity to understand the effect which their intimacy with the Germans and Turks and their incautious language about the war would produce on the native mind has only too often led them into indiscretions of word and deed.

Wassmuss has been particularly successful in making use of them. He has very considerable influence with the Germanophile Governor of Shiraz, and there can be no doubt that he has employed it to induce Mukhbir-us-Sultaneh to call on the gendarmerie to take action against the local Khans in whose welfare we are interested. Then when an expedition of this kind was decided on, what more natural than that Consul Wassmuss, finding the business—commercial, of course—takes him in the same direction, should accompany his Swedish friend. This is the way in which the Swedes represent their action, and it is a plausible enough defence.

But I fear that it is beyond question that in the south the Swedes have too often been actuated by a feeling of pique against ourselves in their complacance towards their German friends. Again, this feeling seems to me to have had its origin in quite natural causes. As I have already said, the Swedes very soon learnt to think they had no masters, and when they were invited by ourselves to carry out their work in the southern provinces, it was not long before His Majesty's consular officers in these regions found their activities being exerted in directions not always compatible with our interests. Our interests were, of course, bound up primarily in the maintenance of order, but it will readily be understood that the Swedes, few of whom know Persian, having to depend for local knowledge on their Persian officers, were often led to wrong conclusions and brought into conflict with the policy of His Majesty's consuls. After the outbreak of war this divergence of views developed, from causes I have already endeavoured to describe in the earlier part of this despatch, into positive antagonism, which, while it has been quite perceptible on the part of the Swedes themselves, has shown itself most markedly in the conduct of the Persian officers. Several incidents, and one in particular at Bushire, have shown how widespread is this anti-British feeling among the latter, and in some cases the Swedes have shown unmistakable inclination to attach credence to their native officers' reports rather than to ours, and even to back up their action.

There have also been other causes contributory to the unsatisfactory attitude of the Swedes, such as the blame attached to them over the Kazeroun affair and the accusation published in the British press on official authority of their having connived at the smuggling of arms in German interests. There can be no doubt that, as regards the first, the Swedish officers' behaviour was most discreditable, but in the second incident I am quite convinced that a hasty conclusion was formed from imperfectly known facts, and the Swedes were quite guiltless of the charge. At all events the arms in question are now in Tehran in the possession of the gendarmerie.

Of late, however, the Swedes have appeared to realise that they have, as regards their relations with the Germans, been extremely indiscreet to say the least of it, and they are likely to be much more careful in the future to preserve themselves even from an appearance of partiality. Nevertheless it is to be anticipated that the attitude of the Swedish officers towards us will continue. It is not likely to exhibit itself in so marked a degree or with so unfortunate results as during the war, but even after peace is concluded I feel convinced that their disposition not to recognise the predominance of our interests and influence in southern Persia will still continue. The question thus arises, what is to be our attitude towards these officers. I have not, of course, forgotten that His Majesty's Government and that of Russia decided three months ago that they must be removed from Persia, but of late M. de Etter and I have thought it wiser not to press the question for the reason that, thanks to the anti-Russian attitude of the Swedes, they have become very popular with the Majlis and the pro-German elements in Persia, and to have insisted on their withdrawal might have embarrassed Ain-ed-Dowleh's Cabinet. Moreover, their attitude has been more satisfactory of late, and they profess themselves to be quite ready to carry out all orders from the Government, even should these orders involve action against their German friends; indeed, in one or two instances they have done something to make good those professions. The above-mentioned decision of the Governments was arrived at—on our part at all events—in consequence of the pro-German proclivities and activity of the Swedes, and was precipitated, if my memory is not at fault, by the story of arms smuggling in German interests, a story which, as before said, I believe to be quite unfounded on fact. In the circumstances, therefore, a change of attitude on our part towards the Swedish officers would be easily explained. I believe that, with few exceptions, they will in future be very much more careful to observe a neutral attitude both in word and deed,

and more amenable to the orders of the Persian Government, through whom I think it should be possible to secure that the Swedes shall not be able to push their unquestionably anti-British feeling in purely Persian local affairs to any dangerous extent. The risk of Persia being thrust into a state of war against us is now remote. No Government of whatever complexion would allow Turco-German influence to carry them so far, and the only possible manner in which such an event could be brought about would seem to be by some local act of violence of such gravity that we and our Allies could not condone it. The Swedes in their chastened spirit can be counted on not to precipitate such an incident, but rather to prevent it. It must not be forgotten that the disappearance of the Swedes will be followed, in a very short interval, by a return to the deplorable conditions of insecurity on the roads, &c., that obtained three years ago, if indeed things would not be very much worse; and I submit that, unless my judgment as to the probable behaviour of the Swedish officers is entirely at fault, it would be to our interest, as well as to that of Persia, to retain them in south Persia and more particularly in Fars until the conclusion of peace, or until it is convenient to us to deal with the question afresh. As to the north of Persia, the matter is one which concerns Russian interests rather more than our own, but M. de Etter informs me that at present he is disposed to think that the force should be maintained.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz has recently informed me by telegraph that Captain Pousette, who is now in command there, is seriously concerned as to the outlook of the gendarmerie from a financial standpoint and is demanding the imposition of a tax on animals to meet the requisite expenditure, failing which he would march the Fars regiment to Tehran as a demonstration. The gendarmerie in that province, so I learnt from Major Pravitz, who called on me on his way to Sweden on three months' leave, have been paid up to the end of May, so that the need of money is not so urgent as I have hitherto been led to suppose, but there are certain arrears dating from rather more than a year back, which amount to 60,000 tomans (12,000*l.*) in round figures. The want of money is, however, likely to be felt in an acute form very shortly, and in the present embarrassed condition of the Persian Treasury it appears to me very certain that, except under very strong pressure from us, the means will not be found to provide the necessary funds; in that event I understand that the Swedish officers, who are not particularly enamoured of their work here, will be quite ready to resign provided that their salaries, &c. are paid. It would therefore seem that it rests with us whether the gendarmerie in Fars is maintained or not; and that if at any moment we decide against them, we have only to remain passive, and the force will melt away for lack of funds to carry it on.

I am well aware that the opinion held by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire is that the Swedish officers have shown themselves consistently disinclined to recognise our paramount influence in the southern provinces, and since the war we have openly abetted the agents of the German Legation in their efforts to injure our interests and prestige in every possible way, and that therefore it is our best policy, even at the risk of seeing the whole of the south of Persia fall into a condition of anarchy, to bring about the recall of the Swedish officers, and that to endeavour to maintain them is merely to throw good money after bad. Indeed I have just received a telegram from Major Trevor strongly advising this course.

But in my opinion the better course for us, as I have said before, will be to retain the Swedes, at all events until the end of the war. If, as I believe, they have now recognised the immense harm they have done to Persia and to their own credit in our eyes by their pro-German attitude, there is at least a good probability that they will succeed in maintaining some degree of tranquillity, which is surely a reasonable set-off against a temporary continuation of the anti-British Swedish proclivities, and even supposing that my belief in their change of attitude is falsified by events the worst that can happen is that the Germans may succeed in bringing about the state of chaos which must occur if they are withdrawn. As to the prospect of this contingency which the Germans are apparently endeavouring to achieve, by creating a coalition against us among the tribes of Fars, I must confess to entertaining great scepticism. Most Persians and many Europeans in a position to form a useful judgment deride the mere idea, but in the face of the evident apprehensions entertained by His Majesty's consular representatives at Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan, I am not prepared to say that the thing is impossible. That the attempt is being seriously made cannot be denied, but I am quite certain that the Persian Government is doing what it can to thwart the German efforts, and will, with our support, in all probability succeed in doing so, and it would, I submit, be a mistake for us to bring about the disbandment of the gendarmerie which is already showing itself much more obedient to the Government than at any

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

other period in its existence, and which would prove itself a very useful instrument in the hands of the Minister of the Interior.

If His Majesty's Government should concur in the view that it would be to our policy to maintain the gendarmerie of Fars by means of financial support, for the duration of the war, or until such time as we may find it convenient to make other arrangements for carrying on its work, the simplest way would appear to be that in the event of His Majesty's Government consenting to agree to giving the Persian Government financial support, a certain monthly sum should be earmarked for the purposes of the Fars regiment, or failing any such agreement, that a special arrangement should be made which would of course be terminable at our pleasure, but in any arrangement that might be made, we should have to stipulate for the transfer elsewhere of any officer, Swedish or Persian, whom we might designate at any time as showing mischievous tendencies.

Since writing the above I have received a further telegram from Major O'Connor, in which he expresses strong dissent from the views entertained by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, and urges that, provided that the eventuality of Persia throwing in her lot with Germany and Turkey is improbable or even uncertain, it would be in our interests to maintain the gendarmerie in Fars.

I enclose a paraphrase of this telegram and of an earlier one from Major O'Connor, as well as one from Major Trevor.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Consul O'Connor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, June 1, 1915.

MY telegram No. 165: General question of gendarmerie.

Captain Poussette tells me that if adequate funds are not forthcoming by the end of the current Persian month, that is, by about the 20th June, he has instructions to march the regiment to Tehran.

Their disappeance from Fars necessarily involves recrudescence of disorder, robbery, and "rahdari"* on the main trade routes, and province would rapidly revert to the intolerable condition of anarchy which existed three years ago. On the other hand, it is difficult for us to afford them further support as long as they show themselves hostile to our interests.

As already stated, I believe that Poussette is generally well disposed and anxious for the sake of his own reputation as well as on general grounds to keep the gendarmerie neutral.

The question therefore arises what policy do your Excellency and His Majesty's Government desire to pursue regarding gendarmerie in Fars? If its continued existence is considered desirable, we should be obliged to supply funds, and might perhaps undertake to do so for say, one year, under certain conditions which I would outline somewhat as follows:—

1. Formal assurances on the part of the commandant of the gendarmerie at Tehran and of the officer commanding at Shiraz that the gendarmerie will observe the strictest neutrality as long as this is the policy of the Persian Government, and that they will take sternest measures to insist on the observance of this policy by Persian officers and men.
2. Withrawal of gendarmerie detachment from Bushire, where their presence is not required, and is only a source of embarrassment and friction.
3. Dismissal of three or four Persian officers known to be chief mischiefmakers in Fars.

I further suggest that the necessary funds be advanced as a gift, or at any rate as a loan without interest to the Persian Government for this specific purpose, the money to be disbursed by permission of the British Minister from time to time as required on demand of the officer commanding Fars gendarmerie, addressed to the British consul. Total sum to be provided, which would not exceed 50,000*l.*, to be decided in consultation between officer commanding gendarmerie, British consul, and

* Road-tax.

the financial agent in Shiraz. If this or some other arrangement is not approved, I venture to urge that the adoption of some alternative policy should be taken into immediate consideration in order to avert crisis with which we are now threatened.

(Addressed Tehran, repeated Basra and Bushire.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Major Trevor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 215 c.)
(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, June 6, 1915.

SHIRAZ telegram No. 170.

As your Excellency is aware, we at Bushire have never desired the gendarmerie below Kazeroun, and I think that it will be agreed that their work on this section has not been a success. The present would appear to be a favourable opportunity to get rid of them on this portion of the road, if not right up to Shiraz.

If the Fars regiment were recalled to Tehran, I should think that it would lose many men by desertion, &c., on the way, and very possibly dissolve before reaching Tehran. Considering the open hostility of the officers from the commandant downwards and the men, this would appear to me a result devoutly to be desired. Further, should the regiment disperse, this would remove a trained body of men, who might give considerable trouble in the south in the event of Persia joining in the war.

When the gendarmerie first came south, the German consul under instructions from his legation at once began to get round the Swedish officers (*vide* Sir P. Cox's telegtam No. 443, of November 1913). For some time past it has been evident that the Germans have been completely successful and have absolutely "nobbled" the gendarmerie. In these circumstances during the present war it seems to me hardly to be supposed that the corps will behave in a genuinely neutral manner towards us, whatever assurances the commandant and other officers give us. On the other hand were the gendarmerie in the south to be removed or to melt away, it might be possible when the war is over to get Russia and the Persian Government to agree to a gendarmerie with British officers for the south. The immediate result of the disappearance of the gendarmerie would be very probably robbers and raiders on the roads, but with the help of Soulet and Kawam and by subsidising the kans this ought to be kept within the limits and at a great deal less expenditure than would be iucurred in bolstering up the gendarmerie.

In any case what with the German activities and intrigues of pro-Turks, &c., it looks as if Persia is in for a period of anarchy till the end of the war, gendarmerie or no gendarmerie.

In the circumstances I venture to submit that in my humble opinion to lend any more money for the gendarmerie would merely be throwing good money after bad.

(Addressed Tehran, repeated Shirez, Bassra, and foreign, by post to-day.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Consul O'Connor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, June 8, 1915.

PLEASE refer to Bushire telegram No. 215, Confidential.

Your Excellency can, perhaps, judge by now whether there is any likelihood of Persia deliberately throwing in her lot with Germany and Turkey or not. If such eventuality seems at all likely, I venture to express agreement with Major Trevor's views that the sooner the gendarmerie disappears the better, and that we should do nothing further to support them. If, however, Persian participation in the war is improbable or even uncertain, I venture to dissent strongly from Bushire point of view which appears to me to take into account rather the interests of Bushire than those of Pars, and so of South Persia as a whole.

In spite of all their faults and failings, which I fully realise and admit, it cannot be denied that the gendarmerie have preserved South Persia from anarchy during the last two years and have kept the roads open for commerce, posts, and travellers. Such a situation is, I venture to think, infinitely more beneficial to our interests than a state of chaos which might compel us to intervene and which might involve us in

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

serious embarassments of many kinds. During the last few days I have been bringing very strong pressure to bear on Captain Poussette with regard to the question of neutrality, &c. He is beyond question sincerely anxious to correct the faults of the gendarmerie and has given me repeated assurances to this effect. This fact combined with my general observation of the situation and persons has convinced me that the proposal I have outlined is the one best suited to what I believe to be our interests, that is, the maintenance of order in South Persia and the prevention of the necessity for intervention here.

But if your Excellency and His Majesty's Government do not approve further advance being made for the use of the gendarmerie, I shall try to formulate alternative proposals.

(Addressed Tehran, repeated Basra and Bushire.)

[86738] No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1316.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 205 of 21st June: Persian finance.

It appears most desirable to accommodate Persian Government in sense proposed by the two representatives at Tehran.

(R.) Effect of proposed transaction on British and Indian exchequers would apparently be on 31st December next as follows:—

	£
Arrears outstanding	40,500
Six months' interest on 1903–4 loan	14,800
Instalment of 1912–3 advances	50,000
Interest on above	15,400
Coupons on public loan	31,250
Total approximately	151,950

I am urging Treasury to act accordingly, and your Excellency should express to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs my earnest hope that he will agree to act similarly. (End of R.)

Delay in giving proof of our willingness to help Persian Government might easily aggravate situation, which Persian Government appear seriously desirous to tackle (see Tehran telegram No. 220 of 28th June).

[89041] No. 3.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 947.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, July* 4, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1251 of 23rd June.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs *aide-mémoire* embodying Tehran telegram No. 198 of 11th June and your telegram No. 593 of 23rd June to Stockholm.

I have received now *aide-mémoire* from the Russian Government to the following effect:—

"Russian Government concur in the opinion of London Cabinet as to the change which has taken place in the conduct of Swedish officers in Persia. These officers have, in fact, during the last few weeks shown wish to conform themselves strictly to the orders of the Persian Government. Their attitude towards the two legations has become much more correct and considerate. In fact, Russian Government are of opinion it was only thanks to the action taken by Captain Gleerup at Ispahan that the regrettable events which took place in this town did not degenerate still graver disorders. Nevertheless, Russian Government do not think these officers can be given unlimited confidence, especially as there is no guarantee that in case of trouble Persian gendarmes, large majority of whom are devoted to Democratic party, will obey orders of their superiors. In the event of resignation of Farman Farma, who may be

considered as a partisan of Great Britain and Russia, gendarmerie under a new Minister of Interior would have still less right to our confidence.

"Nevertheless, yielding to the arguments of Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, and in order not to provoke at such a delicate moment conflict with the Medjliss, which would, of course, raise lively opposition to the departure of the Swedish officers, the Russian Government see no objection to British Minister at Stockholm acting on instructions sent to him by Sir E. Grey."

[89041] No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr Howard.

(No. 673.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1915.

PETROGRAD telegram No. 947 of 4th July: Swedish gendarmerie.

You may now act on my telegram No. 593 of 23rd June.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1344, and Tehran, No. 161.)

[90393] No. 5.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 6, 1915.

PETROGRAD telegram No. 947 of 4th July.

Although it is true that some of the Swedish officers have been more satisfactory of late, others are exhibiting a marked pro-German bias, and this is particularly the case with the commandant at Tehran, who is entirely in the hands of pro-Germans. He is more fool than knave. I concur entirely in the view of Russian Government as contained in Petrograd telegram No. 947 of 4th July.

I would venture to suggest deferring communication of text for the present.

(Repeated to Stockholm.)

[91736] No. 6.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 232.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 8, 1915.

MY telegram No. 229 of 7th July.

Information having reached me privately that Shah's mind has been influenced against Farman Farma by democrats and Germans by reviving an old story that Farman Farma is plotting to dethrone him, and that Shah had consequently intimated to Ain-ed-Dowleh that Farman Farma should not remain in Cabinet, I called on Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and told him, in name of two legations, that we regarded present struggle as a test case which would show whether or not Cabinet was going to continue to truckle to the democrats and Germans, and that, if Government gave way, we should warn our Governments that we could not no longer hold out any hope that Persian Government would maintain real neutrality by putting end to German intrigues against us, and that we should advise our Governments to consider what other measures could be taken to protect our interests.

We desired his Excellency to inform Shah of foregoing, and to explain to His Majesty's Government that we should have held precisely same view had attack been made on any other member of the Cabinet, and that we therefore trusted that His Majesty would give his support to present Cabinet and inform Ain-ed-Dowleh that he wished Farman Farma to retain office. Russian Minister did not accompany me because he had already sent a message in very much the same sense indirectly to Shah.

I also told Minister for Foreign Affairs that, while I understood that Government of India had no uneasiness on the subject of Afghanistan, I was quite confident, considering vastness of struggle we are engaged in, His Majesty's Government were in no mood to run any risks, and, if Persian Government would do nothing to stop German emissaries, would see what they could do themselves.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[91346] No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 227 of 6th July.

In view of the considerations urged by you, the Government of India have been instructed that troops are not to enter Persian territory until further orders have been received. The India Office at the same time point out that the arrival in Afghanistan of German and Turkish agitators would have a bad effect, and though the Ameer has hitherto scrupulously observed neutrality, he has done so in face of strong opposition, which may easily grow beyond his control.

You will therefore see the great importance of doing what is possible to counter German agitation.

[92987] No. 8.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 240.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 10, 1915.

MY telegram No. 232 of 8th July.

At an audience which Russian Minister and I had of the Shah to-day we pointed out to His Majesty the danger towards which the country is drifting, and told him that our Governments would view resignation of the Cabinet at the bidding of a minority in Medjliss as a sign that Persia was under the influence of enemy, and that as in those circumstances there could be no prospect of Persia observing a real neutrality by putting end to German intrigues, and preventing their endeavours to create troubles in Afghanistan, &c., we had no course but to suggest to our Governments that they should consider what measures they should take to protect their own interests. And we urged the Shah to use his influence to maintain present Government. From the Shah's reply it seems that the Cabinet has at length definitely resigned, and that although he would like to maintain it he doubts his power to do so.

Crisis is therefore likely to continue, and so long as it lasts no action can be taken to hold up emissary from going to Afghanistan. In view of the situation as regards that country, now disclosed by Government of India's telegram No. 644 s, Russian Minister and I are of opinion that no time should be lost in taking our own measures.

(Sent to India and Petrograd.)

[92844] No. 9.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 176. Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1915.

VICEROY'S telegram of 8th July: Germans in Afghanistan.

Government of India are being informed that you fully appreciate importance of keeping Germans out of Afghanistan.

You are authorised to telegraph direct to Viceroy when you consider that only military intervention can effect that purpose. Government of India will then take action.

[92987] No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 12, 1915

IN view of last paragraph of your telegram No. 240 of 10th July: Afghanistan, you should inform Government of India immediately what steps you consider it desirable for them to take to obtain object in view.

You should make all arrangements direct with them, repeating your telegrams to me.

[94616] No 11.

Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 14, 1915.

FOLLOWING from senior naval officer, dated 12th July:—

"A report was received to-day that a party of insurgent tribesmen were coming over to lie in wait in nullah south of country residency. It seemed possible that this was probably one of the usual unfounded or false reports, but Major Oliphant, 96th Regiment, and Captain Ranking went with a party of sowars and infantry to reconnoitre. Unfortunately they apparently came suddenly on a large well-concealed party of the enemy, who immediately opened fire at close range. Regret to say that both officers and four sepoys are reported killed.

"Enemy then advanced to attack southern outpost line. Heavy firing took place at sunset and soon after, but has been only desultory since, so attack has been apparently repulsed."

(Repeated to Bushire; sent to India.)

[94462] No. 12.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 245.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 13, 1915.

MY telegram No. 244 of 14th July.

Attack on Residency at Bushire appears to me to justify despatch of any force that may be considered requisite to prevent German missions from reaching Afghanistan, and I submit, now that German intrigues have resulted in the death of two British officers, we are entirely justified in adopting similar means ourselves, and employ steady tribesmen to attack their emissaries.

(Repeated to India, Bushire, Basra, and Birjand.)

[95101] No. 13.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 247.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 14, 1915.

MY telegram No. 242 of 12th July

Cabinet crisis still continues, and although it seems certain that Ain-ed-Dowleh will retain office, he is already talking about doing without Farman Farma at Ministry of the Interior. Should this final concession be made to pro-German party, Ain-ed-Dowleh will be so dependent on them that it will be hopeless to expect that anything will be done to check German action. As it is, small [*sic*] beginning to fulfil explicit promises made to me to hold up German emissaries has been arrested by resignation of Ministers.

Fact is that there is a very general belief, which is carefully fostered by Germans and Turks and from which Ain-ed-Dowleh is thought exempt, that we and our Allies are in desperate position; contrast is being drawn between mild action taken by Russia for murder of her vice-consul at Ispahan and vigour with which she would have displayed her displeasure at such an occurrence in the past, and conclusion is drawn that Russia is really powerless to help herself even in Persia. Ain-ed-Dowleh may know better, but he prefers not to risk his popularity with noisy democratic minority in Medjliss by taking energetic measures to stop constant and flagrant violation of Persian neutrality by Germans and allies of that party, and he thinks that, as we do not show ourselves capable of protecting our own interests here, he can satisfy us with promises and half-measures. As for the future, he reflects that, if friction between the two legations was possible before the war, when their Governments were Allies, disagreements between them in future may make it possible for Persia to play one Power off against the other, as before the 1907 agreement.

With this state of things at the capital, we are confronted with an attack on the Bushire Residency, an attack beyond question directly due to German intrigue, and

of which Persian Government had every knowledge and warning. I submit that, coming as it does after the outrage at Ispahan, it is absolutely imperative that we and Russia should take decisive action at once, and I urge for consideration of two Governments that Russian force at Kasvin and Resht should be raised to 5,000, with a proper proportion of cavalry and guns (which Ain-ed-Dowleh now agrees is necessary), and that we seize Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Mohammerah and occupy Hormuz, and that, having done this, we inform Persia that we shall retain possession until reparation is made for attack at Bushire, and until German intrigues are put a stop to by arrest of various German agents now at work in Persia.

If Ain-ed-Dowleh should not retain office, such action is *a fortiori* more necessary.

Failing it, we must be prepared to be exposed to the possibility of further outrage, and to see Germans free to do what they like except where we are able to use our own resources.

Russian Minister entirely agrees in this view, and is telegraphing to Petrograd in this sense.

(Repeated to Petrograd, Government of India, Basra, and Bushire.)

[94462] No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 15, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 245 of 13th July: German activity.

I approve entirely, and you are authorised to take necessary action in concert with Government of India.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1462.)

[96156] No. 15.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 252.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 16, 1915.

FOLLOWING from consul at Meshed, 15th July:—

"German parties.

"It is reported party from Samnan and Jandak arrived at a place 30 miles from Tabas on 7th July. Composition not yet known, but number of party is estimated at 100, and informant saw two guns, other half of party of similar strength following. I visited Governor-General, and pressed him to ask for assistance of Cossacks, or at any rate to ask that Chaman be sent to Turbat-i-Haidari pending further orders, but he refused to do anything without sanction of his Government. In consultation with Russian consul-general we agreed that it was of greatest importance that Cossacks should be sent at once, and he asked if your Excellency, with Russian Minister, would compel Persian Government to send orders to Governor-General to employ and give them every assistance. I pressed Russian consul-general, as I did before and two days ago, to send Cossacks to Turbat-i-Haidari to be near seat of action pending further instructions.

"(Repeated to India, Baluchistan, Birjand, and Petrograd.)"

[96948] No. 16.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 253.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 17, 1915.

MY telegram No. 247 of 14th July.

I obtained an audience of the Shah yesterday, and, after pointing out dangerous state of things, proved by attack at Bushire, told him that, unless satisfactory Cabinet were formed (viz., one which included Farman Farma as Minister of the Interior), His Majesty's Government would be forced to conclude that Persia was under enemy

influence and could not be considered as determined to maintain neutral attitude, and that I should be obliged to advise that His Majesty's Government should take their own measures to protect their own interests. I added that His Majesty's Government would be painfully impressed by absence of any official expression of regret on part of Persian Government for death of two officers.

His Majesty replied that as a constitutional Sovereign he could not interfere with details of formation of a Cabinet, and until there was a Ministry there was no one who could convey regret of Government. I replied that His Majesty's Government could scarcely quietly wait for reparation for recent outrage until it pleased a handful of politicians in league with our enemies to permit Government to be formed, and expressed hope that His Majesty would use his influence to end the crisis at once. Shah's attitude was thoroughly unsatisfactory, and crisis may continue indefinitely.

Russian Minister used very similar language to Ain-ed-Dowleh.

In these circumstances I recommend that, provided two Governments have requisite forces at their disposal, I be authorised to present our demands, and to add that, failing acceptance, we shall take our own measures.

Our demands might be:—

1. Written official apology for the outrage.
2. Dismissal of Governor of Shiraz and nomination of a successor approved by us.
3. Punishment of tribes concerned and deposition and outlawing of their chiefs.
4. Selection by us of gendarmerie officers in Kerman, Bushire, and Fars.
5. Arrest and expulsion of Wassmuss, disarmament and recall of all unrecognised German agents and emissaries and their followers throughout Persia.
6. Internment of escaped Austrian prisoners of war.
7. Indemnity of 20,000*l.* for murder of officers.

Acceptance of Nos. 5 and 6 will, of course, entirely depend on immediate reinforcement of Russian troops as suggested in my telegram above mentioned.

Demand No. 2 will probably be complied with, and of others which are intended to cover desiderata put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox in his telegram No. 1398 B to Government of India, we can exact execution ourselves if troops can be spared.

If Russia will not send troops we shall have to rest content with such measures as we can take ourselves in the south, but this will have little effect on general political position, whatever local result may be.

(Repeated to Government of India, Basra, Bushire, and Petrograd.)

[97214] No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 19.)

Sir,

India Office, July 19, 1915.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy on the subject of Persian situation.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Government of India to Mr. Chamberlain.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 17, 1915.

PLEASE refer to letter of 14th instant from Minister, Tehran, to Foreign Office, regarding Persia.

We agree with him that time has arrived for strong action. Proposal for increased Russian garrison in north has our entire support, but we do not concur in Minister's view that it is desirable to seize Mohammerah, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, and Hormuz. The forcible occupation of the first-named place would involve the estrangement of a valuable friend who has deserved well of British Government, and a possible renewal of excitement among the tribes astride the pipe line. The result of occupying Lingah,

Bunder Abbas, and Hormuz, the taking of which presents no difficulty, would be the dissipation of our strength and exposure of a small garrison to tribal attack of the kind recently experienced at Bushire, and such action would not be very effective. In our opinion the most suitable course would be the immediate assumption of adminstration of Bushire, taking over the control of the custom-house, holding the revenue, and prohibiting the despatch of merchandise to the interior. This action should be taken without notification to the Persian Government, whom we should leave to question our action themselves. In this way it would be shown that our intentions were serious, and the burden of discussion would be placed on the Persian Government at the same time. In reply to their enquiries, our Minister might explain that the reason of the action taken at Bushire is the conviction that has been forced upon His Majesty's Government against their will that it is no longer possible for the Persian Government to maintain order in Bushire and the vicinity, fresh confirmation of this being found in the regrettable attack made by 300 tribesmen, resulting in the death of two British officers and in the death and wounding of several sepoys. It might be added that the fact that, with the consent of the Persian Government, various armed parties of Germans and Austrians are recruiting Persian sowars, and departing from Kerman and Ispahan with supplies of arms and ammunition, makes it clear to His Majesty's Government that the Persian Government are either unable or unwilling to prevent South Persia from being made a base from which hostile operations may be conducted against Britain and her Allies. Such a situation cannot be tolerated by His Majesty's Government, who are compelled with reluctance to adopt such measures for the protection of their own interests as may appear to them necessary. If, however, the Persian Government are now ready to take serious and effective action with regard to the matters to which their attention is constantly directed, Minister is prepared to intimate terms of the British Government, but in no other circumstances. Under these terms Persian Government should be required within a week (1) to take definite steps for punishment of khans who were concerned in outrage at Bushire; (2) to pay compensation at the rate of 5,000*l.* in the case of each of the British officers killed in the outrage, and 500*l.* and 100*l.* in the case of each sepoy killed and wounded respectively; (3) to take definite action regarding Germans who are at present in Persia by causing them to be arrested, disarmed, and either interned or handed over to British for deportation; (4) to recall the present Governor-General of Fars.

In event of failure of Persian Government to comply with these terms in the specified time, in addition to Bushire remaining in hands of British Government, such further action as the necessities of the situation may dictate will be taken for the protection of their interests.

Outside Bushire we do not at present propose that in any circumstances military operations should be undertaken, with the exception of possible bombardment of Dilwar. We should be content merely to remain on the defensive, and in the event of a repetition of attack we trust that it may be repelled effectively.

Although action of some kind seems to us to be absolutely necessary for the purpose of making the Persian Government realise that it is impossible to allow the hostile machinations of Germans and Austrians to proceed unchecked in Persia, our eyes must not be closed to the fact that if in consequence war should be declared by Persia on Great Britain and Russia, although she herself is a negligible quantity and impotent, the task of the Ameer in maintaining his neutral position in opposition to the warlike tendencies of the Afghans will certainly be made much more difficult, and unrest and bitterness of feeling amongst our own Mahommedan population will probably result.

(Repeated to Tehran, Basra, and Bushire.)

[97057]

No. 18.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 18, 1915.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 680.

My recommendation to seize customs of principal Gulf ports was made with a view to dispelling view carefully fostered by Germans that we are near the end of our military resources, but if, as I gather, Government of India think it unwise to detach troops [group undecypherable] time necessary for this demonstration, we must perforce confine ourselves to lesser measures. In normal times the occupation of Bushire would

unquestionably have brought Persia to her senses and may possibly do so now, but with strong enemy influences that are now at work here, we may find our moderation interpreted as inability to do more, as it will be pointed out that with relatively considerable force we maintain at Bushire we are virtually in possession already. It would probably suffice to gain promise, if not execution, of reparation for recent outrage, but I question if it would provide requisite proof of the determination of ourselves and Russians to insist on real neutrality on the part of Persia. For this purpose an exhibition of strength is requisite, and if we can do it halfheartedly in the south it appears the more indispensable that Russia should act in the north, where, owing to the position of the capital, action is much more effective.

With [group undecypherable] German party in neighbourhood of Tarbaz, it is, moreover, too late to count upon their emissaries to Afghanistan being stopped by Persian efforts alone. We have therefore to rely on our own measures, and, with example of Bushire, where we have strong consular guard, before us, we must expect any action we take against emissaries to be met with reprisals by Germans in less defensible places inland. For their protection we have to rely on Persian Government, and that Government has to be convinced that two Governments are in earnest and ready, if necessary, to force it to put an end German activities.

I do not believe Persia desires to become embroiled in war with two Powers, but it is undeniable that recent retirement of Russia in Poland and Galicia, slow progress of Allies at the Dardanelles and Flanders, and small apparent result of entrance of Italy into the war have given Germans great prestige, and have made idea of a rupture of relations on the part of Persia with us less unthinkable than before, and if at present juncture we fail to show strength, possibility of Persia being dragged into war is brought nearer.

In view of these circumstances and Government of India's manifestation of uneasiness, I would urge that despatch of Russian troops is urgent necessity. Meanwhile, we ourselves should occupy Bushire at once.

As for actual demands we should make on Persia, we can formulate them better when we know in what position we are to enforce them, but if they include any specific measures against German emissaries, I submit that to that extent they should be made jointly.

(Sent to India, Petrograd, Basra, and Bushire.)

[99596]

No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1528.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 21, 1915.

GOVERNMENT of India are authorising His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed in accordance with his suggestion to recruit force of retired officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of Indian army up to number of 100, for keeping peace at Meshed, in absence of Russian Cossacks, and further to intercept any German party who may come into vicinity of Meshed. Substantial rewards will be offered for successful attack on such party.

Inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and explain that gravity and urgency of situation alone have induced Government of India to take this action, to which in the circumstances I feel confident the Russian Government will raise no objection. You should assure his Excellency that His Majesty's Government guarantee definitely that men will be disbanded immediately danger of Germans invading Afghanistan is passed.

If his Excellency approves, the two consuls-general might be authorised to concert measures together.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 200, Urgent.)

[100238] No. 20.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July 23, 1915.*

YOUR telegram No. 1514 of 20th July to Petrograd.

First collision between our own and Russian troops and German bands going to Afghanistan is now only a question of days, and we must expect it to be followed by reprisals at other places, Shiraz, Kerman, and Ispahan being chief danger points.

It is therefore particularly urgent that I should know if Russian Government will send reinforcements to Kazvin and, if so, when.

Arrival of troops is only measure which will put an end to present Cabinet crisis and give us a Government on which we can use pressure for protection of our consuls and colonies.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[100238] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1563.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 24, 1915.*

TEHRAN telegram No. 258 of 23rd July: Russian troops.

In view of gravity of situation and possible consequences, I earnestly hope that Minister for Foreign Affairs will be able to give satisfactory answer to my telegram No. 1514 of 20th July.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 204.)

[101856] No. 22.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July 26, 1915.*

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 715.

Measures contemplated in consequence of outrage in Bushire already fall short of those which, in my opinion, are required not merely to obtain satisfaction but also for more essential purpose of counteracting enemy influence with Persian Government. It is already fourteen days since outrage took place, and if we are to delay further to take any action, our procrastination will be ascribed to our inability to send the few troops requisite, and conviction will obtain that for the present we are no longer a Power to be counted with, and German influences will be very much strengthened.

Immediate despatch of Russian troops is therefore more urgently necessary, and, if possible, in greater force than recommended in my telegram No. 247.

If they do not appear, influence of the two Powers in Persia will be most seriously shaken.

Russian Minister is telegraphing in this sense to his Government.

(Sent to India and Petrograd.)

[101965] No. 23.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July 26, 1915.*

YOUR telegram No. 202 of 23rd July.

Opium and excise revenue were included in the estimated deficit. They are nominally available, but they are in some districts being collected by gendarmerie for their own expenses.

As to conditions to be attached, Russian Minister and I are of opinion that it would

be difficult and might prove inconvenient to define any special point, and we should prefer to preserve our leverage on Government by inserting in note, informing Minister for Foreign Affairs of proposal, a simple stipulation to effect that moratorium can be suspended at any time by simple modification of either party. But, if necessary, to make it clear that we expect Persian Government to put stop to German activities; note could be prefaced by a statement that in granting accommodation two Powers are influenced by, *inter alia*, desire to assist Persia to maintain and defend her neutrality.

[101965] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1596.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 27, 1915.*

TEHRAN telegram No. 264 of 26th July: Moratorium.

Proposed stipulation commends itself to me and is being considered. Meanwhile, I should be glad to hear that Russian Government are prepared to act in sense outlined in my telegram No. 202 of 23rd July to Tehran.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 208.)

[103688] No. 25.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 97.)
Sir,
Tehran, July 7, 1915.

THE attitude of the Persian Prime Minister towards the two legations, almost since the day he took office, has been extremely perplexing. You will remember that his Highness professed to M. de Etter and myself, when we called on him on the 13th May, 1915, the greatest readiness to pursue a policy, the main principle of which was to be the maintenance of the neutrality of Persia, and the counteracting of the German efforts to embroil this country in war, while we on our side promised to endeavour to obtain some financial support for his adminstration from our Governments, and that in conclusion Ain-ed-Dowleh suggested that he be content to work on what I may call a system of payments by results, *i.e.*, that when he had achieved something towards those ends, we would do something to strengthen his position. I said at the time that I had already to thank him for his successful efforts to tide over the bank crisis, and that on the principle he suggested I thought that I could arrange that the Imperial Bank of Persia should make to the Persian Government an advance of 40,000 tomans, the sum mentioned by himself, and, as a matter of fact, Mr. A. O. Wood at once agreed to effect the transaction provided it was put into a business form. On various pretexts, mostly connected with Mr. Wood's very reasonable requirements as to form, which Ain-ed-Dowleh however represented as showing an unfriendy spirit on the part of the bank and the legation, his Highness did not actually draw on the credit opened for the Government to this amount until the end of June, and, in fact, showed just as much reluctance to take advantage of the assistance tendered as he did in the matter of furnishing to the Russian Minister and myself the data necessary to enable us to submit to our respective Governments a proposal to give Persia some financial support to enable her to tide over the financial embarrassment created by the war (see my telegram No. 199 of 13th June last). His Highness's behaviour to the Russian Legation was equally remarkable. M. de Etter had repeatedly told him that in such questions as the collection of the maliat by the Russian consuls, the acquisition of real property by Russian subjects, &c., he was ready to find a solution of a nature to satisfy Persian feeling, but in no single instance has Ain-ed-Dowleh ever shown the smallest sign of readiness to discuss these matters, which have so long been a Persian grievance against Russia, and the removal of which might be reasonably supposed to have redounded to his Highness's credit in Persian nationalist eyes, and so have strengthened his position. In fact, Ain-ed-Dowleh has refused or delayed accepting everything offered to him; and has consistently demanded one thing, and that the one which M. de Etter and I are convinced that we could not accord, and which, moreover, other Persian Ministers have plainly hinted must in no circumstances be accorded, namely, the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin and Resht. I will even go further, and say that Ain-ed-Dowleh would be dismayed if he thought that his request would be fulfilled.

Nor until quite recently can I find any particular reason for congratulation in Ain-ed-Dowleh's efforts to combat the German intrigue. Very soon after he assumed office, he gave me a distinct promise, which he has never repudiated, that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh should be removed from the Governorship of Fars, only stipulating that he should be allowed to do it in his own way, but in spite of strong reminders Mukhber is still a thorn in our side. My efforts addressed to his Highness to get the various parties of German emissaries turned back have been no more successful, though I have had promises in plenty, and the experience of my Russian colleague is no more satisfactory than my own, for the murderer of Baron von Kaver remains at large, and M. de Etter has to derive what satisfaction he can out of the removal of Sardar-i-Muhtasham from the Governorship of Ispahan, only to be replaced by the latter's own brother, Sardar-i-Ashjaa, who, it is true, is regarded by the Russian Legation as their one partisan among the Bakhtiari khans. Ain-ed-Dowleh's conduct towards Farman Farma has been equally ambiguous. It is to him, as Minister of the Interior, that we have chiefly addressed ounselves to get instructions sent to the provincial Governments to take action against the German agents, and we have to thank him for what has been done. Farman Farma has consequently been particularly obnoxious to the Germans and Turks, who at once set their democrat friends in the Medjliss to work to oust his Highness from office, a task peculiarly congenial to the Democrats, as Farman Farma has always been the object of their special hatred, largely on account of his Russophile proclivities. The attack was made on the 3rd instant; Farman Farma was defended by speakers from every quarter of the Chamber, and by Ain-ed-Dowleh himself, who declared that every act of the Minister of the Interior had been done with the knowledge and approval of the whole Cabinet. Yet though, had he taken a vote, Ain-ed-Dowleh would have had a crushing majority in favour of Farman Farma, he declared that he would be satisfied with nothing less than unanimity; walked with his colleagues out of the House and announced the intention of the Cabinet to resign, and the next morning when M. de Etter and I called on him to discuss the situation and pointed out that if he now agreed to a remodelling of the Cabinet, involving even Farman Farma's transfer from the Ministry of the Interior to another department, we and the whole political world of Persia would regard the change as a German victory over us, his Highness, in spite of a good deal of shuffling, left no doubt in our minds that this was precisely what he was contemplating. A week later, during which period M. de Etter has informed Ain-ed-Dowleh that the Russian Government attach the greatest importance to the retention of the Farman Farma at the Ministry of the Interior, the Government again resigned, but the Shah declined to accept it. At this moment it seems a practical certainty that Ain-ed-Dowleh will continue in office without a reshuffle of portfolios, and that this course has been forced on him by two causes, firstly, that the Democratic Party's candidates, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek or Mushir-ed-Dowleh, would not accept office, and, secondly, that he has good reason for believing that we are quite prepared to accept and "run" Farman Farma as a President of the Council if he himself should fail us. He has, however, suceeded in inducing Farman Farma to believe that he is, at least for the moment, sincere in the wish to retain him at the Ministry of the Interior, and I trust that Farman Farma will not find that he has been deceived.

The foregoing would seem to show that Ain-ed-Dowleh has been a false friend, but, while it cannot be pretended that he has proved a really satisfactory instrument to carry out our aim of preserving the neutrality of Persia, I do not think that he has actually played us false. His Highness's position is far from enviable. He has, it is true, the confidence nominally of the whole Medjliss, but, as a matter of fact, he has no real party behind him. He is in no sense the leader of any group even, and he can count really only on the votes of some twenty to twenty-five Moderates, the remainder of the majority who supported the Cabinet on the 3rd instant being made up of small groups who are for the present disposed to think that the presence of Ain-ed-Dowleh at the head of the Government offers the fewest disadvantages. Their support is very precarious, and neither they nor the Moderates have any cohesion or organisation either in the Chamber or in the country, and there are few men of any ability in their ranks. Ain-ed-Dowleh is thus merely a leading Persian statesman selected by the British and Russian Legations on account of his long experience and of the weight his name carries as the most suitable man to steer the ship of the Persian State through a threatening storm, and it is as such that he is supported by the Moderates and the Independent groups. The rest of the Chamber is made up of the Democrats, about equal in number to the Moderates, who only acquiesced in Ain-ed-Dowleh's accession to office to escape from the choice of Saad-ed-Dowleh. They form a compact

party with eight or nine men of some parts as speakers to lead them, they are well organised in and out of the House, and a well-defined aim, learnt probably from the Committee of Union and Progress of Turkey, viz., to allow no Government to exist in Persia, except by their consent. They are entirely unscrupulous, are wholly indifferent to the interests of their country, and will use any means—at present they are in alliance with the Germans and the Turks—to attain their objects.

With his position so precarious in the Medjliss, Ain-ed-Dowleh has endeavoured to practice the art, of which he is an acknowledged master in Persia, of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, that is to say, he has essayed to placate the Democrats by insisting (against his own judgment, and knowing it was useless) on the withdrawal of the Russian troops, by declining to accept at Russia's hands concessions which he knew would be accorded, by delaying to take advantage of financial assistance offered by us, and by evading compliance with our demands in regard to Mukhbar-es-Sultaneh at Shiraz, and the murder of von Kaver at Ispahan, &c. In short, he has tried to persuade the Democrats, by neither receiving favours from us nor making concessions to us, that he is no partisan or tool of Russia and Great Britain. As I suggested in the first sentence of this report, Ain-ed-Dowleh's conduct has been a constant puzzle to us, and usually an unsatisfactory puzzle, but, with the certainty that any unconsidered action on our part might bring about his oft-threatened resignation and the formation of a still less satisfactory Cabinet, the Russian Minister and I have thought it better not to press his Highness too far for fear of disturbing his nicely poised equilibrium, and I am by no means sure also that Ain-ed-Dowleh has not endeavoured, always with an eye to placating the Democrats, to "squeeze" us, if I may be permitted the expression, under the impression, of which I have often endeavoured to disabuse him, that the neutrality of Persia is of more value to us than to herself. However this may be, even Ain-ed-Dowleh himself has been, as it seems to me, at last brought to see that his indecision in deference to the Germanophile Democrats was bringing the country dangerously near the verge of disaster, and that something more than remonstrance, however energetic, to Prince Reuss were necessary. At all events, during the last ten days he has used such insistence that the German Legation has consented to recall Wassmuss, in return, it is true, for the recognition by the Persian Government, hitherto refused, of a German vice-consul at Shiraz, and has issued stringent orders to the Governors of Kirman and Birjand to hold up and send back to Tehran the German emissaries who are on their way to those places, orders which, so long as Farman Farma remains at the Ministry of the Interior, Sardar-i-Zafar and Shaukat-ul-Mulk, who are well-disposed to us, can be stimulated into carrying out. Ain-ed-Dowleh has even gone further, and has actually caused a German agent proceeding to Meshed to be stopped by the Governor of Damghan, his followers disarmed and himself sent back to Tehran. A general instruction has also been issued to the Governors of the provinces to disarm the armed retainers of all consuls—except, of course, the Cossack guards of the Russian consuls and our Indian escorts—and in particular the numerous Mujahids recruited by the Germans at Ispahan, for which purpose some 500 gendarmes have been already drafted to that town and a further 300 are to be sent.

I cannot say how long this display of energy will continue; it may only be a readjustment of the scale that has been too long weighed down on the German-Democrat side; but whatever its motives, unless we are prepared to adopt the direct methods of the Indian Government as described in their telegram No. 618 s of the 1st July, we have no alternative but to endeavour to see that this new vigour is maintained.

I have, &c.
C. M. MARLING.

[104981]

No. 26.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 1081.)
(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, July 31, 1915.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 1596 of 27th July, I handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs *aide-mémoire* embodying your telegram to Tehran No. 202 of 23rd July and Tehran telegram No. 264 of 26th July.

I have now received the following *aide-mémoire* in reply:—

"Imperial Government, while remaining in principle of the opinion that Great Britain and Russia should come to the help of Persia and advance her certain funds to

ensure, as far as possible the working of administration, think nevertheless that the present moment would be scarcely appropriate to make an advance to a Government which may be any day replaced by a Cabinet frankly hostile to the two Powers.

"Considerations put forward in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* will be examined without delay by the Ministry of Finance, but in the event of the latter's approval in the proposal, British Government and Russian Government could only proceed to make the advance when the political situation in Persia is more satisfactory."

(Sent to Tehran.)

[105663] No. 27.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 265. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 2, 1915.

RUSSIAN Cossacks sent to Kain are charged with having quartered their men in a mosque and various acts of violence and robbery. I have no confirmation of these charges, which are, moreover, sure to be exaggerated, but Russian Minister has thought it worth while to telegraph strict injunctions as to necessity of good conduct and avoiding any action likely to rouse local hostility, and I venture to hope that orders may be repeated by Russian superior military authorities.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[104981] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1676.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1081 of 31st July: Persian finance.

Both representatives at Tehran agree that proposed financial relief would be safeguarded by stipulation that moratorium could be suspended at will.

It is also quite possible that if no assistance is forthcoming from the two legations the Persian Cabinet will turn with some justification to German quarters, which would be most undesirable at present juncture.

In these circumstances I hope earnestly that Russian Government will agree to leave matter to discretion of the two Ministers at Tehran.

[105663] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1689.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 265 of 2nd August.

If the charges were substantiated, we should be exposed to considerable danger.

I am unwilling to raise the matter in any form officially, and leave to your Excellency discretion to mention privately to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs extreme desirability of the issue of stringent instructions on the subject.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 214.)

[106818] No. 30.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 267. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 3, 1915.

HIS Majesty's consul at Birjand is anxious for services of ex-Indian soldiers, recruiting of whom at Meshed was stopped in deference to the wish of Russian Government, conveyed in your telegram No. 1528 of 21st July to Petrograd. Consul represents

that British prestige in Seistan suffers if Russian troops are allowed to operate alone in British sphere, and hopes that when Russian Government understand that men are not to be used in Meshed as at first intended they will withdraw objection. I hope Russian Government will agree, as presence of a small British force will reassure Governor of Seistan, who resents the presence of Russian troops alone.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[106826] No. 31.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 268.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 3, 1915.

PERSIAN situation.

His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan has reported that he has reason to believe that there will shortly be some 300 Germans and Austrians (latter being prisoners of war escaped from Transcaspia) assembled in that town.

They are camped a short distance outside the town and possessed of large quantities of rifles and ammunition, besides machine-guns, bombs, and a wireless telegraphy apparatus, and allow no one to approach their camp.

They have also considerable number of mujtehed in their pay.

Small parties of Germans are continually coming viâ Kermanshah, and amongst them probably Oppenheim.

Attitude of Bakhtiari at Ispahan is exceedingly dubious, and I have proof that Sirdar Assad here is playing a double game, and probably Samsan-es-Sultaneh also.

Germans have more than once interrupted Indo-European Department wires south of Ispahan, and German consul there has even written to Department's officers threatening to do so.

Acts of this kind and this considerable concentration at Ispahan obviously implies more than a mere attack on our consulates, and popular rumour here asserts that German design, urged by democrats, is to carry off the Shah and Government to Ispahan. This is far-fetched, but it is not improbable that hostile legations contemplate flight to Ispahan should Russian troops arrive at Kasvin and threaten the capital.

Idea was currently talked of three months ago.

From this centre, with communications open to Turkey viâ Kermanshah, they would hope to throw all Persia into disorder, and paralyse the Persian Government's action by destruction of telegraph lines, and trust to a chapter of accidents to involve her in war with us. It has also occurred to me that they might be contemplating an attack on oil-fields or threatening our position at Basra.

As before said, Bakhtiari loyalty cannot be relied upon; while at least one party of Germans has left Ispahan for unknown destination by southern road, and they may be trying to rouse the tribes as example of [group undecypherable]s. Sirdar Assad also has informed me, in a manner that implied menaces, that he was trying to make an alliance with the Kashgais and Kawam, and the number of small German parties going armed may indicate that attempts to gain over those powerful elements are being made.

These speculations may seem far-fetched, but I can offer no better guess at the objects of German preparations at Ispahan.

Whatever they may be, it seems to me imperative that we should get an end put to intolerable position we are now in of having no responsible Government, and this can only be achieved by appearance of Russian troops, and I hope Russian Government will find it possible to send them at once. Russian Minister entirely concurs.

Meanwhile position of consuls at Ispahan and Shiraz is decidedly dangerous, but Russian Minister and I feel that to withdraw them and our colonies would be a sign of weakness, and might precipitate trouble. On the other hand we see no means of sending them effective assistance.

(Sent to India and Petrograd.)

[106818] No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1707.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 267 of 3rd August: German attempts on Afghanistan.

You are authorised to make such representations as you consider desirable to give effect to Mr. Marling's wish.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 215.)

[108090] No. 33.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 5, 1915.

HIS Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports that over seventy Germans and Austrians are on the way south with the obvious intention of stirring up trouble.

His Majesty's consul at Ispahan reports that the alleged agreement between Bakhtiari and Kashgai amounts to a plot for the overthrow of the Government finances [*sic*] and Persia to be partitioned between Bakhtiari and Kashgai armed by Germans.

In normal times the idea of such a combination would be amusing, but in the actual circumstances it must be remembered that the moral effect of large numbers of well-equipped Germans in open defiance of the Persian Government and of ourselves and Russians at Ispahan and Shiraz on the Bakhtiari and Sunnite Kawam respectively must be great, and with the inducements held out to them the tribes may sink their differences for a time, and such a combination, if only temporary, under German guidance might well give the enemy the chance they want.

Bakhtiari are at present at loggerheads with each other over various questions, and I propose to keep them so, and thus paralyse the tribes as a whole, but it is quite possible that German influences at Ispahan, where most of the khans are assembled, may succeed in preventing their differences from coming to a serious point. In any case it seems to me that more than this is required. Our occupation of Bushire seems to be falling flat as far as its local effect goes, and unless something is done in the way of a punitive expedition against the khans responsible for the attack on Bushire which will strike the Persian imagination and disillusion them regarding our supposed impotence, I fear that a very dangerous situation may supervene in Fars and South-Western Persia.

At the same time it is absolutely necessary that the impression produced by the probable fall of Warsaw should be counteracted by the appearance of the promised Russian troops at Kazvin at the earliest possible moment.

Mustafi-el-Mamelek is trying to form a Cabinet, but, even if he should succeed in filling various offices, the combination would be too weak and too much under democratic influence to be of any use [group undecypherable] in counteracting German agitation.

(Sent to Petrograd, Basra, Bushire, and Ispahan.)

[106826] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1715.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 6, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 268 of 3rd August: German activity.

In view of critical situation therein described, I earnestly hope that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs may be able to secure immediate despatch of adequate reinforcements to Persia.

I fully sympathise with his Excellency's object as mentioned in your telegram No. 1068 of 28th July, and the gravity of the crisis alone makes me urge action at once.

His Majesty's forces were due at Bushire 5th August, but action in south alone cannot have desired effect at the capital.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 216.)

106826] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 217.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 6, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 268 of 3rd August: German activity.

I agree that in present circumstances withdrawal of consular officers from Ispahan and Shiraz would be undesirable.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1717.)

[109490] No. 36.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 1130.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, August* 9, 1915.

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the sense of your telegram No. 1715 of 6th August. He said that Viceroy of the Caucasus had declared that he wanted every man he could get for operations against Turks, and that he had no troops to spare for Persia. His Excellency will, however, make another attempt, as he fully realises gravity of situation.

He hinted that, if matters did not improve, he would have to consider advisability of calling back ex-Shah, who would make short work of Medjliss, who were at bottom of whole trouble. I would prefer that you should not take any official notice of this remark at present, as I do not know whether his Excellency meant it seriously.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[110252] No. 37.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 1135.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, August* 10, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1676 of 3rd August.

Russian Government informs me in *aide-mémoire* received to-day that, while having no intention of meeting every request from Persian Government for financial assistance with a direct refusal, they consider an advance would be inopportune at the present moment, for reasons given in my telegram No. 1081.

On question of principle, Russian Government entirely share your views as to desirability of allowing two Ministers at Tehran full discretion in the matter.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[110253] No. 38.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 1136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, August* 10, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1744 of 9th August.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 1707 of 5th August I made representations to the Russian Government in the sense desired by Mr. Marling in his telegram No. 267 of 3rd August.

I have to-day received the following reply:—

"The Imperial Government is far from under-estimating the gravity of the crisis through which Persia is passing, and considers joint efforts of Cabinets of London and Petrograd should be directed to the sole object of warding off all danger threatening the interests of the two Powers in Persia. Everything else should be consigned to the background, and the considerations which formerly held preponderant position in their political decisions can now only have a secondary importance, such as, for instance, the distinct spheres of influence.

"If the Imperial Ministry declared itself against the formation at Meshed of an Anglo-Indian force it was because it considered Russian forces sufficient to intercept German caravans proceeding towards the Afghan frontier, and that Anglo-Indian

troops could more easily control and patrol southern portion of the frontier regions of Afghanistan. But Russian Government have certainly no intention of raising any objection to the principle of Anglo-Indian contingents working on the same front with the Russian detachments in whatever zone of action against the Germans that may prove necessary. If, therefore, the British Government considers the body of Anglo-Indian troops would be useful at Birjand, Imperial Government declares itself in absolute accord with such a measure."

[110255]

No. 39.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 10, 1915.

PETROGRAD telegram No. 1130 of 9th August.

I hardly think Minister for Foreign Affairs could have made proposal seriously. If ex-Shah, with, as was generally believed, at least moral support of Russia, failed in his attempt to regain throne a few years ago, what chance would he have to-day, when Russian prestige is so shaken here, unless he had strong material backing? Case of Saad-ed-Dowleh is lesson enough.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[110256]

No. 40.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 10, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 201 of 22nd July.

I have been led by recent reports from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz to feel considerable doubt as to wisdom of maintaining gendarmerie in Fars under Swedes, and on 25th July I had telegraphic conversation with him for express purpose of ascertaining his opinion. He was then in favour of scheme, but has now telegraphed that Persian officers are taking an active part in German campaign, that Swedes make no attempt to control them, and are inefficient and unfriendly, and that, in the circumstances, and especially as Pousette has left Fars, he is inclined to think we had better withdraw all support from Swedes and endeavour to secure their recall from Persia altogether.

In view of this change of opinion on the part of His Majesty's consul, and of exceedingly unfavourable accounts which reach me from all quarters of hostile attitude of Swedes in every part of Persia, I presume that His Majesty's Government will no longer be willing to accord subvention.

Swedes at Shiraz themselves declined, on advice of Governor-General, who is very pro-German, to accept subvention except with sanction of Persian Government, which, of course, cannot mature until a Cabinet is formed.

[110257]

No. 41.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 10, 1915.

RUSSIAN Minister informs me that, in reply to Russian Minister for Foreign Affair's urgent insistence for troops to be sent to Kazvin, military authorities have replied that none are at present available, and that they are considering in what other manner pressure can be exercised on Persian Government.

Russian Minister agrees with me that only a demonstration of military force can restore our influence here. If necessary troops are not forthcoming, the situation which I suggested in my telegram No. 268 of 3rd August as being a possibility will very soon become a serious probability, and it appears to me that we have now to choose between two alternatives:—

Firstly, to abandon frankly effort to induce or force Persia to adopt a policy of real neutrality and rely on our own resources to keep German emissaries out of Afghanistan. This may involve withdrawal of our consular posts at inland places,

destruction of our telegraphs (which have already been cut four times), and probably eventual employment of much larger force on Persia's eastern frontier than at present required at Kazvin.

Secondly, to secure loyalty of principal tribes, and especially Bahktiari. It is a question of money. I think that, although many khans have been got at by Germans, they are, as a tribe, under the influence of their traditional friendship with us and belief in our power, that they prefer our money to German, and that at this moment I could induce them to collect a sufficient force at Ispahan to disarm the Germans. Proposal which would be made to them would certainly be attractive to them, coming, as it would, from two Legations, as it would restore them to predominant position they have once enjoyed in Persia. We should have to pay current expenses of their sowars and promise khans a lump sum down on completion of the job; but this is a matter for negotiation.

From casual remarks dropped by khans in conversation I feel fairly certain that as part of the agreement khans will want an assurance that Ispahan will not be left in Russian sphere of influence. I have of course, never initiated or allowed any discussion on this point.

It might also be necessary to come to some similar arrangement with Kawam and Soulet.

I cannot say what cost would be, but it would not, I think, exceed amount sanctioned by His Majesty's Government, as a subvention to Fars gendarmerie, if continued one year. As that subvention is abandoned (see my immediately preceding telegram), might not the sum sanctioned be diverted to above purpose, say to a total amount of 200,000 tomans?

Opportunity for coming to an agreement with khans is likely to be very brief indeed, and I should be glad to be informed, if possible by Thursday night, whether I may proceed on these lines. I have shown this telegram to my Russian colleague, who concurs that there is no other alternative if troops cannot be sent at once.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[110257]

No. 42.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 223.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 11, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 276 of 10th August.

You may, as regards the Bakhtiari khans, proceed on the lines which you propose, but you should avoid, if possible, any discussion as to Ispahan, and in no case should you give any undertaking in regard to it being removed from Russian sphere. The other points raised in your telegram under acknowledgment and your other telegram will be taken into immediate consideration and I will let you have replies shortly.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1768.)

[110256]

No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 224.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 11, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 275 of 10th August.

In the circumstances reported by you, I agree that we should withdraw offer of subvention for Fars gendarmerie.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1771.)

[110256] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Howard.

(No. 974.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1915.

IN view of the situation in Southern Persia, and of the attitude of some Persian officers in the Fars gendarmerie, His Majesty's Government are compelled to withdraw their offer of a subvention to that force, but you should not mention the matter unless Swedish Government enquire about it.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1772, and Tehran, No. 225.)

[114407] No. 45.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 282. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 15, 1915.

WITH all his intimate knowledge of Bakhtiari affairs, His Majesty's consul at Ispahan has not the knack of dealing with khans, and in order to be in close touch with them I propose to send Mr. Bristow to Ispahan temporarily. He is much liked by khans, and Russian Minister has complete confidence in him.

Am I authorised to draw up to 200,000 tomans? Exchange at present is well above 60. Russian Minister believes that his Government will contribute towards expenses, but recent promises of money have never materialised.

[114407] No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 234.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 282 of 15th August: Bakhtiari.

Proposed action approved, and sum in question is being placed to your credit.

(Very Confidential.)

I think that it would be undesirable to press Russian Government to participate in financial operations with Bakhtiari.

Cannot matter be regarded merely as substitute for financing Fars gendarmerie in which Russia has never co-operated?

[116052] No. 47.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 288.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 19, 1915.

MY telegram No. 276 of 10th August.

Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik has succeeded in forming a Cabinet, himself being Minister of the Interior; Mohtashim-es-Sultaneh, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, Ministerof Finance; and Ala-es-Sultaneh, Minister of Justice.

Germans last few days have been trying to rouse popular feeling here against Russians and ourselves by means of street preachings, and leaflets threatening Persians friendly to us have been distributed.

Police have done but little to stop it, and gendarmerie are almost openly hostile. German object would appear to be to make an advance of Russian troops from Kazvin hazardous.

Occupation of Bushire and other operations have caused considerable excitement at Shiraz, where consul describes situation as critical.

In Ispahan clergy are agitating, but Bakhtiaris are keeping aloof from movement. At Kermanshah German consul has threatened to prevent forcibly return of British and Russian consuls, who are actually held up at Kangavar. I think that Ministers are quite alive to dangers of situation that party squabbles have brought about.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[117242] No. 48.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 21, 1915.

CONSUL at Tabriz reports panic at Urumia was more serious than he had been led to believe.

Over 25,000 refugees have entered Salmas in a state of destitution. American missionaries are affording such relief as they can.

Russian military authorities are trying to repatriate refugees and hope soon to be able to garrison Urumia, which would probably induce the refugees to return. Meanwhile they are being directed to Khoi, where food is more plentiful.

Consul anticipates that a subsequent withdrawal of Russian troops would lead to another panic under worse conditions.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[117238] No. 49.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 1204.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, August* 22, 1915.

RUSSIAN consular representative at Seistan has informed his Government that a detachment consisting of six Germans, a Turkish officer named Kazem Beg, Turkish Mullah, six Afghans with a certain Mirmast Khan Afridi at their head, and an Afghan artilleryman, by name Asgar Zadi, has crossed Afghan frontier near Tch[? mis]yg.

Russian consul having been informed too late, Cossacks sent in pursuit were unable to prevent detachment from entering Afghanistan.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[120271] No. 50.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 26, 1915.

SWEDISH gendarmerie may be now considered as practically an enemy force, and most Swedish officers hardly make even a pretence of being neutral. It is nevertheless difficult to advance actual proof of instances of misconduct, but if judged by results their partiality to Germans is indisputable.

Law against carrying arms is well known and has, in the past, been very strictly enforced, so much so that Sir W. Townley was stopped by the gendarmerie for having a sporting rifle in his car, while a cart containing arms of the legation's Indian escort was stopped on the way to Gulahek while in charge of non-commissioned officer, and taken to the police station. It is therefore obvious that, if gendarmerie had executed the law against the Germans, passage of armed German parties with convoys of arms would not have been possible.

Two of the Swedish officers, Rejosette and Gleerup, have admitted to me that they were instructed not to interfere with Germans.

Again, about a week ago three cartloads of ammunition were being conveyed by night to the chief German recruiting agent in Tehran. Police wished to seize them, but refrained from doing so because of gendarmerie escort. Swedish Chief of Police, whose conduct is irreproachable, has confirmed this to me in strict confidence.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz is prepared to produce documentary evidence of small but numerous irregularities committed by Swedes in financial administration of the gendarmerie, but those which he has reported to me would be venial in Persian eyes.

Swedish Government is unable to recall them, but it might be induced to send them serious warning to observe strict neutrality. If they would not consent to do so, I would suggest that Reuter's agent here might send suitably worded message to the press.

[121069] No. 51.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 26, 1915.

NEW Cabinet has been in office a week, but has done little or nothing, partly owing to vacillation of Prime Minister.

At Shiraz campaign carried on against us by Germans, with the assistance of Governor-General, has resulted within last few days in insults and threats being levied against British subjects, and their position is one of considerable peril, while volunteer forces are being collected to renew attack on Bushire. Both Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs have given me most categorical assurances, even before I asked for them, that Governor-General, who is directly responsible for existing situation, shall be recalled without delay, but Cabinet hesitates to act, and Governor-General and his German friends redouble their activity.

At Ispahan situation is not immediately dangerous, but His Majesty's consul reports that he and his Russian colleague propose warning their communities that it may become so shortly, so that preparations may be made to remove women and children to Ahwaz. Mr. Bristow has arrived at Ispahan, and reports show that Bakhtiari khans have yielded to inducements offered to them and can be depended on to protect us; they have not, however, had time to bring in their retainers.

Khan in Tehran appears to be equally friendly to us.

At Kermanshah German consul has openly threatened to prevent return of British and Russian consuls to their posts, and actually attacked them while at Kangavar awaiting gendarmerie escort promised by Persian Government. Two consuls are now returning to Hamadan.

About 30 miles from Kazvin force of gendarmerie have been badly cut up by tribe, and near Burujird 800 of them have been completely smashed by Lurs with loss of two guns. In fact, general state of the country somewhat resembles that which used to exist a century ago.

In Tehran itself situation is unstable. According to chief of the police enemy have enrolled at least 300 men, while gendarmerie officers and men are openly pro-German and part of police is untrustworthy. Cabinet quite recognise that the enemy they have to fight is Germany, and they have no force at their disposal except Cossack brigade and Bakhtiari whom I am endeavouring to bring. Government is aware of and approves coming of latter force, and is even making pretence of finding funds to pay sowars, but it must go very much against the grain for Prime Minister to be relying on Cossacks with their Russian officers.

Knowing their helplessness, Cabinet is appealing to the two legations for support, but they are conscious that by doing so they will alienate Democrats, who have already attacked them in press for inclusion of Vossuk-ed-Dowleh and Sipahdar.

We have replied to these advances that we have no desire to embarrass them, but we cannot yet hope to persuade our Governments to give support promised to late Cabinet to a Cabinet formed by efforts of party that brought about and prolonged recent crisis, but that Cabinet may hope for support when they have proved that they merit it. It appears to us to our interests to see present Cabinet retain office as long as possible, and get out of it what we can. It is not likely to stand long, and it is better for us that its fall should be compassed by its late friends than by us.

It is impossible to say whether Germans will risk a *coup* here, or whether moral effect of Kazvin will deter them, but on the whole I think they feel that they are not strong enough yet, and arrival of Bakhtiari in the meantime should alleviate situation.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[121478] No. 52.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 28, 1915.

FACTS have come to my knowledge which show that the Government is not sincere with us. Realising my anxiety about safety of His Majesty's consul and community at Shiraz, they are seeking to use it as a lever to induce us to evacuate

Bushire. Their attitude makes the position of the consul still more dangerous, and I have instructed him to make preparations to leave Shiraz.

Bakhtiari are professing here and at Ispahan that they cannot bring sowars without orders from Government, and Prime Minister will try to make these orders condition of our leaving Bushire. Khans are, of course, making use of this opportunity to squeeze us for money.

(Repeated to India, Petrograd, Basra, Bushire, and Ispahan.)

[121482] No. 53.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 29, 1915.

MY telegram No. 306 of 29th August. Prime Minister also spoke of arrangement with Bakhtiari. I told his Excellency that we wished to secure presence of a sufficient number of sowars at Ispahan and Tehran to deter Germans from attempting to create disorder, in fact to make Persian authorities masters in these towns. This would entail expenses, and I was ready to help to bear them.

Prime Minister's reply was to the effect that he was grateful and approved the object. He himself had "ordered" khans to bring an adequate force to make Government authority secure, but he could not see his way to accept any monetary help except as a part of larger scheme of financial assistance.

[121484] No. 54.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Basra, August* 29, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 298 of 28th August to Foreign Office.

I respectfully submit that it would be a great mistake for consul to leave Shiraz or to make preparations to do so. He is not alone there. There is a British community, including, if I am not mistaken, ladies and children. If they did leave, where could they go to except Ispahan? Surely they run less risk in consulate under guard. Bushire is enemy's objective. Judging from consul's reports there is no reason to expect trouble in Shiraz itself, and, for the sake of his own skin, Governor-General would probably not allow consul or British community to be harmed. Withdrawal of consul would have worst possible effect on the general situation.

I suggest that Governor-General be warned that he will suffer personally for any harm that may happen to any British subjects.

Kawam will probably assist consul.

(Addressed to India; sent to Tehran, and Bushire.)

[121541] No. 55.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 29, 1915.

OCCUPATION of Bushire.

After three hours' conversation yesterday the Prime Minister said he would agree to our conditions in principle, though he took exception to the amount of indemnity and suggested the following procedure:—

Governor-General of Fars to be recalled and Persian authority restored at Bushire simultaneously.

Our troops to remain until danger of further attack is past.

Persian Government to pledge itself to put an end to German agitations, and as soon as possible punish khans implicated in attack.

I said that I had no hope that His Majesty's Government would accept such terms, but would certainly insist at all events on the removal of the Governor-General before terminating the formal occupation.

Otherwise proposal is worth considering. Governor-General has been chief

instrument of German agitation in the south, and his removal will be a decided blow to them in Persian eyes. Consul at Shiraz always puts his removal as most important point. Other Persian promises are of course valueless, as Government are quite powerless to fulfil them, and, moreover, their hold is very precarious.

It may, however, last long enough to get rid of the Governor-General.

On the other hand, our command continues, and we are relieved of nuisance of having to administer Bushire while irritation felt all over Persia at hauling down of Persian flag is removed.

Would His Majesty's Government agree to this proposal with the modification that Persian authority is not restored at Bushire till Governor-General has definitely left and Kawam-ul-Mulk appointed as Acting Governor-General, legation to be consulted as to selection of two new governors of Bushire and Shiraz.

[121679] No. 56.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 302.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 29, 1915.

MY telegram No. 301 of 29th August.

My conversation confirms the impression stated in my telegram No. 298 of 29th August, viz., that Government is trying to squeeze us. In connection with the Bakhtiari, they hope to get advance promised to Ain-ed-Dowleh. This is an illusion easy to dispel, but it will be more difficult to deal with khans. They profess that they will not do anything without the approval of the Government, and could not accept payment from us for their sowars direct, which means that they are joining in Government tactics to squeeze us in the interests of themselves and Cabinet.

In the question of Bushire it is the same. They look on consul and community as hostages, which indeed they are so long as Mukber remains as Governor-General and Germans are free to stir up feeling against us.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports that the situation is considerably improved, and he thinks he can hold his own. I fear, however, that if the Governor-General is not removed danger may revive.

[121680] No. 57.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 303.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 29, 1915.

MY telegram No. 297 of 26th August.

Russian Minister has telegraphed to his Government in very pessimistic strain. His view, in which I largely concur, is that Germans with their mujahids and gendarmerie are virtually masters in some of the chief towns of Persia—Shiraz, Ispahan, Kermanshah; that they are endeavouring to reproduce same conditions in Tehran itself, and that in other districts such as Luristan and in the south anarchy reigns. He thinks that Germans plan is to undermine Government authority to the point when it will be incapable of maintaining semblance of order to render position of our consuls, &c., so precarious that we shall have to withdraw them, and finally to drive out even legation.

(Sent to India, Basra, and Petrograd.)

[122235] No. 58.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 30, 1915.

MY telegram No. 303 of 29th August.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports that Kawam and Soulet are both friendly, but that the method of our occupation of Bushire, *i.e.*, removal of flag, has given German party a splendid war-cry against us, which placed them in a difficult position *vis-à-vis* of the tribesmen. He thinks that unless we do something to soothe

widespread irritation thus aroused it may be impossible for khans to resist pressure which is being brought to bear upon them to join campaign against English. Should this occur in the south of Persia, it would become untenable for us. He recommends that he be authorised to assure them that on expulsion of Governor Persian flag will be replaced.

[121069] No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 240.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 297 of 26th August: Situation.

I approve your action regarding the Bakhtiari and your attitude towards the Persian Cabinet in this critical time, the difficulties of which I fully appreciate.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 1955.)

[121478] No 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 242.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1915.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 298 and 302 of 28th and 29th August, and Bushire telegram of 29th August.

In view of great difficulties in way of withdrawal either to Bushire or even to Ispahan, I am in favour of His Majesty's consul and the colony remaining at Shiraz.

If you see no grave objection to this course, you should instruct Major O'Connor accordingly.

You are authorised to inform Persian Government that, if any harm befalls His Majesty's consul or the colony, His Majesty's Government will hold Minister of Interior and present Governor-General jointly and personally responsible.

I hope to reply soon regarding Bushire situation.

[121680] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1915.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 300 to 303 of 29th August: General situation.

I realise fully that inability of two Powers to send strong forces to Persia renders it difficult to negotiate with success. I must therefore leave it to you to make the best use you can of the lever such as it is afforded by our occupation of Bushire, though you will doubtless bear following desiderata in mind:—

Present Governor-General should be removed immediately.

Substantive appointment of Kawam as his successor would seem desirable; but if you see objection to this, I would agree to his acting appointment, which he should take up at once, without any interregnum.

Persian Government should also, as preliminary to evacuation of Bushire, remove all German emissaries, not only from Shiraz but also from the whole district extending to sea coast, and to intern them.

You are authorised to negotiate accordingly, using your own discretion on points that may arise.

[122235] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 246.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1915.

PERSIAN Minister has suggested privately that situation might be improved if Persian Governor were allowed to return to Bushire, and Persian flag to be again flown there, even if His Majesty's forces remained in occupation.

He has been informed that this might perhaps be a solution when once Governor-General of Fars has been removed.

This appears to tally with view expressed in your telegram No. 306 of 30th August, since received.

If, therefore, you concur, His Majesty's consul at Shiraz may certainly give oral assurance proposed in your telegram.

[123657] No. 63.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 1276.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, September* 1, 1915.

ON my communicating to Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of your telegram No. 244 of 31st August to Tehran, his Excellency expressed much concern at contemplated evacuation of Bushire. He thought it would be a grave mistake on our part to withdraw, and that preliminary removal of German emissaries would afford us no guarantee against their eventual return.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[123802] No. 64.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 310.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 1, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 244 of 31st August.

I think it undesirable to demand substantive appointment of Kawam as it would arouse latent jealousy of Sowlet, who is at present on good terms with him.

intern?

To remove German emissaries from Shiraz, &c., and still more to [? group omitted] them is quite beyond power of Persian Government, but our troops would under arrangement suggested in my telegram No. 300 of 29th August remain in effective occupation until we chose to consider that improved conditions safely make it possible for them to be withdrawn, *i.e.*, till German agitation has ceased.

I therefore propose to insist on conditions outlined in my above-mentioned telegram, viz.:—

Restoration of Persian flag and civil authorities in Bushire as soon as Mukber has left Shiraz and Kawam has taken charge from him as Acting Governor-General; new Governors of Bushire and Shiraz to be appointed with our concurrence.

Troops will remain at Bushire until all possibility of further attacks has passed.

Persian Government to undertake to take effective measures against German agitation.

Indemnity to be paid as laid down.

I expect to see Prime Minister to-morrow morning.

[123723] No. 65.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 312.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 1, 1915.

REGRET following just received from consul-general at Ispahan:—

"Was fired on and slightly wounded whilst riding this morning. Regret Indian orderly killed."

Details follow.

(Sent to India.)

[123657] No. 66.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1995.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1276 of 1st September.

We are informing Mr. Marling that the Persian flag may be re-hoisted at Bushire when the Governor-General has been definitely removed from Shiraz. As to withdrawal of troops from Bushire, we shall retain them there until we are satisfied that the activities of German emissaries and of others have definitely been checked, and also that the general situation in Southern Persia is such that we need have no further anxiety or apprehension as to the safety of our various consulates, and that a state of tranquillity has been established which will ensure security to our interests in those regions.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 252.)

[124491] No. 67.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 2, 1915

BUSHIRE.

Your telegram No. 244 of 31st August.

I saw Prime Minister this morning. I said that, as I anticipated, His Majesty's Government could not accept solution he had suggested, but I was glad to have learnt that Persian Minister at London had put forward a proposal practically identical with the one I now brought with me.

His Highness agreed without very serious demur to dismiss Governor-General of Fars as previous condition of restoration of Persian civil authority, but he then boggled over punishment of khans and insisted on early withdrawal of our troops. He would promise no more punishment of tufanghis who had actually taken part in attack, and would give no kind of promise in regard to khans responsible for it. As regards troops, he said that they must be withdrawn to appease public opinion. At about this point I received news of attempt on consul-general at Ispahan, which I at once communicated to his Excellency, and pointed out that public opinion he wishes to placate was that which agreed about these occurrences. It was opinion aroused and paid for by German gold, and I could not consent to his making any concession to it. British troops must remain until all danger was past. His Excellency said he would send gendarmes, to which I replied that he was setting wolves to guard sheep, and suggestion would not be entertained.

I considered his Excellency's objections, especially in view of attack on consul-general, as tantamount to a refusal to give us satisfaction, and as an indication that Persian Government had no intention of carrying out policy of neutrality so often proclaimed, and I regretted to be obliged to telegraph to you to this effect.

I warned his Excellency that attempt at Ispahan was fourth of series of attempts on consuls of the two Powers for which no adequate satisfaction had been given. It revealed a serious situation, and Persian Government had now to choose whether or no they were going to allow Germans to achieve their object of making our position here impossible. If his Excellency decided now not to give us very moderate satisfaction we required, we should draw our own conclusions, viz., that Persian Government contemplated without serious misgiving possibility of relations being broken off between Persia and her two neighbours.

His Excellency said he could not give reply without consulting his colleagues.

(Sent to India, Petrograd, Basra, Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan.)

[125184] No. 68.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 314.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 3, 1915.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called on me this morning to express regret of Persian Government for attempt on life of consul-general at Ispahan. I asked his

Excellency what steps Persians were going to take to put an end to German campaign of assassination, and he replied that measures would be taken, but that Cabinet looked to two Powers for assistance. I told him that unless Ministers had given signal proof of their intention to take active measures they could not expect financial help or arms from us, and reminded him that, though Cabinet had been in office a fortnight, it had done nothing whatever. As long as it remained passive, Persia would believe that Cabinet approved German propaganda against the two Powers.

As to Bushire, he strongly urged withdrawal of our troops. I said that I had talked matter out with Prime Minister, and absolutely declined to recede from arrangement offered to his Highness yesterday.

Minister for Foreign Affairs again appealed for money from us. Russian Minister is to see Shah this afternoon.

(Repeated to India and Basra.)

[125261] No. 69.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 315.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 3, 1915.

MY telegram No. 313 of 2nd September.

His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan describes the situation as very disquieting, and advocates departure of at least the women and children before it is too late. Russian consul's report is equally alarming. Both describe popular ferment as due to our occupation of Bushire, but excitement against us is fictitious, and if alleged cause did not exist Germans would have invented another.

Russian Minister and I are of opinion that it would be a useless risk that our consuls and colonies should remain any longer. It is of course true that to withdraw them is to play German game, but if they remain Germans will renew their attempts at murder and so achieve their object. If Government here could take any action whatever, I should be disposed to hold on in spite of risks, but they cannot, even if they are trying to do so, which I am half inclined to doubt. Their departure from Ispahan will probably make position of Shiraz more difficult unless we get rid of Governor-General. This Government have promised, and, if I can obtain fulfilment, it will be at least a sign to Persia that Government disapproves of German action, and might somewhat alleviate situation at Ispahan; but it might also cause Germans to reply with another attempt there or elsewhere.

Consul-general's wound progressing well.

[125785] No. 70.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 316.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 4, 1915.

RUSSIAN Minister's conversation with Shah yesterday was unsatisfactory. His Majesty appears to be very much under enemy influence.

After long and careful consideration Russian Minister and I think that attempt at Ispahan following no [*sic*: ? on] other attacks on our consuls reveals a state of things that necessitates strong action on the part of the Powers without delay.

It is clear that object of enemy is by [group undecypherable]s of this kind to bring about a rupture of relations between Persia and the two Powers so as to enable them to announce union of two Islamic peoples. Persian Government do nothing whatever to restrain German proceedings, or even to influence Persian opinion against them; on the contrary, Government's one idea is to use Germans as a lever to squeeze us, unless pressure of some kind and substantial inducements also are brought to bear on them.

Pressure applied by the occupation of another port would defeat its own object, because, as in the case of Bushire, it will only furnish Germans with another pretext for inflaming feeling against us. Same considerations would also apply to use of Russian troops at Kazvin, unless their numbers are very greatly augmented, say, up to 15,000 men; there is no time for this, even if the men were available.

Only course open to us would be to give Persia choice of declaring herself for or against us. It would be akin to asking her to break off relations with enemy

Powers; distinction is too subtle for average Persian, and step would be so signal as to leave no room for half-measures or doubt. If Persia wishes to join us, she must declare war on those Powers, and in that case we would agree to moratorium from now until, say, three years after the end of the war. In the contrary case, two Legations would at once leave the country, holding Persian Ministers responsible for the safety of our consuls and colonies on their journey, of any of our nationals who may remain behind, and of all British and Russian property.

Persian Government would have, say, forty-eight hours in which to decide.

There is, we believe, a chance that Persian Government would accept these terms, though they would very likely stipulate for military assistance, for a sum of money down, for a guarantee of territorial integrity at the end of the war, and for eventual removal of all foreign troops from Persia, or some or all of these points.

It is for the Allied Governments to decide whether their interests at stake make some arrangement such as that outlined above necessary or desirable, but Russian Minister and I are agreed that, unless some very drastic measure is taken or a decisive military success occurs to shake Persia's belief in German invincibleness, we shall not be able to remain at Tehran very much longer, and it would at least be less damaging to our prestige to depart by our own doing than to be driven out.

French and Belgian Ministers are in accord with these views, and former has telegraphed to his Government that situation is becoming critical.

Russian Minister is sending a message to Petrograd identical with foregoing.

If Persian Government join us enemy missions will probably make for Ispahan, and, if they succeed, grave disorder may ensue, though I do not think that it would be of long duration provided that Persian Government had plenty of money to use amongst the tribes. There would be some danger for consuls and colonies at Shiraz and Ispahan, and former would have to rely on Kawam and latter on Bakhtiari; elsewhere, I think, there would not be much danger.

In the event of the Persian Government declining our proposals I presume policy laid down in Government of India's telegram No. 483 of 15th May would hold good while, as regards our troops in East Persia, Governments of two Powers would decide whether operations should be continued or not.

(Sent to India, Petrograd, and Basra.)

[125261] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 255.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 5, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 315 of 3rd September: Ispahan.

While I should deprecate withdrawal of British subjects from Ispahan, unless imperative, I authorise you to instruct His Majesty's consul-general to order women and children, or, if necessary, the whole colony, to leave, whenever you think that moment has arrived.

You should at the same time inform Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs of action you decide to take, and add that His Majesty's Government will hold Minister of Interior personally responsible for anything that may befall British subjects on the way.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2018.)

[126799] No. 72.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 6, 1915

MY telegram No. 316 of 4th September.

I have just learned that, in reply to request from Mullahs of Ispahan for instructions as to their attitude towards agitation in that town against us in connection with our occupation of Bushire, Prime Minister said he was in communication with British Legation, and instructions would be sent in a few days. This is tantamount to inviting Mullahs to continue agitation in order to put pressure on us. In circumstances, it appears to me that for consul and colony to remain longer is to run needless risk. Even if we give way as to Bushire, which I firmly deprecate, I doubt whether

Government could arrest agitation; they certainly could not prevent Germans from instigating attempts; if, however, consul and colony leave [group undecypherable] is removed and Germans, having accomplished part of their design, may give up attempts.

I have communicated to His Majesty's consul-general nature of step which Russian Minister and I have submitted to our respective Governments, and told him that question of his departure will depend on instructions we may receive; that if these instructions are not of a nature to relieve situation at Ispahan I authorise him and colony to leave, or even earlier if danger should demand it.

(Repeated to India, Petrograd, and Basra.)

[126800] No. 73.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 319.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 6, 1915.

ISPAHAN situation.

Officer commanding gendarmerie has informed His Majesty's consul-general that agitation is becoming very serious, that plot is on foot to assassinate him, Mr. Bristow, Russian consul, and managers of English and Russian banks, and that gendarmerie is powerless to prevent it.

Broadsheet has been issued urging that killing of consul is useless, and that all British and Russians must be driven out.

I have sent a very strongly worded message to Prime Minister, holding him personally responsible for any harm that may occur.

[126719] No. 74.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 6, 1915.

I HAVE told Prime Minister, who is also Minister of Interior, that he will be held personally responsible for any harm that may befall [? group omitted] in Ispahan.

[127350] No. 75.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 7, 1915.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 912 S.

My Russian colleague and I have constantly had in mind the importance which Indian and Afghan considerations possess in the Persian problem, and our proposals were passed entirely with a view to hold up the situation here. I readily admit there is no small element of chance involved in proposals, but I entirely fail to see how the policy of drift, which Government of India advocate, can meet the difficulty.

The Germans are strengthening their position here every day, and could even now by the same methods as those employed at Ispahan render our position untenable.

It is therefore not a question of drifting, but of how long the Germans will hold their hand, and we can scarcely hope that the Germans will wait for some signal success, such as the forcing of the Dardanelles, to alter the position. The capture of Bagdad would, in my opinion, be much more to the purpose.

There is an alternative to them and open to us, but it appears to me to labour under the same disadvantages as the policy of drift. That course would be to inform the Persian Government that we are ready to give them the support which they are always hinting at, viz., money and arms—in other words, to confess to surrender and allow ourselves to be mercilessly blackmailed.

In return we should ask the Government to close the Medjliss, suppress hostile newspapers, &c., and at the first sign of such action the Germans would strike [groups

undecypherable]. As a matter of fact, the only element of the present situation in our favour is that the Persian Government will go to considerable length to prevent the two legations from leaving. Even this reluctance on their part the Germans are endeavouring to overcome, and two inopportune events have just occurred which are calculated to assist them, as they will give the Germans further grounds for inflaming Persian opinion against us. The first is the landing of a Russian regiment to-day at Enzeli—a force insufficient to inspire respect, but its appearance is provocative. The second is the intention to deport the Turkish consul-general at Resht, but Russian Minister says that he will endeavour to get orders sent from the Caucasus.

The Government consider that our proposal involves playing Germany's game; we, on the contrary, see the game is already in Germany's hand, and we believe that the course we suggest, by utilising the only element of the situation that tells in our favour, and at the same time promising financial assistance and other inducements, offers a chance of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire. The chance is but a small one, for, in spite of half-hints from Persian Government that they would at a price become our Allies, I can scarcely believe that, when the moment comes, so flabby a Minister as Mustaufi would find courage to put his name to a declaration of war against Germany, to say nothing of Turkey. The disposition of the Persian Government towards us at present may be judged by the fact that I have just received a verbal message from Minister for Foreign Affairs [that] Persian Government reject our proposal to settle the Bushire question and insist on hoisting the Persian flag prior to the recall of the Governor-General of Fars.

If, however, the two Governments decide against our proposal, I submit that, rather than adopt a policy of drift, and an [?]ing drift, we should at least try to induce the Persian Government by giving them assistance in money and arms which they ask for. This will of course involve sooner or later settlement of the Bushire question on Persian terms, but, on the other hand, it offers a slight chance of inducing Persian Government not tacitly to encourage pro-German feeling in the country.

It may, however, just as well have the contrary effect, as it will show Persia we are wholly dependent on their good-will.

[? Group undecypherable] unfortunately the inducement will have to be large, but it is necessarily limited by the power of the Imperial Bank of Persia to make the advance. It must also be made immediately, and without waiting for the assent of the Russian Government.

(Sent to India and Basra.)

[126799] No. 76.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1915.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 318, 319, and 320 of 6th September: Ispahan.

I cannot give definite decision on questions raised in your telegram No. 316 of 4th September until Cabinet have discussed it. In these circumstances I approve instructions which you have sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2049.)

[128007] No. 77.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 326.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 8, 1915.

MY telegram No. 323.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Hamadan reports that German consular agent there has now 150 men in his pay, and is threatening to drive British and Russians out of the town. He describes the situation as critical.

[128032] No. 78.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 328.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 8, 1915.

I CALLED on Prime Minister at his request this afternoon and came to following agreement with him respecting Bushire:—

Governor-General of Fars is to be removed at once and Kawam appointed as Acting Governor. Kawam is to select a suitable person to act as Governor of Bushire; Persian Government will inform me of name of person selected, and I am to transmit it to military authorities at Bushire, who will then hand over administration to him and allow Persian flag to be hoisted.

Troops to remain as long as required in order to ensure safety of consulate and community.

Persian Government undertake to punish guilty khans and to endeavour to put an end to German intrigues, but hope we shall not insist on excessive severity on former point. Nothing was said about indemnity, but I consider it as accepted tacitly.

If you approve of this arrangement I shall be grateful if necessary instructions will be sent to military authorities at Bushire.

This surrender on the part of the Persian Government is very largely due to landing of Russian troops at Enzeli.

(Sent to India, Petrograd, Basra, and Bushire.)

[128032] No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 328 of 8th September: Bushire.

We approve, and the India Office is sending instructions accordingly to the military authorities at Bushire.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2062.)

[125785] No. 80.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1915.

HIS Majesty's Government do not consider it desirable at this juncture to present to Persian Government an ultimatum of the somewhat drastic nature proposed in your telegram No. 316 of 4th September.

You are, however, authorised to inform Persian Prime Minister in most earnest manner that His Majesty's Government cannot but view with the utmost surprise and concern recent events which have been allowed to place certain of His Majesty's consular officers and British subjects in a well-nigh intolerable position, in direct contradiction to the very friendly feelings which Great Britain has entertained towards Persia during the last century.

His Majesty's Government find it difficult to believe that the Persian Government have ever contemplated the serious consequences to their country which would be entailed if, by allowing a continuance of the present unbearable position, they definitely alienated these friendly sentiments. His Majesty's Government feel, therefore, that they are justified in asking to be informed whether the Persian Government are prepared forthwith to assert themselves to protect His Majesty's consular officers and British subjects throughout the Shah's dominions, and, if so, what steps the Persian Government propose to adopt for the purpose.

You may at the same time give his Excellency to understand that, if the repys were to be of a satisfactory nature, His Majesty's Government would be willing to ease

the financial position of the Persian Government by granting a moratorium from now until six months after the end of the war, and a subsidy at the rate of 50,000*l.* per mensem during the war so long as their attitude is satisfactory.

(Confidential.)

If you think it absolutely imperative you may increase offer up to maximum at 100,000*l.* per mensem, but I greatly hope that 50,000*l.* may prove adequate

(Most Confidential.)

I propose that on this occasion you should confine yourself to the above remarks. But if replies were unsatisfactory I would authorise you, on subsequent occasion, to remind his Excellency that, if two legations were once withdrawn, probable result might be that the two Powers would never again be represented in Persia by two diplomatic missions accredited to an independent and neutral court.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2066.)

[128981] No. 81.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 330.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 9, 1915.

MY telegram No. 328 [group undecypherable].

1,200 Russian troops have disembarked at Enzeli. Russian Minister does not know what full numbers of force may eventually be, as his telegrams have arrived in very mutilated state, but they are under command of general officer, which appears to indicate that it will be considerable enough to restore situation. A telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs speaks of possibility of sending troops to Ispahan.

[129999] No. 82.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 332.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 11, 1915.

MY telegram No. 330 of 9th September.

Can you ascertain whether Russian Government intend to send more troops, and, if so, in what number? Rumours that a considerable force is about to arrive have shaken German supporters considerably, but their confidence would be restored and fortified if these reports prove unfounded.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[130000] No. 83.

Mr. Marling to Sir Eaward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 333.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 11, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 262 of 9th September.

It would, I think, be a mistake to offer Persian Government so large a subvention all at once. I should prefer to offer them moratorium in respect of southern customs receipts only to begin with, viz., about [?] 10,000*l.* a month, and so keep plenty in hand to meet their inevitable demands for more.

I would also urge, as His Majesty's Government contemplate an expenditure of [?] 50,000*l.* a month, that I should be empowered to employ part or all of the difference between this sum and the subvention which should be at any moment granted to Persian Government for secret service purposes. I could use it more directly in our interests and with more effect than the present Cabinet.

[130126]

No. 84.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 1339.)
(Telegraphic.)

Petrograd, September 12, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 332 of 11th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs can hold out no hope of any considerable number of troops being sent to Tehran.

[130131]

No. 85.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, September 12, 1915.

GERMAN consular agent at Hamadan is collecting men, with avowed intention of attacking British and Russian consuls and driving them from their posts. I have made repeated verbal representations to Persian Government, but Prime Minister is too feeble and vacillating to overrule Under-Secretary of the Minister of the Interior, who is well known to be working in German interests.

[130126]

No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2112.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 14, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1339 of 12th September.

Arrival of Russian troops already sent has sensibly lightened the situation, and I much hope that Russian Government may find it possible to increase their numbers sufficiently to maintain this good effect and to destroy confidence of German supporters altogether. It does not appear that any very considerable numbers of troops would be necessary.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 272.)

[130131]

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2115.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 14, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 335 of 12th September.

Your Excellency should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and ask if he would join us in making Prime Minister and Minister of Interior and the superior officer of that Department responsible personally if any harm occurs to our consulate.

[132209]

No. 88.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 15, 1915.

RUSSIAN Minister and I called on the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs by invitation late yesterday afternoon. Their attitude had completely changed They professed the utmost anxiety to protect the consul and put an end to German propaganda, and almost implored us to give them financial assistance and arms. They, in fact, gave unasked the assurances you directed us to demand in your telegram. While Russian Minister took the attitude that he must consult his Government before giving any reply, I held out hopes that the former accommodation could be arranged, but, in view of opinion of Russian Government that it would be impolitic to give financial support for the moment, I did not feel justified in making a definite promise.

Persian Ministers desire moratorium or its equivalent, that is about 200,000 tomans, as from 1st January last to the end of the war, and 10,000 rifles with ammunition. I believe as regards arms we should find it very difficult to supply any at once, as those captured from the Turks have already been disposed of, and Russian Minister also is not very hopeful on this point. As regards money, Russian Minister and I are agreed that it would be politic to assent to the request at once, and he is telegraphing strongly to his Government in this sense.

The sum required each month is less than that which His Majesty's Government were prepared to expend themselves as a subsidy, and it would be easy enough to arrange that 200,000 tomans per month should be advanced in the guise of a moratorium in the name of the two Governments, and should the Russian Government agree to share in the arrangement, the proportion of expense they would bear can be settled later.

Retroactive effect of moratorium requested involves a sum of something like 300,000*l.*, and it would be impossible for Imperial Bank of Persia to finance the operation at once without grave risk of another run. Russian Minister is, however, urging his Government to assent to it, but the most that can be done would be to promise Persian Government the whole or part of the above sum as soon as a necessary arrangement can be made by the banks.

It must not be expected that Persian Government will be able to do much against the Germans, but moral effect produced by the fact that Cabinet, which owes its existence to pro-German influences, has had to appeal to the two Powers to assist them to counteract German campaign might be considerable. It would discourage German supporters and encourage our friends, on whom hitherto dubious attitude of the Government has had a very chilling effect.

These are not very large results to look forward to, but the combination appears to me to hold out some chance of staving off the possibility of rupture of relations for a time. Time is of great importance, and even if Russian Government were to decline to join in arrangement, I would urge that I may concede at least the monthly subvention in the form of a moratorium in the name of the two Powers, and to employ the difference between it and 60,000*l.* as suggested in my telegram No. 333.

(Sent to India.)

[132209]

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2136.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 340 of 15th September.

I think that Russian Government and His Majesty's Government should authorise their representatives at Tehran to make a monthly payment of 15,000*l.* each in the guise of a moratorium, to be continued during the war so long as conduct of Persian Government is satisfactory. The two Governments might also hold out promise of lump sum, representing moratorium from 1st January to the present date, as soon as banks can arrange for it.

As time presses, I am authorising Mr. Marling to inform Persian Government that the two Governments are considering their proposals, but that, in the meantime, he will give them a monthly subvention in the form of a moratorium, as explained in the last paragraph of his telegram. Question of control over expenditure could be reserved for later consideration.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 276.)

[132209]

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1915.

PERSIAN situation.

My telegram No. 2136 of 16th September to Petrograd.

You may act as you suggest in last paragraph whenever you think it desirable to do so.

[134377] No. 91.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 346.) *Tehran, September* 18, 1915.
(Telegraphic.)

AFTER consultation with my Russian colleague, I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and told him that I believed that so far as monthly sum of 200,000 tomans was concerned I could promise that wish would be met, but that as regards the sum accruing since beginning of year, financial difficulties in way would delay operation. My Russian colleague and I were somewhat concerned at prospect of seeing whole gendarmerie force of Persia concentrated at capital, for character of force was well known to Persians, who would see it would make Germans masters in Tehran. And before going further in the matter of moratorium, we must have full assurances that Persian Government would prevent it.

Minister for Foreign Affairs began by feigning to be ignorant of orders given by commandant, but finally admitted fact. He promised that commandant would be asked for explanation, and said that if his reply was unsatisfactory he ought to be dismissed. He complained that Swedes as a whole behaved as though they were independent of Persian Government. I urged Minister for Foreign Affairs strongly to get commandant dismissed. I think it is not impossible that under suitable pretext we might get rid of some of Swedes, for instance, commandant and Sonessen, who is known to have supplied machine gun to German vice-consul at Kermanshah for the purpose of attack on the two consuls at Kangavar.

As regards Sonessen, we should be justified in making official demand.

Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that request of Persian Government was that moratorium should take effect as from beginning of Persian year, so that total sum would be 1,200,000, not 1,800,000 tomans.

(Sent to India, Stockholm, and Petrograd.)

[134378] No. 92.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 347.) *Tehran, September* 18, 1915.
(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE been approached by Soulet's confidential agent here with a letter [?] proposal of personal protection to Soulet.

In return, Soulet would guarantee to maintain order and protect our interests and take active steps against Germanagents. A similar [request was made to Russian Minister. I replied that a step of this kind would be a great innovation in our policy in Persia, and would require great consideration. Agent of Soulet pressed repeatedly for an early reply.

I am inclined to think this step indicates that Soulet is being urged by German emissaries to join them against us, though his agents naturally assert forcibly he has consistently refused all their overtures. They admit Pugin was very active in neighbourhood of Kumisheh in [group undecypherable] of an upheaval. Importance of securing Soulet at this moment is undeniable, but may lead to all kinds of complications both now and in the future.

I should be glad to know what reply to make.

Russian Minister says his Government would give desired protection at once.

(Addressed to Petrograd, Bushire, Shiraz, and Basra.)

[134451] No. 93.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 348.) *Tehran, September* 19, 1915.
(Telegraphic.)

WHEN proper moment comes, I propose to inform Persian Government that a credit of 30,000*l.* will be opened for them with Imperial Bank of Persia in respect of month ending 8th September, with a further similar sum on 8th October.

Manager of Imperial Bank of Persia informs me that he can finance this operation. He says, however, that, if it is decided to agree to making moratorium retroactive, to

[135152] No. 94*.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 352.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 20, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 268 of 11th September.

It is very difficult to say whether return of Zil-es-Sultan would be advantageous or not, but on the whole I am inclined to think so.

pay over sums accruing for five months ending 8th August would be risky at present, as there are signs of a run being organised on bank, and he suggests that Persian Government might be informed that whole or part of it could be held at their disposal in gold in London.

May I assume that necessary arrangements for operations indicated in first paragraph have been made with Imperial Bank of Persia in London.

[134699] No. 94.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 350.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 20, 1915.

MY telegram No. 347 of 18th September.

Consul at Shiraz earnestly urges protection be accord[omitted : -ed to] Soulet as "there is no alternative if we are to remain in Southern Persia, and if we do not make arrangements with Soulet, Germans will do so and could render our position untenable."

He describes situation as very critical, as ex-Governor-General and democrats are hatching a plot to be carried out by help of gendarmerie.

As consul made no mention of Kawam, I presume he does not anticipate any immediate objections from him.

On the whole I think that a cautiously worded letter of protection might be given.

(Sent to India.)

[134699] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 283.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 347 of 18th September : Soulet.

Government of India deprecated in their telegram of 15th May any commitment *vis-à-vis* of Soulet, and I realise force of their argument.

I gather, however, from your telegram No. 350 of 20th September that there appears to be but little alternative.

(Confidential.)

Moreover, it would be exceedingly undesirable if Soulet were to receive assurances from Russian Government and not from His Majesty's Government, in view of precedent of Zil's properties and of Soulet's geographical position. (End of Confidential paragraph.)

You are therefore authorised to draft a letter of the nature proposed which should be submitted for my approval before being communicated to Soulet.

You will of course keep it as anodyne as possible.

[136079] No. 96.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 357.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 21, 1915.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz to-day, No. 332 :—

"Soulet.

"I venture respectfully to express entire concurrence in views of Government of India regarding undesirability of [group undecypherable]ing us with local khans, and I have always considered taking sides for or against insignificant khans like those of Borasjun and Shabanara, &c., and mixing in their quarrels, as greatest possible mistake.

"Policy has been the cause of much of our trouble in the south and has been brought about in great part, as I venture to think, by anomalous system of consular representation in Fars and by misapprehension of Persian affairs as a whole by officer serving at Bushire.

"But I venture to submit question of relations with ilkhanis of the great tribal groups of Fars is entirely different matter. These chiefs exercise influence over thousands of armed men and scores of smaller khans and over very large tracts of country, and they may in fact be said practically to rule South Persia. I have long advocated the adoption of some definite line of policy with regard to these two powerful chiefs, and at present time we are compelled to do so by force of circumstances. If we can now make satisfactory agreement with Soulet and Kawam our position in Fars would become comparatively secure, and minor difficulties such as those enumerated in Bushire telegram No. 560 c will solve themselves, especially after restoration of Persian administration at Bushire. But, if we allow this opportunity to slip, we must naturally expect Germans to take advantage of our failure, and in this case situation in inland of Fars would probably become impossible.

"You might make it clear to the Government of India that agreement with Soulet would in no circumstances throw upon us obligation to send troops into inland of Fars.

"Chief difficulty I foresee is *vis-à-vis* of Persian Government and different Governors-General of Fars, who might not approve of our protection or favourable guarantee of the ilkhani, and who might intrigue against our protégés.

"We should have to be prepared for this, and to take necessary steps to render Kawam or Soulet, as the case might be, independent of such intrigues. Eventual situation in South Persia will depend, of course, on result, but, meanwhile, if we wish to remain here at all, it is absolutely essential, as I venture to think, that we should seize the opportunity to cement friendly relations with so powerful chief as Soulet."

(Sent to India.)

[135152] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 285.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 352 of 20th September: Zil-es-Sultan.

My impression is that Zil-es-Sultan does not intend to return to Persia except by desire of the two legations.

You will have seen from Petrograd telegram No. 1369 of 18th September that Russian Government have no objection to renewal of guarantees, so far as may be possible.

I propose therefore to inform the Zil in the sense of Sir M. Durand's letter of 5th June, 1898, enclosed in Mr. des Graz's despatch No. 90 of 21st June, 1902.

Care will be taken to impress on the Zil that this assurance must be limited by the extent to which it may be possible to protect him.

Do you desire that when so informing His Imperial Highness I should urge him to return to Persia?

I surmise that his presence at Ispahan might disturb the feelings of the Bakhtiari khans to our prejudice.

I should be glad of early reply.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2185.)

[137580] No. 98.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 358.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 23, 1915.

SIR P. COX'S telegram No. 2068 B to Government of India, repeated to Secretary of State.

Sir P. Cox is of course in a far better position to judge of expediency of proposed compact with Bakhtiari from a military point of view than I am, and, as regards political aspect, I quite concur that any agreement that can bind tribe more closely to our interests would be of great value.

I feel, however, grave doubts whether it would be possible to negotiate such a compact within any useful time, and I am inclined to think that, in urging that present

[137480] No. 99*.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 360.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 23, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 285 of 22nd September.

In the circumstances, I think Zil-es-Sultan should be urged to return.

---

moment is an opportune one, Sir P. Cox has not before him all the facts in the present situation.

In the first place, he assumes that the Amir Jang has been appointed Illbegi. This is not so; he is merely acting temporarily as such, and definite appointment is still under discussion. Still, even if definite appointment were made, Illkhani and Illbegi would not have power to negotiate compact of this kind; in practice, their authority is limited to internal affairs of the tribe, and pact of kind suggested would have to be submitted to the other senior khans and their assent obtained. Khans are scattered, and much time would be lost in discussions between them.

Samsam and Bahadur (latter practically acts tor his fast-failing father. Sardar Assad), who represent one of the chief branches of the tribe, are now here, and when tentatively sounded as to possibility of closer relations with us gave very guarded reply, and I think it extremely unlikely, although their attitude has been more satisfactory for the last few days, that they will abandon their determination to do nothing in their relations with us without knowledge and approval of Government. They are, indeed, nervously anxious not to be looked on as actively pro-British; so much so that they have actually refused to accept from me money required to pay forces for which Government have asked them to despatch to Tehran and Ispahan, and have preferred to find it themselves, relying on my reimbursing them later (and then only in the shape of a loan through Imperial Bank of Persia) if Government cannot do so. So long as these two khans are in this frame of mind, it seems to me to be hopeless to expect that they would agree to a pact proposed stipulations of which could not be approved by Government.

There is even less to be hoped from khans at Ispahan. Though I scarcely believe they would take active steps against us, they would be even less willing than Samsam and Bahadur to declare themselves openly with us, which they would have of course to do by entering into negotiations with us, as the fact could not be kept secret. They are very much under the impression of German boasts of victory, of [group undecypherable: ? their being] invincible, and of local influence which German display of force and contempt for Persian authorities has achieved at Ispahan, but they, like their relatives here, are still awaiting course of events, and a decisive success on our side would bring them over at once to us. Like the rest of Persia, they want to be on the winning side.

Sir P. Cox's proposal appears to me to offer very slender hopes of success, and I think a safer course will be to endeavour to secure khans' loyalty by gifts and promises of more gifts, and by guaranteeing any expenditure they may incur at request or with assent of Persian Government, and I think by this means we may succeed in securing something more than their benevolent neutrality without assuming obligations that might prove inconvenient later.

(Sent to India and Basra.)

[137642] No. 99.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 359.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 23, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 283 of 21st September.

Following is text of letter I would suggest for Soulet:—

"His Majesty's Government have authorised me to assure your Excellency that, so long as you maintain attitude of friendly co-operation with British Government, whose policy in Southern Persia is directed solely to the maintenance of order and tranquillity, to the development of commerce, to the security of the high roads, and in particular at this moment to the suppression of the present disturbances due to the intrigues and instigation of foreign agitators, His Majesty's Legation will afford your Excellency such protection and support as are compatible with friendly relations which happily exist between the British and Persian nations, and will use its influence with Persian Government at Tehran to assure your personal protection and well-being."

[137480] No. 100

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2213.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, September* 25, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 1369 of 18th September: Zil-es-Sultan.

I propose to address to Zil-es-Sultan note in following sense :—

(R) "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th September, requesting the renewal of the guarantee previously given to you by His Majesty's Government.

"In reply, I have the honour to assure your Imperial Highness that if your life be in danger, or if anything is done against your honour, His Majesty's Government are prepared in conjunction with the Russian Government, and as long as you continue to act in a loyal manner towards His Imperial Majesty the Shah, to extend to you and your family every protection which they may be in a position to afford.

"In conclusion I would urge your Imperial Highness to return to Persia, if the British and Russian Ministers address a request in this sense to your Imperial Highness." (End of R.)

And I would suggest that Russian Ambassador here might be authorised to address a similar note, *mutatis mutandis*.

In view of Mr. Marling's telegram No. 360 of 23rd September: I think that as soon as the two representatives at Tehran have decided in what way Zil's services may prove of use, they should address invitation to him to return to Persia.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 289.)

[138774] No. 101.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 363.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 25, 1915.

A FEW days ago I made a verbal communication in the sense authorised in your telegram No. 277 of 16th September, adding that the two Governments were exchanging views as to possibility of agreeing to give arrangement retroactive effect. His Highness pressed very urgently for this concession, and I said that I must await instructions of His Majesty's Government.

Russian Minister meanwhile has received telegrams from his Government indicating a disposition to grant total suspension of service of loans, &c., with retroactive effect, and in view thereof and also of indicated readiness of His Majesty's Government to grant a [? group omitted] amounting altogether to 60,000*l.* a month, we suggest that we should be authorised to make to Persian Government communication of which translation is contained in my immediately following telegram. I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs, who called this morning to ask for a reply of nature of proposal we would submit to our Governments, and it is at his special request that we adopted formula to the effect that customs receipts would be repaid Persian Government, but only up to maximum of 30,000*l.* a month. His Excellency pressed very hard for our assent to agreement taking effect from January, not March, and we think it would be politic to agree to this.

Eighth day of month is selected, as it is on that day customs accounts are made up with banks.

Russian Minister and director of Russian Bank here are both of opinion that transaction should be carried out by Imperial Bank of Persia alone on behalf of the two Governments as being more convenient and as preventing loss to Persian Government through unfavourable exchange with Russia.

Russian Government desire that transaction should be of nature of advance, by which I understand sums received by Persian Government shall bear interest. I do not consider Persian Government will raise any objection to this.

We propose to send communication with covering note explaining that the two Governments consent to give this support for the purpose of enabling Persian Government to take active measures to suppress foreign intrigues, &c.

Russian Minister and I hope that we may be authorised to make proposed communication without delay.

I presume you will give necessary authorisation to Imperial Bank of Persia in London that agreement can take effect at once.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[138815] No. 102.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 25, 1915.

MY telegram No. 363 of 25th September.

Following is a translation of communication to the Persian Government :—

"With reference to interview which took place on 15th September between Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and British and Russian Ministers on the subject of suspension of service of British and Russian loans and advances, His Britannic Majesty's Legation has the honour to inform the Persian Government that its request for suspension of these services from 8th March until one month after conclusion of peace has been received with benevolence by British and Russian Governments, who agree that for period above indicated registered customs receipts affected to respective services be repaid to Persian Government, but with condition that total monthly sums accruing to it do not exceed 30,000*l.*

"As regards sums resulting from retroactive effect of present arrangement, it is understood that as financial considerations prevent immediate payment thereof, they will be placed at the disposal of Persian Government when that is feasible.

"Imperial Bank of Persia is authorised by the two Governments to come to an understanding with Persian Government for execution of present agreement, as well as for eventual liquidation of suspended services. Contracting parties reserve right to terminate this agreement by a simple declaration to that effect."

(Sent to Petrograd.)

[139605] No. 103.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 366.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 27, 1915.

SOULET is about to arrive in neighbourhood of Shiraz, and it is important that His Majesty's consul should be able to inform him of contemplated protection, so as to induce him to co-operate with Kawam. I should be glad to know if the form which he submitted to you in my telegram No. 359 of 23rd September is approved.

[140219] No. 104.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 110.)
Sir, *Tehran, August* 30, 1915.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Persian gendarmerie, under the personal command of Swedish officers, have recently sustained two not inconsiderable defeats at the hands of the tribesmen.

In the first instance a branch of the Shahseven tribe attacked a column of gendarmes under Captain Hierta on the Kazvin–Hamadan road, and during the engagement Captain Hierta was killed. This is the fourth Swedish officer who has lost his life since the formation of the gendarmerie under Swedish control.

Detailed reports of this encounter are not as yet available, but it seems clear that the gendarmerie suffered considerable loss and that a native officer with some 200 men and two guns deserted to the attacking tribesmen. A punitive expedition was despatched from Tehran, and the officer in command here informs me that steps are being taken to restore order and to bring the offenders to justice.

Such information as is available in regard to the second instance would point to its having been of a much graver nature than the above-mentioned fight.

For some time past the Governor-General of Luristan had ceased to exercise any control over the turbulent tribesmen in his province and has been unable to collect the taxes for several years, and the efforts of the young Swedish officer in command at Burujird resulted a few days ago in the complete defeat of his force of 800 gendarmes with the loss of some 200 men and four guns and the whole of the Governor-General's baggage, tents, &c. Captain de Mare, the officer in question, and Nizam-ul-Sultaneh barely escaped with their lives.

These defeats have somewhat shaken the prestige of the gendarmerie and would seem to prove that the Swedes, apart from their open pro-German propaganda, are quite incapable of fulfilling their more obvious duties of safeguarding the peace of the roads.

Colonel Edwall, the chief officer commanding, somewhat naively admitted in a letter to a member of my staff that "pour le moment 800 gendarmes sont disparus et je n'en sais rien de leur avenir, mais j'espère en retrouver la plus part (*sic*)."

Colonel Edwall even went so far as to put forward this tragic disappearance of his gendarmes as an excuse for not complying with the orders of the Persian Government to furnish an escort for the British and Russian consuls to Kermanshah.

I have already reported to you by telegraph that the two consuls were forced to return to Hamadan by the action of Herr Schunemann, an ex-carpenter from Tabriz, who is nominally the German consul at Kermanshah.

I personally always doubted the wisdom of allowing His Majesty's consul to return to Kermanshah, but as you will remember, Sir, it was decided at the request of the Russian Legation that Mr. McDouall should be permitted to accompany the new Russian consul thither when it should be possible for the latter to take up his post. Kermanshah being in the Russian zone, I have deferred largely to the views of my Russian colleague as to the question of the re-establishment of the two consulates there and informed Mr. McDouall that he should conform his movements to those of Baron Chirkassof. On the 6th instant I heard from Mr. McDouall that their departure from Hamadan was fixed for the next day but one, and I informed M. de Etter of this intention, expressing the opinion that the consuls should wait until proper arrangements had been made for their reception at Kermanshah, a question which had been under discussion with the Persian Government for some days. M. de Etter replied that he agreed with me and was telegraphing to Baron Chirkassof to remain at Hamadan until further instructions. He appears, however, to have forgotten to send the message, and the consuls started.

As the Russian Legation has at its disposal in the shape of the Cossack brigade and the troops at Kazvin far better means of coercing the Persian Government in this matter than myself, I left further arrangements in M. de Etter's hands, but he kept me informed of the course of events and of his own action.

Eventually the two consuls reached Kangavar, where the preparations of Schunemann to prevent their further progress became so formidable that it was obviously foolhardy for them with their small escort of about fifty Cossacks and gholams to persevere. The Persian Government ordered the Swedish gendarmerie officer at Kermanshah to send an adequate escort, but Captain Sonesson refused on the ground that his men had no horses. A similar attempt to get gendarmes from another post failed, and M. de Etter then threatened to send two squadrons of Russian Cossacks from Kazvin. This produced the desired effect, and a force of gendarmes actually arrived when Schunemann's attack on Kangavar was in progress, but declined to take any part in the fight and went on to Hamadan. As I informed you by telegraph, the German force retired and the two consuls were able to regain Hamadan in safety.

Meanwhile M. de Etter had, as I think wisely, reconsidered his decision to send Cossacks. Kermanshah is of course of the first importance to the Germans and Turks, as it is their sole door of communication with the outer world and the one by which they introduce arms, ammunition, money, &c. The Germans would therefore have kept their position there at all hazards. It is true that the population of the town desired the return of the two consuls, but I doubt whether their appearance with a large bodyguard of Russian troops would not have cooled their enthusiasm. In any case it is certain that Hassan Raouf, who was not far off, would have returned with his own Turkish troops and a horde of Kalhurs and Pishkuhis to support him, and the Russians would have required heavy reinforcing, which the Kazvin force is not able to send.

The Russian Minister therefore made a virtue of necessity and informed the Persian Government that in order to avoid embarrassing them by creating a serious incident he would not send the Cossacks, provided they agreed to provide a sufficient

force of Persian Cossacks to take the two consuls to Kermanshah. Orders were then given to Captain Mamomof, at Senneh, to proceed to Kangavar, but the consuls had already left for Hamadan, and it was an open secret that until 700 to 800 men are collected, no attempt to convoy Mr. McDouall and Baron Chirkassof can succeed.

For this purpose Colonel Prozorevitch is now collecting the scattered detachments of the brigade from all parts of North-West Persia, even from Tabriz; they are to assemble at Hamadan until it is decided whether to renew the attempt of the two consuls to return to Kermanshah or not. Personally I believe that they will be kept at Hamadan as a useful striking force in case of necessity nearer the capital.

The insolence of the German consul and the open avowal of the German Minister that he could not permit the door of Kermanshah to be closed has given great offence here, but the Government knows that it is powerless and has had to swallow these affronts.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[140220]

No. 105.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 111.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 1, 1915.

MUCH as it has been talked of, the definite resignation of Ain-ed-Dowleh's Cabinet on the 9th July came as a slight surprise to most people, as he had been apparently making a stronger stand against the Democratic attacks on Farman Farma for two or three days previously. Nor am I quite certain even now, a month after the event, exactly what his reasons were, but the general opinion is that his Highness, being one of those who do not believe in the existence of two kings in Brentford, hoped that by sacrificing Farman Farma he would be brought back to office by the grateful Democrat. During his short tenure of office Ain-ed-Dowleh seems to have endeavoured to do what Hussein Hilmi Pasha and other Grand Viziers failed to do with the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkey, *i.e.*, bend the Democrats to his will; but, like the Turkish statesmen, he eventually discovered that if he was to retain office it must be as servant, not as master. All the time he was professing to the Russian Minister and myself his earnest desire to serve our interests, which he always admitted were identical with those of Persia, but always failed—out of fear of offending the pro-German Democrats—to give practical effect to his professions until just before the fall of his Cabinet, when he permitted the arrest of an obscure German agent proceeding to Meshed.

M. de Etter and I called on his Highness on the morning after his resignation and give him to understand that if he wished to resume office without Farman Farma he could no longer count on the financial support which the two Powers were ready to afford him. Farman Farma had been attacked because, in virtue of his office, he had been the instrument of such mild measures as the Cabinet had taken to check German intrigues, and if his Highness now sacrificed him to Democrats—*i.e.*, German clamour —our Government could only regard it as a German victory and Ain-ed-Dowleh as an instrument in the hands of the pro-German party.

Having demolished Ain-ed-Dowleh's Cabinet, the Democrats had to find a substitute. I need not weary you with the list of their futile efforts, but it will be enough to say that at his second attempt Mustofi-ul-Mamalek succeeded on the 19th August in presenting to the Medjliss as heterogeneous a Ministry as ever sat at the same Council table. Mustofi himself represents the Democrats—not that he is one at heart, but because he cherishes the fantastic belief that if Russia would consent to remove her troops from Kasvin and elsewhere in Persia, public opinion would pass from bitter hatred to warm affection for the northern neighbour. He can therefore be trusted to keep open the sore between Persia and Russia. Vossugh-ed-Dowleh and Sipahdar, on the other hand, are considered to be nothing but Russian agents, while Ala-es-Sultaneh represents Great Britain, and the presence of these three is to secure our tolerance, if not our support, of the combination. With Muin-el-Vezareh as his "chef de cabinet," Motesham-es-Sultaneh can be trusted not to compromise the Government with us, while Assadullah Khan seems to have been thrown in to strengthen the "English" element in virtue solely of his knowledge of the language. The others scarcely count.

The Russian Minister and I have, of course, been accused of having prolonged the

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

crisis, but the accusation is unjust, for the simple and obvious reason that our interests would have been better suited by the installation of any Cabinet except a frankly democratic and pro-German one, and that, as events showed, the Democrats could not achieve. On two occasions we made endeavours to induce the Shah to use his influence and terminate the crisis, but His Majesty was too much under the influence of his German-paid entourage—it is alleged that he himself has not been a stranger to inducements of this character—to listen, and I have some reason to think that His Majesty's eyes were only opened to the "German peril" by the insolent behaviour of the German consul at Kermanshah (see my despatch No. 110). Meantime we have succeeded, thanks to the influence of the better-informed press, in creating a body of opinion among the more educated and substantial classes strongly opposed to the fatuous tolerance which the Persian Government has up till now exhibited to the Germans and their intrigues.

Unfortunately, however, during the seven weeks in which the country was without a Government the enemy has had a free hand, and has made the most of it. The German chief centre is at Ispahan. It is there that the large quantities of rifles and ammunition, machine guns, &c., and money, &c., smuggled in somewhere in the vicinity of Kermanshah are stored, and it is thence that the numerous parties of emissaries start on their missions. It is difficult to say what the exact number of Germans in the country now is, as fresh agents appear to be constantly coming viâ Kermanshah, and there is every reason to believe that they are in some cases disguised as Arabs; and it is probable that Baron Oppenheim is already in Persia, although so far there has been no mention of the name in the reports I receive. The few Indians in German service also appear to come by this route, and I have evidence, which I have sent on to the Government of India, that among them are soldiers taken prisoners in France. The Austrians are, so far, escaped prisoners of war from the Transcaspian provinces of Russia. There seems to be at least 200, and among them a few officers, but of late the supply of men from this quarter seems to have been nearly cut off.

The Germans have had two main objectives, *i.e.*, to reach Afghanistan and to rouse the tribes south of Shiraz to attack us at Bushire, and in both, thanks to the criminally passive attitude of the Persian Government, they have succeeded.

I must admit that the anxiety as to Afghanistan exhibited by the Government of India in their telegram No. 644 of the 8th July came as a distinct surprise. I had received from them two telegrams which informed me that the Ameer had given pledges of loyalty that were deemed satisfactory. I did not read in these messages anything more than that it was believed that the Ameer himself could be relied on to do his best to maintain peace. But what did largely mislead me as to what it now appears was the real view of the Government of India was the series of telegrams ending with No. 5195 of the 29th May, discussing what the consequences to us would be and what action we should take should Persia be dragged into the war against us. In those messages there is scarcely a bare allusion to Afghanistan, and it appeared to me incredible that such an omission could have occurred had any misgiving existed in the minds of its authors on so capital a point. My long service in Constantinople had of course taught me that the Pan-Islamic missions sent thence to Afghanistan for a considerable number of years past were always watched with something more than interest in Calcutta, and I came to the conclusion that just as the apprehensions felt in India as to the undesirable effect which an unfriendly policy towards Turkey might have on the Indian Moslem opinion had been shown by the test of war to be groundless, so, as regards Afghanistan, the Government of India had reason to be convinced that Turco-German intrigues in Afghanistan would fall on barren ground. The Russian Minister also had told me more than once that just before he left London he was assured that no uneasiness was entertained by His Majesty's Government on the score of Afghanistan. I do not say that even with a full knowledge of the true state of affairs we could have materially altered the course of events. On looking back it seems to me clear enough that at the time nothing but the despatch of Russian troops would have put sufficient heart into the Persian Government to take really effective measures to stop the German bands, and the troops, as we know, were not forthcoming.

But to revert to the Germans. As before remarked, they made the fullest use of the abeyance of responsible authority in Persia. Parties aggregating something like 400 men in all were despatched to Afghanistan, agents were sent to Kerman, Wasmuss redoubled his pernicious activities in Dashti and Tangistan, and large quantities of arms, &c.—one convoy that reached Ispahan towards the end of July comprised over

200 mule-loads—were poured in viâ Kermanshah. The sequel of these activities in the east and south are so well known to you, Sir, through the channel of the India Office that I need not even summarise them; but it is fitting that I should report that the Bakhtiari Governor of Kerman, after a moment of weakness which gave the German agents Zugmeyer and Friesinger a footing in the town itself, showed a vigour which is in pleasing contrast with the passivity of almost all his colleagues. For the first three weeks or so after Ain-ed-Dowleh's resignation it was impossible to get any instructions sent by the permanent officials in any Department to local Governors to take action against the German agents, and I had to rely on appeals to our ancient friendship with individual Governors even to prevent them from giving passive tolerance to the Germans. My appeals were reinforced by other inducements, but even so they had very partial success, for the Germans could always rely on the gendarmerie wherever it existed, and, moreover, usually had the karguzar and other local officials in their pay. The position of a local Governor was thus difficult. He was, like everyone else, much impressed by the reports assiduously spread by the Germans of crushing defeats to Russia, and he felt that to oppose the Germans was to run counter to the artificially raised sentiments of the populace, and he hesitated to risk an encounter without the most explicit orders from the Government.

By the beginning of August, however, a slight change for the better took place. The appearance of the Cossacks in Kain and Seistan, and the advance of our own column from Baluchistan, and a little later the occupation of Bushire, woke Persia up to the imminent danger into which party struggles had led her, and it was then possible (by the help of proper inducements) to get instructions sent through Suleiman Khan, the ultra-Democratic Secretary-General of the Minister of Interior, to Seistan, Kerman, and Ispahan, and occasionally warnings to Shiraz. Even so, these instructions were often scarcely better than the traditional order "to maintain neutrality," *i.e.*, do nothing, and when a more categorical message was sent it was not infrequently cancelled by a subsequent secret telegram.

I do not, however, believe that this partial change of attitude was due to any fear of future chastisement on the part of the two Powers. The impression created by the Russian retreat in Poland was too deep, and it was rather from the consciousness that German intrigues had been allowed to go too far, and from fear that unless checked at once Persia would relapse into anarchy. The same apprehension forced even the Democrats to recognise that a Government of some kind must be formed, and as they recognised that a purely Democrat Ministry, even if accepted by the Medjliss, could not stand for a week, they left Mustofi a free hand to get support where he could.

Mustofi-ul-Mamalek means well, and he is reputed, and I believe rightly, to be absolutely clean-handed, but while he is aware of the dangerous position to which his friends have brought the country, he is also appalled by the difficulty of surmounting it. His proper course would be to assemble a reliable force composed of the Cossack Brigade and Bakhtiari sowars to Tehran and then close the Medjliss and suppress the pro-German press. But he hesitates to incur the wrath of his quondam friends the Democrats by employing what are regarded as being respectively Russian and British forces, and still more to be frank with the Russian Minister and myself and work honestly with us in interests which are, as he admits, more Persian than foreign. Instead of that he is trying to "squeeze" us in order to be able to conciliate the Democrats and their kind by showing that he has wrung concessions from us. Such a policy, which is entirely to the taste of so weak a character as Persia's present Prime Minister, can only fail, and our present endeavour is to get what we can out of the Cabinet before it falls.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[138774]

No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 290.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 28, 1915.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 363 and 364 of 25th September: Finance.

His Majesty's Government approve terms of proposed communication to Persian Government, and you may act accordingly in concert with your Russian colleague. Date of "8th March" should at present be adhered to, though I am approaching Treasury regarding retroactive effect to 8th January.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

I presume that by word "transaction" in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 363 of 25th September you refer merely to act of financing the Persian Government, not to the collection of northern customs receipts. The Imperial Bank of Persia, with whom whole question has been discussed, would be glad if you would consult manager at Tehran on this point and on feasibility of transmitting from London in due course and by instalments the lump sum of 300,000*l.* derived from retroactive moratorium. If part of this sum were required in the provinces, bank presume that matter would be easier to solve.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2236.)

[139605] No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 292.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 28, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 359 of 23rd September: Soulet.

Subject to omission of word "solely" (thirty-first word of text) I approve terms of letter, which consul is authorised to communicate immediately.

[141225] No. 108.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 369.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 29, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 290 of 28th September.

Russian Minister has been informed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he is to delay making communication to the Persian Government until assent of Russian Minister of Finance has been given.

Russian Minister and I are agreed that no time should be lost in making it.

[141745] No. 109.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 372.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 30, 1915.

EX-GOVERNOR of Shiraz has at length left Tehran.

It would, I think, be politic now to allow Persian flag to be replaced at Bushire, as its removal has caused more irritation than the occupation, and to re-hoist it would take some of the sting out of the German agitation, particularly at Shiraz. This was not to be done until an Acting-Governor for Bushire was selected and had arrived, but Szwam's candidates have so far refused, or are so unsatisfactory, that Persian Government have not approved them. A spontaneous concession of this kind would be much appreciated by the Persian Government, and make things easier for them here, and as it does not affect materially our position at Bushire, I should be glad if you would authorise it.

(Sent to India, Basra, and Shiraz.)

[141745] No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 299.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 1, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 372 of 30th September: Bushire.

I agree, and you may act accordingly, on distinct understanding that this concession in no way affects retention of our troops as mentioned in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 328 of 8th September, and that administration is not handed back to Persian authorities until fulfilment of the original conditions.

[141767] No. 109*.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 373. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 30, 1915.

GERMAN position here depends entirely on their keeping open the road to Bagdad viâ Kermanshah. Yesterday German Minister told newly appointed Governor of Kermanshah that, if there was any intention of his bringing about return of British and Russian consuls, Governor's own arrival would be forcibly prevented, as German interests could not permit the possibility of closing their only means of communicating with the outer world, through which they receive news and money, &c. If Grand Duke could now send enough troops to hold both Kazvin and Kermanshah until our own troops reach Bagdad, and can control Khanekin road, Germans would be left *en l'air*.

Kermanshah is now virtually in the possession of the Germans, as the greater part of Raouf's regulars have been surreptitiously brought in, and German consul is still busy proselytising, and may perhaps now have altogether 2,000 men in his pay.

(Sent to Petrograd.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[141767] No. 113*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2283.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 2, 1915.*

TEHRAN telegram No. 373 of 30th September: Germans.

I am not in a position to judge whether proposal is feasible in present circumstances, though it is unquestionable that successful hemming in of Germans in Persia would have best possible effect.

You should communicate the suggestion, when opportunity offers, to the Grand Duke for his consideration.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 301.)

[142536] No. 111.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 1, 1915.*

ALL reports show that Germans are bringing in very considerable quantities of arms and ammunition viâ Kermanshah to Ispahan, and that practically the whole of the Turkish force under Raouf Pasha that has been waiting at Saripul has been brought surreptitiously to Kermanshah, where German vice-consul is said to have also some 1,100 tribesmen in his pay.

This may indicate an attempt to reach Afghanistan with a considerable force.

(Sent to India, Birjand, Meshed, and Kerman.)

[143183] No. 112.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 2, 1915.*

YOUR telegram No. 298 of 30th September.

Russian Minister has been informed that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to moratorium, but his instructions are not to sign communication to Persian Government until it has been approved by Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I hope authority to sign may be given him without further delay and that on conditions will be introduced by Russia.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[143184] No. 113.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 376.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 2, 1915.*

YOUR telegram No. 295 of 30th September.

As I understand, the so-called "moratorium" will be executed as follows:—

His Majesty's Government, on behalf of the two Governments, will pay into Imperial Bank of Persia in London 30,000*l.* a month as from 8th September last for the period agreed upon, and also sums accruing to Persian Government in respect of retroactive character of the agreement. These sums will be placed by plenipotentiary at disposition of Persian Government in the manner provided for in the "notice" telegraphed to you in my telegram No. 364 of 25th September.

Meanwhile, British and Russian Banks will continue as before to encash revenues from customs of south and north affected to the service of the loan, &c., and apply them to that service.

1911 loan to bondholders will not thus be affected.

I presume that proportion in which Russian and British Governments will contribute to scheme will be settled by directed negotiation between them.

As regards the 300,000*l.* short loans, I see no objection to bank endeavouring to induce Persian Government to pay interest, but I should feel opposed to legation exercising any pressure on them for the present.

[143279] No. 114.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 377 [*sic*].)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 3, 1915.*

YOUR telegram No. 299 of 1st October.

Position of our troops would not be affected.

As to second proviso, under present agreement, Persian administration is to be restored on arrival of new Governor, in consideration of Persian Government's

undertaking to fulfil our original conditions, actual fulfilment to take place later, as Government is obviously not in a position to fulfil them for the present.

I presume above-mentioned second proviso does not imply that I am authorised to rescind present arrangement.

[143183]

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2292.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 3, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 375 of 2nd October.

It is most desirable, more especially in view of great activity of Germans in the neighbourhood of Kermanshah and of arrest of Turkish consul by Russians at Resht, that this financial question shall be satisfactorily settled without any further delay. Russian Ambassador has handed me a memorandum stating that Russian Minister of Finance is disposed to act in concert with His Majesty's Government in meeting Persia's present financial needs.

In these circumstances I earnestly hope that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will send instructions immediately to Russian Minister at Tehran to sign, without insertion of any new conditions.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 303.)

[143279]

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No 305.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 4, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 377 of 3rd October regarding Bushire.

Your surmise is correct.

Present arrangement is approved and need not be rescinded.

[143399]

No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 5, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 358 of 23rd September: Bakhtiari.

I am disposed to try negotiations advocated by Sir P. Cox in his telegrams Nos. 2040 B and 2068 B of 17th and 19th September respectively, though I see no reason why your proposed gifts should not proceed *pari passu*. Unless, therefore, you consider that present situation entirely precludes all possibility of success, you are authorised to begin negotiations through Mr. Grahame, if you have any safe means (but I understand that he has no cypher, nor, of course, telegraphic facilities), or through Sir P. Cox.

I regret to say that there is little or no ground for Sir P. Cox's hope that Ispahan may be found shortly in our sphere. In these circumstances it would obviously be undesirable to commit ourselves in promises which might be inconsistent with rights of Russian Government in Russian sphere, and Governorship of Ispahan must not therefore be promised, though His Majesty's Government might and probably would use good offices on behalf of khans.

The total, therefore, of our possible commitments amounts to promise to preserve Bakhtiari country with its present limits for tribe, and to give khans local autonomy to deal with their own way under our ægis. Further, to be prepared to consider Bakhtiari candidates, among others, for Governorships in sphere which can legitimately be influenced by us.

[145553]

No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 6, 1915.

MY telegram No. 2213 of 25th September to Petrograd.

Prince Bahram has expressed great disappointment that assurance contains no mention of Zil's properties in sense of your letter to His Imperial Highness of 12th August, 1908 (see "Persia" print of that year, 31st August, section 10).

As properties are no longer under protection of M. Kaver, do you and your Russian colleague consider it desirable to renew guarantee for properties, and, if so, can you count on obtaining necessary document from Persian Government?

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2319.)

[146379]

No. 119.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 7, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 306 of 5th October.

I beg leave to offer following observations on the proposed Bakhtiari agreement:—

1. Our requirements of khans (see Sir P. Cox's telegram No. 1082 B).

In respect of those of a general character, and referring to protection of British interests, it would not, I think, be impossible to obtain from khans here written assurances without giving any special undertaking in return on our part, but with such undertaking khans would always find pretexts for evading fulfilment of their assurances if they should deem it advantageous. Same observations apply also as regards a pledge from them to live on good terms with the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Question of Liravi is different. Khans' ambitions in that direction are well known, and only two days ago they sounded me as to acquiring it by purchase. I question whether inducements His Majesty's Government are now prepared to hold out to them would suffice to induce them formally to abandon their ambition.

2. Our commitments.

A guarantee of internal autonomy would be valueless in the eyes of the khans, as notion of any interference in tribal administration is a contingency quite unthinkable to them.

We might, however, succeed in representing guarantee of their territory as advantageous, although it is possible that khans might see in it a limitation of their future expansion, especially when taken in conjunction with our stipulation respecting Liravi.

Contemplated promise of assistance to them to obtain governorships might prove embarrassing to us in the future, for when neutral zone disappears, only available provinces in our gift will be Yezd and Kerman.

The one solid attraction for the khans in Sir P. Cox's original suggestion was guarantee of governorships of Ispahan, and that being now ruled out, small residue would give compact little value in their eyes. Moreover, question of Ispahan is of such importance to them it would inevitably come up in the course of negotiations, and no evasion on our part would avail to prevent khans from deducing from our refusal to give guarantee respecting governorship the conclusion that Ispahan is to fall definitely under Russian influence.

Effect on our relations with them would be disastrous.

3. Consul-General Grahame could not conduct negotiations with Ilkhani and Ilbeggi for reasons given in your telegram. Negotiations would have to be initiated in Tehran, where the two most important khans now are, and where they will very soon be joined by Sirdar Jang.

I think it will be impossible to negotiate with tribe without letting them and all Persia see too far into our hand, and that we can probably get assurances on some of the points suggested by Sir P. Cox without running above risk, though I do not attach much value to such assurances, even if obtained.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

I would suggest as a more practical and less dangerous course that Mr. Grahame and Dr. Young in Bakhtiaristan and I in Tehran endeavour to keep tribe loyal by secret service inducements.

Khans are showing a more satisfactory disposition here than for some time past.

(Sent to India, Basra, and Ahwaz.)

[149299] No. 120.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 392.) *Tehran, October 12, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 2292 of 3rd October to Petrograd.

Russian Minister received his instructions on 10th October respecting communication to Persian Government on the subject of moratorium, but he was directed to omit passage referring to Imperial Bank of Persia and insert following at the end of the preceding paragraph :—

"Under the form of a new advance and on the same conditions as regards rate of interest as preceding advances."

I pointed out to him that employment of word "advance" would make it impossible for Persian Government to accept without putting it before the Medjliss, and that proviso in communication as approved by you for eventual liquidation to be arranged between the Imperial Bank of Persia and Persian Government afforded ample security for giving requisite instructions to bank, and manager was quite confident that Persian Government would raise no objections regarding interest. Russian Minister agreed, and is sending in notice to-day, with omission of reference to Imperial Bank of Persia and of sentence quoted above, while I have sent in notice as authorised.

Manager of bank informs me that he learns from London moratorium takes effect from 8th January. Is this true?

(Repeated to Petrograd except last paragraph.)

[149299] No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2384.) *Foreign Office, October 13, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.) D.

TEHRAN telegram No. 392 of 12th October: Moratorium.

Situation in Persia is still critical, and it is essential that Medjliss shall not be given an opportunity to embarrass the Persian Government in connection with this financial assistance.

Your Excellency should therefore do your utmost to induce Russian Government to send such instructions to Russian Minister at Tehran as will enable him to act in complete accord with Mr. Marling.

I presume that Russian Government will inform you officially in the near future of their willingness to bear half the cost of the transaction. M. Bark when here approved the moratorium.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 315.)

[149299] No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 316.) *Foreign Office, October 13, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.) D.

YOUR telegram No. 392 of 12th October: Moratorium.

Moratorium was fixed to date from 8th March last.

You are, however, authorised to make it retroactive to 8th January if you find it necessary, though Treasury hold view that payment of substantial sum in cash down is likely to be less effective than monthly subsidy in securing friendly relations.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2385.)

[151649] No. 123.

Mr Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 393.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 15, 1915.*

MY telegram No. 373 of 30th September.

For last few days Germans have been showing great activity. Great quantities of arms and ammunition and, it is said, bombs are being imported, and the number of German agents has been increased considerably. Exact figures are, of course, not to be obtained, but my reports show that Germans in comparatively large numbers are constantly arriving, and I think in all Persia there cannot be less than 60 Germans, 250 Austrians, mostly prisoners of war escaped from Transcaspia, and perhaps 50 Turks, renegade Indians, &c., with 80,000 rifles, 7 or 8 machine guns, bombs, &c. Contemptible as this would be elsewhere, in Persia, with gendarmerie entirely and police probably disaffected, and with yellow press and all worst elements in enemy pay, it is formidable. Besides which money is being more lavishly spent than ever.

This spurt is probably due to fear that Bagdad is about to fall into our hands, which event would interrupt their present relatively easy line of communication with Constantinople, and also to conjecture that arrival of Grand Duke in the Caucasus may imply more rigorous military measures in Persia. If this surmise is correct German great effort would seem to be imminent. What direction it will take I have not enough indications to predict with certainty, but for the present Hamadan seems to be present point of attack. German consul there is openly threatening our consuls to avenge arrest of Turkish consul at Resht. He is said to have 300 tribesmen led by Germans in his pay, against whom Governor, who is timid though well disposed, has possibly 200 decently led men, while gendarmerie and police cannot be relied on. Government have sent 100 Persian Cossacks from Tehran, but they confess that position is very bad and that position of consuls is most precarious. Russian Minister is asking for permission from Petrograd to send a regiment of Cossacks from Kazvin. Provided they are not indefinitely detained there, I think that measure would be good one, but we must not be led into undue weakening of our only force within striking distance from the capital. Sultanabad is threatened. In Fars Wassmus is making great efforts to prevent new Governor of Bushire from taking up his post.

That Germans intend an attempt of some kind in Tehran seems to be clear from the fact that Swedish commandant of gendarmerie has been enquiring of Armenians what their attitude would be if Persian Government should declare themselves on the side of one of belligerents or if an attack were made on Christians. Attempts would be certainly made in the month Moharem, which begins now, when religious fanaticism is easily roused.

Is there any prospect of Russia sending any more troops to Kazvin?

(Sent to India and Petrograd.)

[151571] No. 124.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October 15, 1915.*

MY telegram No. 364 of 25th September.

Persian Government raise objections to last paragraph in communiqué beginning with "The contracting parties," which they say will prevent their accepting proffer of financial support, and they point out as execution of the agreement is entrusted to Imperial Bank of Persia we always retain the power of putting an end to it, and that precaution is unnecessary. This is perfectly true, and I think that provided the words "until a month after conclusion of peace" are left out, offending paragraph might be omitted.

General situation in Persia is undoubtedly disquieting, and, as we are supporting this Cabinet, whose position is none too strong, I urge that we should do so without reserve.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[151649] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2408. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 393 of 15th October.

I realise great difficulties against which Russian Government have to contend in the matter. If, however, any more forces could possibly be sent to Persia the effect might be of the greatest importance.

His Majesty's Government are making every effort to influence the situation in the neighbourhood of Bagdad, but it will take time, and in the meanwhile action by Russia would be most opportune. Failing this, the situation may at any moment become very critical.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 318.)

[151649] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 319. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 393 of 15th October.

You will see from my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan repeated to you that action by us is not immediately possible.

You will of course use any financial inducements that may appear practicable.

[151571] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 394 of 15th October: Finance.

Persian Minister made similar representations, and was informed that on receipt of report from you matter would be considered and dealt with through you.

In the circumstances, I approve omission on conditions mentioned by you.

It will be necessary to omit also words "for period above indicated."

I presume that Russian concurrence will be obtained direct by your Russian colleague.

(Not repeated to Petrograd.)

[152828] No. 128.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 396. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 18, 1915.

I LEARN from confidential source that, while Ameer is perfectly loyal, his brother and a cousin, name not given, are working in German interests. I send this for what it is worth.

(Sent to India.)

[154425] No. 129.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 1531.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October* 20, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 393 of 15th October and your telegram No. 2408 of 16th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has drawn attention of military authorities of the Caucasus to the alarming situation in Persia.

They state that from recent reports from Tiflis it appears that measures will be taken to reinforce Kazvin garrison as soon as possible, so as to enable it to undertake reconnaissances in the direction of Tehran and Hamadan.

As regards the despatch of a regiment of Cossacks to Hamadan, military authorities find this scheme impracticable at present. As the Russian and British consuls at Hamadan can consequently not count on any help from Russian troops, Russian Government are of opinion that they should leave the town in case of imminent danger.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[156098] No. 130.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 402.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 21, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 322.

Attitude of Persian Government is very equivocal. There is a strong pro-German element in it, and, unhappily, final decision rests with the President, who, while I believe him to be convinced that for Persia to throw in her lot with the Germans would be a disastrous error, is, however, very much under the influence of Secretary-General of Ministry of Interior, latter a rabid [group undecypherable], practically administers that Department in enemy interests. Prime Minister is also openly influence [group omitted: ? d by] Democratic party and press.

That hostile influences brought to bear on the Government are powerful is evident from its hesitation to accept financial assistance. The Government is now haggling over a really inoffensive expression in Russian communication; Russian Minister has telegraphed to Petrograd, and expects to obtain permission to omit it. If he does so, Persian Government will then have no further excuse for procrastination, and we shall be able to form better judgment of their attitude. An unpleasant symptom is projected foundation of national army, which receives support from Democratic party and press. Government have hitherto pretended that it was absolutely necessary for them to have some armed force on which they could rely as being free from political bias, in other words, a force to counterbalance gendarmerie.

The Russian Minister and I have always discouraged the idea on the score of economy, and private information now reaches us that force is intended by Democrats for use against us. This is also borne out by the arrival two or three days ago of twelve Turkish officers (or, according to another version, Persians who have been trained in Turkey), who were presented to the Shah yesterday by the Turkish military attaché and, it is alleged, are to officer the force.

It is quite possible, then, in spite of his convictions, that the Prime Minister may be forced by German party here to join Germanic Alliance. If, on the other hand, he should resist those influences, Germans may use forcible means as suggested in my telegram No. 393.

The only remedy is an immediate large reinforcement of the Russian garrison at Kazvin, but a weak addition would be useless.

(Repeated to Petrograd.)

[154425] No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 323.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 22, 1915.

PETROGRAD telegram No. 1531 of 20th October.

I leave question of withdrawal of consuls at Hamadan entirely to your discretion, and you have authority to act as you think best.

I hope, however, that they will not leave unless it appears to you imperative that they should do so.

[156098] No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2466.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 402.

The urgency of the situation in Persia is apparent, and it is clear that Russia and we must act with promptitude if we desire to avert most serious consequences. Pray urge that more Russian troops should be at once sent to North Persia.

You may also tell Minister for Foreign Affairs for his most confidential information that an immediate advance will be made by us on Bagdad, and the capture of that important place will doubtless create a great impression in Persia favourable to our common cause.

If Russia therefore acts simultaneously in the north with us in Mesopotamia, we shall doubtless save the situation, but prompt action is necessary.

Repeated to Mr. Marling "for his confidential information."

[157994] No 133.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 1572.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Petrograd, October* 25, 1915.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, to whom I have communicated your telegram No. 2466 of 24th October, said Russian Government is only too anxious to do all it can with limited means at its disposal to take some simultaneous action in North Persia. Reinforcements were, he believed, being sent to Kazvin, but he could not give me numbers. He would see if it were possible to do anything more.

[157874] No. 134.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 408.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 25, 1915.

MY telegram No. 405 of 24th October.

Following from consul at Shiraz, No. 423 of 25th October:—

"General situation.

"I fear I am now forced to submit to your Excellency my opinion that, unless the Persian Government are prepared to take immediately vigorous steps to set matters right in Fars, it is impossible for us to remain here any longer. Two outrages have now been committed with perfect impunity, and it is certain that others will follow. All the consulate staff with the exception of my private secretary and [group omitted]s have been either killed or wounded, and I am myself practically a prisoner. Kawam and I, together with our friends and employés, are constantly threatened with assassination. Situation is in fact intolerable, and is one which, as I venture to think, no representative of Great Britain should be expected to submit to. I am, of course, most reluctant to recommend evacuation of Fars, and I am quite prepared myself to remain in the region as long as you and His Majesty's Government consider desirable, but it seems to me that no useful purpose can be served by our remaining here any longer in such circumstances, and I am reluctant to expose our friends and employés to further risks.

"As long as German consul and agents remain in Fars, I do not think that any improvement can be expected in the situation. Unless the Persian Government are able and prepared to have them removed it is better in my opinion for us to withdraw. I fear we cannot rely either on Kawam or Soulet to deal adequately with the situation.

"One advantage of withdrawal would be that it would enable our authorities in the Gulf and elsewhere to undertake such military and other measures as may be considered advisable. I would suggest that the Persian Government should be

informed that expulsion of British from Shiraz will entail the following measures on the part of His Majesty's Government:—

"1. Military occupation of Arabistan, Gulf ports, and Seistan.

"2. Stoppage of all trade with Southern Persia, both import and export, until situation in Persia is satisfactory.

"Withdrawal from Yezd and Kerman might be also necessary.

"(Repeated to Bushire.)"

Of course, if we can no longer look to Kawam and Soulet to save the situation in Fars, I see nothing for it but to direct the consul and colony to leave, but, though position of consul is beyond question very perilous, I can hardly think, after his repeated expressions of complete confidence in them, they are incapable of taking effective action provided that we are ready to finance them and that they understand that we look to them to administer the province almost independently of the Central Government.

If consul leaves, we must expect to see both Kawam and Soulet fall into the enemy camp, and the effect of that on Kuhgelus [*sic*] and even on Bakhtiari would be disastrous. I am, of course, most reluctant to ask consul to remain in a position of so much danger, but it appears to me that the interests at stake make it necessary to hold out as long as possible. If we can find the requisite money, I think that Kawam should be able to provide sufficient force to protect the consulate.

I can see no advantages in evacuation unless the Indian military authorities can find sufficient force to undertake expedition inland, simultaneously with contemplated reinforcement of Russian troops at Kazvin. Occupation of Gulf ports would have little useful effect, and indeed would probably only result in adding fuel to the hostility which the Germans have roused against us.

(Sent to India, Basra, and Petrograd.)

[157999] No. 135.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 409.)
(Telegraphic.) *Teheran, October* 25, 1915.

MY telegram No. 397 of 18th October.

Prime Minister called on Russian Minister yesterday and said that 30,000*l.* a month even, with two instalments paid down, was not sufficient, and that Government required 1,800,000 tomans in virtue of retroactive effect of moratorium.

His Highness also admitted that some Turkish officers (my telegram No. 402 of 21st October) might be taken into Persian service. I have further received some evidence from Meshed suggesting that Minister for Foreign affairs, who has hitherto shown himself friendly, is also playing a German game by assisting escaped Austrian prisoners of war to reach Tehran, where there are already some eighty of them.

I have been unable to see any Persian Minister to-day. Monday is a holiday, but I hope to see the Prime Minister early to-morrow.

(Sent to India, Petrograd, and Basra.)

[158725] No. 136.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 410.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, October* 26, 1915.

MY telegram No. 409 of 25th October.

I saw Prime Minister this morning and asked him what I was to understand by request, or, rather, condition, he had put before Russian Minister on Sunday that 1,800,000 tomans should be paid down at once in respect of "arrears of moratorium." His Highness knew that such a payment was materially impossible, and it looked as if he wanted not to proceed with the arrangement, but hoped to get better terms elsewhere, and I must tell him frankly what my Russian colleague had told him already, viz., that local report said that the Government was negotiating with the German Minister.

This he vehemently denied. He declared that money would not suffice to pay

seven or eight months' arrears of payment due in Government departments, that it was absolutely necessary for Government to get it at once, and that he knew for a fact that bank could find the money. I said he was mistaken, and he then made various suggestions, essence of which was that the above-mentioned sum should be paid over within six weeks. I said that the two Governments were ready to give Persia financial assistance on the understanding that the Persian Government would take steps to stop the German campaign here, but that nothing whatever had been done to that end.

German importation of arms continued unchecked, gendarmerie was as hostile as ever, proper support was not given to those provincial Governors who tried to check German agents, condition of Shiraz was as bad as ever, Persian officers, who had been educated in Turkey, had been presented to the Shah by the Turkish military attaché and were to be appointed to the new national force, Karguzar of Meshed was smuggling escaped Austrian prisoners of war to Tehran. Facts like these seem to show a leaning towards our enemies. His Highness said Government had to proceed slowly, as public opinion was strongly against us. I remarked that in that case we might at any moment see his friendly Cabinet replaced by a hostile one, and any money we might have advanced would be used against us.

We must have some kind of a guarantee that the Persian Government would keep its part of the bargain before we paid over the big sum he required; we wished to assist a strictly neutral Persia, but not a hostile Persia.

Prime Minister's explanations of the facts I put before him were very lame and inadequate, and his general attitude unsatisfactory.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz telegraphs to-day that Kawam agent recently arrived states that Cabinet is at heart pro-German, and that they are playing a double game.

Soulet has the same conviction.

It is significant also that appeals to me for monetary assistance have become numerous.

It looks as if the Cabinet were trying to get all the money out of us they can to line their pockets and resign on the familiar grounds that they have not received the support of the two legations.

This would, of course, suit the Germans perfectly well, without any formal agreement being necessary, and would allow the Government to disclaim responsibility. I can hardly believe that this weak and timorous Prime Minister would sign any agreement, but if inducement is sufficient, and pressure from pro-Germans apparently enough to provide colourable excuse, he would lend himself to some such combination as suggested above. Formal agreement might be concluded with new Cabinet, and may be under negotiation now, but I have not yet confirmation of suggestion.

In the circumstances I have instructed the Imperial Bank of Persia not to let the Persian Government draw any money for the present.

Two squadrons of Russian troops are disembarking at Enzeli, and Russian Minister believes more are coming, but has no certain knowledge. If more are to be sent, they should arrive before Moharrem, *i.e.*, 9th November, if possible.

[157874]

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 27, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 408 of 25th October: Shiraz.

I realise the critical situation at Shiraz, to which Major O'Connor rightly calls attention.

His Majesty's Government consider, however, that the departure of His Majesty's consul would inevitably be hailed as a success of the Germans and would aggravate the position of Kawam and Soulet, in connection with whom instructions have been sent to you in my telegram No. 332 of 25th October.

In these circumstances I consider that Major O'Connor should remain at his post, if possible, till effect of endeavours to enable Kawam to afford adequate protection can be judged.

If, however, consul is of opinion that we can no longer look to Kawam and Soulet to save the situation or any new adverse development takes place, he is authorised to leave with the British colony, if safety requires it.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2504.)

[159391]

No. 138.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 336.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 27, 1915.

IT is possible that Persian Government have already signed an agreement with Germany and we may be confronted with a *coup d'Etat* or declaration of war at any moment.

We do not desire to precipitate a breach with Persia, and it should be made clear that if a rupture takes place it will be due entirely to Persian submission to German agents.

You should therefore without delay put it on record with Persian Government, in view of the last murder at Shiraz, that unless Persian Government give redress for the murders and assaults that have taken place and can protect the persons of our consuls and their servants, in future we shall hold the Persian Government responsible for any rupture of friendly relations that may ensue hereafter.

You might follow this up by sending a full summary for record with the Persian Government of the recent murders and assaults that have taken place.

You can inform your Russian colleague, but as the communication will relate solely to British injuries, and does not involve any further action on your part at this moment, you need not wait for him to receive instructions.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2503.)

[160004]

No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1596.)
(Telegraphic.) D.

Petrograd, October 28, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 410 of 21st October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that he had yesterday sent for the Persian Minister and had spoken to him very seriously of the present leanings of the Persian Government towards our enemies. He had requested him to remind his Government that the Anglo-Russian agreement was conservative in character and aimed at maintenance of Persian integrity and independence, and to warn them that if they sided with our enemies that instrument would be used in an entirely contrary sense that would be fatal to Persia. He must also ask them to intern two Austrian officers who escaped from Central Asia, were appointed by the Persian Government to be gendarmerie officers, and are now at Hamadan.

[160012]

No. 140.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 419.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 29, 1915.

YESTERDAY a division of Russian cavalry, consisting of 4,000 men, disembarked at Enzeli.

This move will probably materially alter the situation in our favour.

[160012]

No. 141.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 341.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 29, 1915.

YOUR telegram No. 418 of 28th October.

I conclude you have already made communication on lines of my telegram No. 336 of 27th October about murders and assaults already committed.

You should now follow this up by informing Persian Government that you have reason to suppose that even the legations are not safe from attack organised by

Germans with Persian connivance, and that Persia has signed a convention with Germany. You should point out to Persian Government that, if Persia has entered into a hostile agreement with Germany, she will be responsible for any consequences that follow from it, and we shall be free to take what action is necessary on our own behalf to protect lives and property of British representative and subjects.

It would be a mistake in any circumstances to give Persia the ultimatum which Germany wishes to provoke from us.

If you withdrew from Tehran, it should be on grounds of personal safety, but, in view of your telegram No. 419 of 29th October, there would seem to be no necessity for this now.

You should inform your Russian colleague.

(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 2525.)

[160611] No. 142.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 1600.) *Petrograd, October 29, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.)

TEHRAN telegram No. 418 of 28th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is opposed to presentation of ultimatum or to rupture of relations. He proposes to publish warning which, as stated in my telegram No. 1596 of 29th October, he has addressed to the Persian Government through their representative here, as he considers this the best language to hold at the present moment.

[161356] No. 143.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 1607.) *Petrograd, October 30, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated this morning your telegram No. 341 of 29th October to Tehran, expressed entire concurrence in instructions sent to Mr. Marling, but said he hoped that you would supplement them by similar warning to that which he had given to Persian Government through their Minister here (see my telegram No. 1596 of 28th October).

[161289] No. 144.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 422.) *Tehran, October 30, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

THE Russian Minister casts doubt on the signature of a convention with Germany.

He now says that his information as to the disembarkation of Russian troops was inaccurate, and that he believes that only the General with his Staff have arrived. We hope that the General, who should be at Kasvin by now, will move towards Tehran immediately.

[161418] No. 145.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 426.) *Tehran, October 30, 1915.*
(Telegraphic.)

I HANDED to Minister for Foreign Affairs note couched in terms indicated in your telegram No. 336 of 27th October, and his Excellency asked what grounds there were for belief that there was any convention between Persia and Germany, and assured me that there was not a word of truth in the report. I pointed out local evidence, and added that it was clear that His Majesty's Government had

further information of a more concusive character, the nature of which I was unable to tell him. His Excellency again declared that the Cabinet was innocent of any intention of making any convention with Germans. I said that a *coup d'État* engineered by Germans might bring in a Cabinet prepared to sign a convention already negotiated secretly. His Excellency seemed so taken aback by suggestion, that I really think that his denials of an agreement are sincere, but it may merely be that the accuracy of my guess astonished him.

His Excellency said that a reply to our notes respecting moratorium would be sent to-morrow, and enquired whether Government could at once draw money. I replied that, with the very dubious attitude of the Government, I must refer to you, but I thought it unlikely that the two Governments would agree to pay money that might be used against us. It seemed to me that Germans were trying to repeat their *coup* at Constantinople, where a few months after conclusion of a loan in France they had jockeyed Turkey into war. I think it very probable that promised reply of Persian Government will include some further desiderata.

Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that Government are practically helpless, and observed that if His Majesty's Government thought that legations were in danger, we had our own means of defence, meaning, of course, troops at Kazvin.

(Sent to India and Petrograd.)

[161540] No. 146.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, October 31, 1915.*

MY Russian colleague has, on the instructions of his Government, read to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs a statement to the effect that whereas Russia by the Convention of 1907 agreed to respect the independence of Persia, her object in the future will be the latter's destruction, should any understanding be come to by the latter country with Germany.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs again denied the existence of any convention and added, that we should to-morrow receive from the Persian Government a reply with which "we shall be more than satisfied" on the subject of the moratorium.

If, as is promised, that reply is satisfactory, my Russian colleague is of opinion that the bank had better be instructed to open account. I therefore propose to instruct bank to advance money, as it would be easy during the first days of moharrem to rouse public opinion against us, were this long-expected money withheld, whereas the payment of arrears of salary to officials would tend to conciliate it. Furthermore, Government acceptance of this scheme practically amounts to a declaration of policy favourable to us.

Russian Minister thinks that, in these circumstances, it would be better to wait until a really imposing force is available, and not to summon the troops from Kasvin at present, the more so as it seems possible that Hamadan may again be unprotected.

I receive many reports, which are, however, disbelieved by Persian opinion in touch with the Germans, that an attack on the legations is intended.

[166359] No. 147.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 438.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November 7, 1915.*

PERSIAN Government has begun to draw the money.

[175473] No. 148.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 471.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, November 21, 1915.*

MY telegram No. 466 of 19th November.

Resident at Bushire yesterday telegraphed text of a message from Kawam, giving details of events at Shiraz on 10th November, when the gendarmerie arrested consul,

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

manager of Imperial Bank of Persia, superintendent of Indo-European Telegraph Department, and other British subjects, and deported them to Borasgun with their wives and families. Kawam asked gendarmerie for explanations, and was told that they were acting under orders from Tehran and that Persia was at war. As all telegraph lines were cut, Kawam was in the dark and apparently helpless. Party of gendarmes escorting five Englishmen and four Englishwomen avoided the high road so as not to risk being intercepted by Soulet.

I communicated this information to Persian Government yesterday. Though rumours had been current in Tehran for some days, they were without definite news, and my information caused them to be genuinely horrified and alarmed.

They at once drew up telegrams to Kawam, Soulet, and other important chiefs in the south, to be [? group omitted: sent] through me care of Governor at Bushire. They declared that Persia was not at war and that relations with Great Britain were most friendly.

I have addressed a very strong note to the Persian Government, and have prepared them for a further note after I receive instructions from you. I think we should at least demand dismissal of chief of gendarmerie, and of Swedish officer at Shiraz, though the latter was not in Shiraz on 10th November. We know him to have been a declared German agent.

[176159] No 149.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 130.)

Tehran, October 21, 1915.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 392 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the communications made by my Russian colleague and myself, informing the Persian Government of the decision of our Governments to agree to their request for the suspension of the services of the loans and advances secured on the receipts of the southern and northern customs. This suspension, to which the Persian Government have attached the absurd name of "moratorium," is of course in reality nothing else than a monthly subvention from the two Governments, and the operation has been so far as possible disguised as a suspension of these services so as to allow the Persian Government to agree to it without submitting it to the Medjliss. As a matter of fact, I presume that neither Government has the power to agree to the suspension of the service of any loans and advances except those made by themselves directly, and, as you will remember, the Russian Government raised this objection when the question was discussed with Ain-ed-Dowleh on his accession to office. The objection was not then raised by ourselves, because His Majesty's Government were prepared to assume themselves the service of the loans, &c., secured on the southern customs receipts to the amount, in round figures, of 10,500*l.* a month, while the Russian Government did not then care to accept similarly the much more considerable monthly charges in respect of the loans, &c., guaranteed by the northern customs.

The use of the words "moratorium" and "suspension of service" seem to have produced the impression, more especially at Petrograd, that the operation is a very complicated one, but when once it is clearly realised that it consists in nothing more than a monthly subvention, shared equally by the two Governments, the repayment of which is implicitly secured on the customs receipts, all obscurity vanishes.

The confusion caused by the miscomprehension in Petrograd of the operation has, however, unfortunately apparently been the cause of considerable delay. So long ago as the 16th September you were so good as to inform me that His Majesty's Government were ready to accede, in part at least, to the Persian demands, and to agree to a suspension of the services of the loans to the extent of 30,000*l.* per mensem, and a few days later M. de Etter informed me that his Government were in principle in favour of the scheme. On the 25th September we submitted to our respective Governments the terms of a "notice" in which we suggested that the Persian Government should be informed of the extent and manner of the financial aid which Great Britain and Russia were prepared to accord. You, Sir, were good enough to approve of the draft "notice," but M. de Etter could get no reply from Petrograd, except a hint that the delay was due to the absence of the Minister of Finance, who had to be consulted. About the end of September, however, in reply to repeated requests for authority to send in the "notice," M. de Etter was instructed not to do so without special

instructions, so that when on the 3rd October he received a telegram from Count Benckendorff stating that M. Bark desired M. de Etter to be informed of his approval of the scheme, my Russian colleague still considered himself debarred by the Petrograd instructions from taking the final step.

Further urgent messages eventually elicited on the 9th instant the long-awaited instructions, but when examined they were found to contain directions to modify the draft "notice" in a manner which would, in the opinion of us both, have rendered the acceptation of the advances by the Persian Government impossible. As I explained in my telegram No. 392 already referred to, this modification involved—

1. The omission of the penultimate paragraph, by which the Imperial Bank of Persia is entrusted with the carrying out of the arrangement and the eventual settlement of accounts in connection with it; and

2. The addition after the words "as soon as possible" in the antepenultimate paragraph, of the words "in the form of a new advance, and on the same conditions as regards the rate of interest as preceding advances."

M. de Etter, who is still residing in the country, came to see me on the following day to discuss the situation. He was clearly exasperated that, after having most carefully explained to his Government that the formula we had inserted in the "notice" would enable him, through the Imperial Bank of Persia, to insist on any reasonable condition that might be desired, he should now be invited to drag in the objectionable word "advance," the appearance of which would have made a reference of the scheme to the Medjliss inevitable; and after some little insistance on my part on the efficacy of the safeguard provided in the original draft, he finally agreed to send in the "notice," omitting from it, however, the paragraph referring to the Imperial Bank of Persia and also the sentence containing the fatal word "advance." He further agreed to my presenting the "notice" in what is practically its original form, which, indeed, was necessary from merely practical point of view. It is none the less unfortunate that the two communications are not identical, but, on the other hand, they are not contradictory, and my own can plausibly be represented to the Persian Government as supplementary to that of the Russian Minister, inasmuch as it explains the method by which the agreement will be put into force, *i.e.*, through the Imperial Bank of Persia, a British institution.

In this shape, then, the two notes were presented to the Persian Government on the 11th instant, but when I saw Motesham-es-Sultaneh on the following day, he at once raised objections to the last paragraph of the "notice," which reserves to both parties the right to terminate the arrangement at ary moment, which he said he had not expected, and which would make it very difficult for the Persian Government to accept the accommodation, as the purport of the paragraph was so palpably one-sided. I replied that both the Russian Minister and I had throughout the negotiations given the Persian Government to understand that the "moratorium" would only be continued so long only as the Persian Government made use of the benefits it conferred in a manner compatible with our interests, and his Excellency ought not to be surprised at the presence of a clause which expressed that stipulation. I did not think that our Governments would be ready to omit it. The Minister did not insist on the point very strongly on this occasion, and in fact left me under the impression that a firm show of resistance on our part would bring him to desist from it. With M. de Etter, however, he urged the point with greater force, and also sent me a message to the effect that he was endeavouring to obtain the suppression of the paragraph through the Persian Minister in London and Petrograd. In the circumstances, I thought it necessary to request your authority to agree to the Persian request, and I suggested that, if it were conceded, the words "jusqu'à un mois après la conclusion de la paix" should also be omitted. To this, Sir, you agreed (your telegram No. 320). My Russian colleague, however, twenty-four hours later was authorised to send in the "notice" in its original shape (except for the omission of the last paragraph), the Russian Government being of opinion that, as the power to stop the payments to the Persian Government through the Imperial Bank of Persia was in our minds, and that sufficient excuse for using that power was reserved to us by the concluding sentence of the note communicating the notice to the Persian Government, the point was sufficiently safeguarded. Although I felt that to make use of that power without having reserved it to ourselves more explicitly, may very possibly create a disagreable situation at some future period, it appeared to me to be most undesirable, in view of the really pressing need of money in which the Persian Government find themselves, to lose further time by referring to

you again, and I therefore agreed with M. de Etter not to make any modification in the notice.

I venture to hope that in doing so I have not exceeded the discretion with which it appeared to me from your telegram No. 276 you were so good as to entrust me in this matter.

All these various delays, however, have been most unfortunate. In the first place, the present Cabinet has been kept for weeks without the money required to enable it to take any measures to endeavour to counteract the German propaganda among the population, with the result that in places like Hamadan and Sultanabad they had had to leave the local Governors without the means of raising local levies to oppose to the hired bands of the Germans, and the situation in those two towns has become decidedly critical. Much the same has also been the case at Kermanshah, for which city the new Governor, Ikbal-ed-Dowleh, with a courage that comes as an agreeable surprise, as actually started with neither troops nor money wherewith to recall the tribes to their allegiance. To take direct measures against the Germans themselves was, I fear, beyond the resolution of the present Cabinet, but it is just possible that a month ago they might have encouraged some of the tribesmen on the western frontier to attack the large convoys of arms which the Germans, in anticipation probably of the fall of Bagdad, have been feverishly hurrying into Persia by the Kermanshah route. As it is, the opportunity has been lost, and German influence, which depends so largely on the display of force, the possession of arms, and the distribution of money, has in the last month become markedly stronger.

Then, again, the protraction of the negotiations, for which Petrograd is chiefly responsible, has, as always, resulted in the conditions of the "moratorium" becoming perfectly well known, so that everyone recognises the true nature of the arrangement, *i.e.*, that it is merely a monthly subvention to the Persian Government, or in its essence a fresh advance by instalments. The result is that the pro-German party, under orders from Prince Reuss, are preparing to insist that the whole matter has to receive the sanction of the Medjliss, and, although the Democrat party is now split, it is not impossible that some of the Moderates will insist on the spirit of the Constitution being observed in the strictest fashion, and that the Government may not be able to take advantage of the accommodation we offer them for some time yet, or may even have to decline it.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 149.

Russian Minister to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Zerghendeh, le 29 septembre (12 octobre), 1915.

M. le Ministre,

LE Gouvernement Impérial et le Gouvernement Royal britannique, prenant en considération le préjudice causé aux intérêts persans par la guerre actuelle, ont formé la décision d'accéder à la demande du Gouvernement Impérial persan ayant trait à la suspension des services des emprunts et avances garantis respectivement par les recettes des douanes du nord et du sud.

Je suis, en conséquence, autorisé de communiquer à votre Excellence la notice ci-jointe. Quant aux conditions dans lesquelles cette aide financière devra s'effectuer, j'aurai l'honneur de les porter à sa connaissance ultérieurement. L'idée du Gouvernement Impérial serait de lui donner la forme d'une nouvelle avance faite aux mêmes conditions que les avances précédentes par rapport aux taux des intérêts.

Les dépenses obligatoires du Gouvernement Impérial persan, telles qu'elles furent stipulées par des arrangements antérieurs spéciaux et dont les payements devaient être réglés sur les recettes des douanes, pourraient être remises, provisoirement—pour le cas où la Trésorerie générale serait dans l'impossibilité d'y faire face—à un terme qui serait à fixer et sous l'engagement formel du Gouvernement persan de les rembourser.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Excellence, je me fais un devoir d'ajouter que le Gouvernement Impérial russe s'attend comme de raison à ce que le Gouvernement Impérial persan procède sans retard à mettre fin à la propagande hostile, dirigée contre la Russie, ainsi qu'aux actes de violence des agents ennemis tant à l'endroit des personnages officiels qu'aux autres ressortissants russes.

Veuillez, &c.
M. DE ETTER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 149.

Note

EN se référant à l'entretien qui a eu lieu le 1er septembre, année courante, entre son Altesse le Ministre Président, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et les Ministres de Russie et d'Angleterre, au sujet de la suspension des services des emprunts et des avances russes et anglais, à partir du 8 mars dernier jusqu'à un mois après la conclusion de la paix, la Légation de Russie a l'honneur de faire savoir au Gouvernement Impérial persan que sa demande pour la suspension de ces services a été accueillie avec bienveillance par le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, qui consent à ce que dorénavant le montant des recettes des douanes, affectées aux services respectifs, soit réservé au Gouvernement Impérial persan, à la condition, toutefois, que la totalité mensuelle qui lui reviendrait ne dépasse pas 30,000*l.*

Quant aux sommes résultant de l'effet rétroactif du présent arrangement, il est entendu que, vu les obstacles d'ordre financier qui en empêchent le versement immédiat, elles seront mises à la disposition du Gouvernement Impérial persan quand faire se pourra et dans les conditions qui lui seront communiquées ultérieurement.

Zerghandeh, le 29 septembre (12 octobre), 1915.

Enclosure 3 in No. 149.

Mr. Marling to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 18, 1915.

RECOGNISING the embarrassment which has been inflicted on the Imperial Persian Treasury by various causes arising directly or indirectly out of the present war, His Britannic Majesty's Government, in concert with the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, has decided to accede to the wish of the Persian Government for the suspension of the services of the various loans and advances made by them or through their good offices, and secured on the receipts of the southern and northern customs respectively.

In pursuance of this decision, I have been authorised by His Majesty's Government to communicate to your Excellency the enclosed "notice," specifying in outline the conditions in which this suspension of those services will take effect, and I have also to inform your Excellency that a credit, under the name of the moratorium account for the sum of 30,000*l.*, has been opened in favour of the Imperial Government of Persia with the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Your Excellency will, of course, understand that, in view of this accommodation, His Majesty's Government is justly entitled to expect that the Imperial Persian Government will at once use its best endeavours to put an end to the intrigues and agitation directed by German and other enemy agents against British interests which have manifested themselves in four murderous attacks on British consular officials.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 4 in No. 149.

Note.

EN se référant à l'entretien qui a eu lieu le 1er septembre entre son Altesse le Président du Conseil des Ministres, son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et les Ministres d'Angleterre et de Russie, au sujet de la suspension des services des emprunts et des avances anglais et russes, la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique a l'honneur de faire savoir au Gouvernement Impérial persan que sa demande pour la suspension de ces services à partir du 8 mars jusqu'à un mois après la conclusion de la paix a été accueillie avec bienveillance par le Gouvernement britannique, qui consent à ce que, pendant le délai susindiqué, les recettes des douanes affectées aux services respectifs soient remboursées au Gouvernement persan, à condition, toutefois, que la somme totale mensuelle qui lui reviendrait ne dépasse pas 30,000*l.*

Quant aux sommes résultant de l'effet rétroactif du présent arrangement, il est

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

entendu que, vu les obstacles d'ordre financier qui en empêchent le versement immédiat, elles seront mises à la disposition du Gouvernement persan quand faire se pourra.

La Banque Impériale de Perse est autorisée par les deux Gouvernements à s'entendre avec le Gouvernement persan pour la mise en exécution du présent accord, ainsi que pour la liquidation éventuelle des services suspendus.

[179374] No. 150.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 486.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November* 26, 1915.

SITUATION is developing somewhat unfavourably.

According to official accounts there are now some 3,000 gendarmes and a somewhat larger number of mujaheds in German pay at Hamadan, and more are expected. Russian troops are moving inthat direction from Kazvin, but we do not know in what force.

Turkish Ambassador and Austrian Minister are returning to Tehran, and it is asserted that a considerable number of mujaheds will accompany them. Some forty Austrian prisoners of war are already [group undecypherable]. It is possible that, with help of gendarmerie, who are no more amenable to the Government here than in Hamadan, an attempt on Farman Farma may be made.

His Highness has been much impressed with a threat sent by Major Demare that, if he does not join Nationalist party or leave the country, all his properties in West Persia will be destroyed. He has enquired of Russian Minister and me whether our Governments would indemnify him if threat is carried out, which is quite probable.

A signal Russian success at Hamadan would restore some measure of confidence to Cabinet, but at present they are so much impressed by threats of Germans and gendarmes that they scarcely dare talk even of an alliance, and we can get nothing definite from them as to completed demands.

Klein, who is supposed to be bringing money, is still at Kermanshah.

(Addressed to Petrograd.)

[179374] No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 2839.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1915.

TEHRAN telegram No. 486 of 26th November.

It seems clear that we can only save the situation by meeting force with force, and for this purpose a defeat by Russian troops of the revolted gendarmerie, either at Hamadan or wherever they are accessible, would be most effective. It is particularly important to make Farman Farma secure, and sole means of doing so is by having Russian troops within reach of Tehran. To occupy Tehran unless essential for protection of legations might precipitate departure of Shah, who is already at Ferabad, outside Tehran, and of some, if not all, of Persian Government, but troops should be near enough to prevent gendarmerie and Germans occupying and becoming masters of Tehran. I trust, therefore, that Grand Duke may be able to order Russian troops accordingly.

I understand that Farman Farma's properties are extensive, and that guarantee asked for would consequently involve a considerable sum. We should eventually have to recover it from Persia, but I am asking Mr. Marling for further details.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 418.)

[179374] No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 419.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1915.

MY telegram No. 2839 of 28th November to Petrograd: Farman Farma's properties.

Please send estimate of amount involved.

044] No. 153.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 132.)
Sir,

Tehran, November 4, 1915.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 130 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to enclose copy of the Persian Government's reply to my note announcing the consent of His Majesty's Government to the so-called moratorium.

I would draw attention to the fact that the last paragraph of the "notice," as originally proposed in my telegram No. 364 of the 25th ultimo, was omitted in sending in to the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 153.

Note communicated to Mr. Marling by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated October 31, 1915.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 18th instant, enclosing a memorandum containing the conditions on which a delay in the payment of the debts of the Persian Government would be allowed and accepting the moratorium.

My Government hereby express their utmost thanks for the assistance received from your Government through your efforts to bring about a satisfactory arrangement in this matter, which has been under discussion for some time past, and I especially request your Excellency to convey the thanks of my Government to that of His Britannic Majesty.

In view of the contents of the memorandum above mentioned, the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia has been approached, and has expressed his readiness to facilitate the repayment of the past instalments, but he only awaits your written authority to open at once a credit to meet the bills drawn by the Persian Government. I therefore hope that your Excellency will at once send him the necessary authority in writing, and urge him to show his goodwill in the matter. Considering the assistance already rendered by His Britannic Majesty's Government, the measures taken by your Excellency, and the assurances given for the fulfilment of your promises in connection with the legal question of the moratorium from January last, perhaps there may be no need for referring to the question again.

I avail, &c.
HASSAN, MOHTASHEM-US-SULTANEH.

[188045] No. 154.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 133.)
Sir,

Tehran, November 4, 1915.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the Persian Government, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 341 of the 29th ultimo, as to the responsibility which Persia would incur should she enter into any arrangement with Germany inimical to Great Britain.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 154.

Note communicated to Persian Government.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 30, 1915.

IN my note of yesterday's date I drew your Excellency's attention to the dangerous position in which His Majesty's consular officers in various towns in Persia

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

have been placed by the neglect of the Imperial Persian Government to afford them protection to which they are entitled as the representatives of a friendly Power.

The presence in the capital of a considerable number of Germans, Austrians, and Turks, many of whom are soldiers, the introduction by the enemy legations of large quantities of arms and ammunition, the enlistment by those legations of numerous retainers, and other proceedings with which the Persian Government are perfectly well acquainted, and which I need not therefore recount, has produced in the mind of my Government the apprehension that even His Majesty's Legation and those of the Allies are not safe from the possibility of attacks organised by Germans, with the Persian connivance, and I have, moreover, some reason to believe that some convention has been signed between Persia and Germany. In these circumstances I am to point out to the Imperial Persian Government that if it is a fact that Persia has entered into some agreement with Germany, the stipulations of which are inimical to Great Britain and her Allies, the responsibility for any consequences that may ensue from it will fall on Persia, while His Majesty's Government will be free to take whatever action may be necessary to protect the lives and property of British representatives and subjects in Persia.

[189683]

No. 155.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 1856.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Petrograd, December 11, 1915.

WITH reference to telegram No. 519 of the 9th December from Mr. Marling, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conversation this morning, said that in his opinion we should rest content with securing the neutrality of Persia, contending that for alliance we should have to pay a price quite out of proportion to whatever advantages might be derived from it.

[189731]

No. 156.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 524.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 12, 1915.

MY telegram No. 521 of 10th December.

We met Prime Minister and President of Council yesterday afternoon. They said that it was impossible to conclude an alliance in face of public opinion at present, and after four hours' conversation President said that he would submit to his colleagues the following:—

"Persia is to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality, and in order to have a force capable of putting down German agitation the Cossack brigade is to be increased to 10,000 men with Russian officers. The two Powers to give or to assist Persia to obtain arms, &c., to agree to a small increase of import duties on sugar and cotton goods to provide for expenses, and to some of the six points mentioned in my telegram No. 442."

All I can say of this proposal is that it may keep the Government from resigning for a time; Government here confesses itself powerless, and the situation is for the present in the hands of General Baratof.

(Sent to India, Petrograd, and Basra.)